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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores legal boundaries restricting economic coercion, by persons in groups and 
by groups acting in concert. When groups take collective action targeted at another party 
there is potential for considerable damage to be inflicted. What forms of coercion should the 
law allow, what justifications are advanced for conduct and by what means should the ambit 
of prohibitions be confined?  The issues are studied within the context of the private political 
contest between activist groups such as environmental NGOs, and for-profit corporations. 
The boundaries of permissible conduct have historically been defined by the rules of common 
law economic torts - causing loss by unlawful means, conspiracy, intimidation and inducing 
breach of contract – and in more recent times by statutory interventions by Parliaments, 
including limitations on boycott conduct under competition laws. Through doctrinal research 
and analysis of judicial opinions, the current settings of the laws in these areas, as they apply 
in Australia, are examined. The study takes account of normative and policy considerations, 
including the advances that have occurred in the practice and effectiveness of modern-day 
activism. It addresses the challenge of setting defensible legal compromises in situations 
where there are conflicts between competing rights and priorities. The study outlines 
modifications and adaptations of existing rules that may be considered by lawmakers in order 
to improve the coherence of long-established legal doctrines, while enhancing societal 
welfare. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS THESIS 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the legal rules which inhibit economic coercion by persons in 
groups and by groups acting in concert, principally the economic torts. It deals with 
important remedies available to parties who are targeted by collective economic coercion 
which causes them loss or damage. 
 
Economic coercion is perceived to have pernicious economic effects.
1
 Arguments for 
prohibitions on collective economic coercion arise from both economic and rights theories. 
The case for legal interventions to halt coercion and resulting economic dislocations derives 
from a utilitarian perspective, which seeks contractual freedom whenever loss of utility to 
third parties exceeds gains to parties to a transaction, but justifies antitrust laws in a carved 
out set of cases in which systematic losses to society at large
2
 give cause for some restraint on 
freedom of contract.
3
 The libertarian rationale assumes that the state has a legitimate role to 
play in preserving property rights, upholds the private autonomy of individuals and hesitates 
to give effect to “(physical) duress, deceit or misrepresentation.”4 
 
The thesis is concerned with the following central Research Question: when groups, or 
individual members of groups, acting in concert, band together to inflict injury upon third 
parties by economic coercion, what are – and what should be – the boundaries of permissible 
conduct? 
 
There is a particular focus on the family of intentional economic torts that restrict interference 
with a plaintiff’s economic interests – the torts of inducing breach of contract, conspiracy (in 
both its lawful means and unlawful means forms), intimidation and causing loss by unlawful 
means. These torts are in focus in Chapters Two to Eight. The thesis also (in Chapter Nine) 
addresses legislative interventions developed as extensions of the applicable common law 
principles, in the form of competition laws which seek to regulate secondary boycott conduct. 
 
The economic torts are a distinctive set of causes of action, developed by the common law, 
which are designed to protect individual and corporate rights. They exist to “protect both 
businesses and individuals against abuses of economic power (with combination being 
regarded as at least potentially involving an abuse) and the use of illicit means” and “to 
protect market actors from certain forms of interference which the law regards as 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Friedman M, ‘Consumer boycotts: a conceptual framework and research agenda’ (1999) 47 
Journal of Social Issues 149-68 and Baron DP, ‘Private Politics and Private Policy: A Theory of Boycotts’ 
(2002) Working Paper No 1766, Stanford Graduate School of Business. 
2
 Measured by failure to produce goods to the point where social marginal revenue equals social marginal cost. 
3
 Epstein R, ‘A Common Law for Labor Relations: a Critique of New Deal Labor Legislation’ (1983) 92 Yale 
LJ 1357 at 1381. 
4
 Deakin S and Randall J, ‘Re-thinking the Economic Torts’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 519 at 529-30. 
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illegitimate.”5 Not all intentionally caused economic loss is actionable but “several kinds” 
are.
6
 
 
As Elias and Ewing have highlighted, the significant case law on the permissible boundaries 
of collective conduct has been concerned with fundamental legal questions: “is it unlawful 
deliberately to harm the interests of another without justification? To put it another way, is 
there liability for abuse of economic power even where no independently unlawful act is 
committed?”7 To these may be added: to what extent, and under what conditions, should it be 
legitimate for parties acting in concert to cause economic harm to a ‘target’?  
 
Some examples drawn from the case law, and spanning the past eighty years, illustrate the 
wide range of scenarios in which the torts can arise and the need to set boundaries around 
permissible conduct and to determine the principles which should shape those boundaries. A 
decision reported in 1936, De Jetley Marks v Greenwood, involved an alleged unlawful 
means conspiracy to cause a breach of contract, where company directors were said to have 
conspired together “to secure the dismissal by the company of one of their number.”8 In 
Crofter Hand Woven Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch, a case decided in 1942, an embargo was 
organised by officials of a trade union against producers of Harris tweed whose spinning 
mills were located on an island, with dockers instructed not to handle yarn from the mainland 
consigned to the island.
9
 Resolute Forest Products v 2471256 Canada Inc dealt with actions 
taken by environmental activists to target the plaintiff company’s stakeholders, to damage its 
reputation and dissuade customers from dealing with the company.
10
 The 2015 case of Boral 
Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU concerned actions taken by an Australian trade union to 
impose bans upon the products of a building materials supplier at construction sites.
11
   
 
To address the central research question the thesis must examine four main subsidiary 
questions. First, when groups take collective action targeting another party, what forms of 
coercion are proscribed under Australian law? Secondly, how has the law fashioned control 
mechanisms to confine the ambit of prohibitions? Thirdly, how does – and should – the law 
deal with the use of unlawful means and illegality in the context of collective economic 
coercion? Fourthly, should justification defences be widened, and how might this be 
achieved? 
 
Context has affected the development of the economic torts to a significant degree. Their 
evolution has been spurred along by the advent of a series of social movements, most 
                                                          
5
 Ibid at 535. Rationales for prohibitions are addressed in great depth in Chapter Five, Part II of this thesis. 
6
 Heydon JD, Economic Torts, 2
nd
 Edition (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1978) at 1. 
7
 Elias P and Ewing K, ‘Economic Torts and Labour Law: Old Principles and New Liabilities’ [1982] 41 
Cambridge Law Journal 321 at 322. 
8
 [1936] 1 All ER [KBD] 863 at 863.  
9
 Crofter Hand Woven Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435. 
10
 Resolute Resources Resolute Forest Products v 2471256 Canada Inc 2014 ONSC 3996. 
11
 Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2014] VSC 429. 
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importantly, the growth of trade unionism.
12
 Increasingly, the economic torts are being 
applied in the context of corporate interaction.  
 
A particular modern-day context has been selected for this study to provide a setting to test 
the propositions examined in this thesis: economic coercion in the course of campaigns 
mounted by environmental activist groups. Environmental activism has been under-explored 
as a context for the application of the torts but this is likely to be a domain in which 
established legal principles pertaining to collective conduct will be re-shaped over the next 
decade or so. Environmental campaigns are certain to present new cases in which the 
application of ‘control mechanisms’ can be tested. 
 
Maxwell characterised the ways in which environmental groups seek changes in corporate 
and government behaviour as a form of “private politics.”13 He noted that “direct engagement 
between NGOs and industry” can take the form of actions which impose considerable costs 
on ‘targets’, including negative information campaigns and boycotts.14 It is increasingly 
common for activist campaigns to be confrontational in nature, involving threats and actions 
calculated to cause damage to those targeted.
15
 These kinds of group conduct are placed in 
focus in Chapters Eight and Nine of this thesis. The contests in which activist NGOs are 
engaged can be confidently predicted to be a domain in which established legal principles 
pertaining to collective conduct will be tested and re-shaped over the decades ahead. 
 
Through doctrinal research and analysis of judicial opinions, the current settings of the law in 
Australia are examined. In this thesis, there is a particular focus on the topics of unlawful 
means and justification defences. The thesis outlines modifications and adaptations of 
existing rules that may be considered in order to improve the coherence of some long-
established legal doctrines, with a view to public interest considerations. Carefully arranged 
and balanced, legal settings have the potential to encourage and reinforce desirable social 
effects and practices, limit negative social effects and enhance the ‘public good’. 
Interdisciplinary research, including the views of policy economists on the effects of 
campaigning environmental groups, is also taken into account. 
 
This introductory chapter briefly explores a range of aspects of the legal problems associated 
with collective action causing economic injury. There are unresolved ambiguities under 
Australian law; fine judgements must be made as to which levers to use as control 
mechanisms to contain liability; clarity needs to be established around the consequences of 
illegal conduct, and the meaning of ‘unlawful means’; there are differences of view as to 
whether the mere fact of a combination of persons should be a basis for liability; such 
conduct gives rise to contests of rights and duties; and justification defences have not been 
clearly delineated. There is also discussion of the potential for the invocation of fundamental 
rights arguments and legislative encroachment to disrupt established rules and principles. 
 
                                                          
12
 The contributions of various social movements are described in Chapters Three, Eight and Nine of this thesis. 
13
 Maxwell sees “private politics” as a counterpoint to the traditional activist arena of “public politics”: Maxwell 
JW, ‘An Economic Perspective on NGO Strategies and Objectives’ in Good Cop/Bad Cop: Environmental 
NGOs and their Strategies toward Business (RFF Press, Washington, 2010) 136 at 137. 
14
 Maxwell, n 13 at 137-38. 
15
 Friedman, n 1, 149-68. 
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The chapter will then begin to discuss how further iteration of the common law, in particular 
the strengthening of justification defences and attention to public benefit and public interest 
considerations, can potentially offer solutions to perceived deficiencies in the existing 
common law position. It will then expand upon the methodologies employed in the research, 
and provide an overview of how this thesis is organised. 
 
  
Chapter One: The Subject and Objectives of this Thesis 
 
6 
 
II.               THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Collective action has been defined as action taken together by a group of people whose goal 
is to enhance their status and achieve a common objective.
16
 The potential benefits of 
collective action are widely acknowledged.
17
 It allows minorities to make their voices heard, 
and can serve as a counterbalance to established power structures. But when groups take 
collective action, they have the capacity to cause significant economic injury to those they 
target.  
 
In Quinn v Leathem, Lord Brampton railed against “the perpetuation of organized and 
ruinous oppression” and said: 
 
It is at all times a painful thing for any individual to be the object of the hatred, spite and ill-will of 
anyone who seeks to do him harm. But that is as nothing compared to the danger and alarm 
created by a conspiracy formed by a number of unscrupulous enemies acting under an illegal 
compact, together and separately, as often as opportunity occurs regardless of law, and actuated by 
malevolence, to injure him and all who stand by him.
 18 
 
Courts have been motivated to intervene by a “belief that the coercive pressure of a group far 
outweighed that of an individual acting alone.”19 However, as Lee noted, nowadays “the idea 
that a peculiar power or force of coercion resides in numbers is widely regarded as 
sophistry.”20  
 
Fleming saw the nature of the defendant’s conduct as a key variable in tort problems: 
 
Deliberate injury to others is almost invariably devoid of social utility and, excepting situations 
where on supervening grounds of policy a special privilege is recognised [as in cases of self-
defence or necessity] a defendant who intentionally invades another’s interests of personality or 
reputation, or meddles with another’s things and, in many situations with the pecuniary interests of 
another, is held responsible for the harm he thereby causes.
21
   
 
An appropriate set of rules are needed to articulate principles that set boundaries for 
permissible conduct. The common law’s response to this problem has been the progressive 
iteration of the intentional economic torts. The torts normally come into focus in connection 
with interference with economic interests by groups acting collectively.
22
 There is a 
                                                          
16
 Dowding K, ‘Collective Action Problem’ in Encyclopaedia Brittanica (2013), see 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/collective-action-problem-1917157 (accessed 1 September 2017). 
17
 Searle J, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’ in Cohen P, Morgan J and Pollack M (eds), Intentions in 
Communication (Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990) and Hardin R, Collective Action (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1982). 
18
 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 at 531, per Lord Brampton. Critics may see Lord Brampton’s concern as 
old-fashioned and a view of its time, but it is argued in this thesis that the concern is an enduring one. 
19
 Elias and Ewing, n 7 at 324, referring to Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495, per Lord Lindley at 537-38. 
20
 Lee PW, ‘Causing Loss by Unlawful Means’ [2011] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 330 at 348. 
21
 Fleming J, Law of Torts (5
th
 edition, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1977) at p 5. 
22
 It should be noted, however, that acts transgressing the general economic torts (other than conspiracy) are 
capable of being performed by a single party acting alone. 
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legitimate playing field of permissible collective conduct, but this intersects with the domain 
of the economic torts at the margins. The question of where the boundaries of this arena 
should be set is contestable, and viewpoints differ.
23
 
 
However, there are continuing uncertainties about the manner in which key principles 
enshrined in these torts will be applied in Australia, and a need to clarify a number of 
contentious issues which are central to the architecture of the economic torts. 
 
A The Contest of Rights 
 
The application of economic coercion by groups can lead courts, and lawmakers involved in 
setting policy limits, to deliberate on conflicts of putative rights – between the interests 
asserted by those taking collective action and the private or civil rights of individuals and 
corporations. The areas of law which regulate collective economic coercion seek to resolve a 
conflict between rights of reputation and personal freedom (to be free from attacks on assets, 
property and businesses and to have redress for infringement of those rights) and rights of the 
public (such as for freedom of communication and association).
24
  It is the role of legal 
systems to determine demarcations when interests conflict. 
 
As Deakin and Randall observed, “all the great cases in the area of the economic torts…have 
been based on the principle that the right to pursue a trade, business or livelihood free of 
certain forms of interference, deemed to be illegitimate, deserves the protection of the law.”25 
 
The law of torts has traditionally protected economic, trading and property interests against 
intentional intrusion, reflecting an idea deeply entrenched in judicial thought that “the law 
should not legitimize the infliction on another of gratuitous harm.”26 As Collins noted, two 
parties involved in a private law dispute will enjoy rights, but they will also be duty-bearers 
and “unlike the orientation in public law that typically treats fundamental rights as trumping 
arguments in order to control abuse of state power, the role of rights in private law is much 
more likely to be one of questioning the existing delicate balance struck by private law 
between rights, interests and public policy.”27 
 
According to Wright, the purpose of the law of torts is to adjust losses and “afford 
compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another.”28 
                                                          
23
 See Searle J, n 17. Alternatively, see Olson M, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1965) for a controversial theory of political science and economics which argued concentrated 
minor interests will be overrepresented and diffuse minority interests will be trumped due to a free-rider 
problem that is stronger when a group becomes larger. 
24
 See, for example, Tajjour v New South Wales; Hawthorne v New South Wales; Foster v New South Wales 
[2014] HCA 35 (8 October 2014). 
25
 Deakin and Randall, n 4 at 534. 
26
 Weinrib EJ, ‘Two Conceptions of Remedies’ in Rickett CEF (ed), Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 3 at 44. 
27
 Collins H, ‘The Challenges Presented by Fundamental Rights to Private Law’ in Barker K, Fairweather K and 
Grantham R, Private Law in the 21
st
 Century (Hart, Oxford, 2017) p 213 at p 221. 
28
 Wright C, ‘Introduction to the Law of Torts’ (1942) 8 Cam. L.J. 238. 
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In J. Bollinger v Costa Brava Co, Danckwerts J said “… the law may be thought to have 
failed, if it can offer no remedy to the deliberate act of one person which causes damage to 
the property of another.”29 
 
The right to use property is not protected from all interferences, “but rather only those which 
are unreasonable”30 and there are differing views as to the reasonableness or otherwise of 
various interferences. Canada’s Supreme Court has noted that “tort law has traditionally 
accorded less protection to purely economic interests than to physical integrity and property 
rights.”31 
 
In inquiring into the nature of rights protected by torts such as inducing breach of contract, it 
is important to keep in mind a principle articulated by Deakin and Randall – that while some 
forms of interference with others may be legitimate, others are “illegitimate.”32 This thesis 
addresses the need for the law to set well-reasoned legal compromises in situations where 
there are conflicts between competing rights and priorities. Of course, the evaluation of 
whether a given compromise is well-reasoned can be subjective, especially in a field which is 
politically contentious.  
 
B Uncertainties under Australian Law 
 
The thesis addresses the problem that the Australian common law regarding the economic 
torts is at a surprisingly early stage of development. The precise status of some key causes of 
action is still to be settled by the High Court, anomalies exist and a number of contentious 
issues central to the application of the torts remain unresolved.
33
 For example, in Sanders v 
Snell, the High Court left open the question of whether or not the tort of causing loss by 
unlawful means is part of the law of Australia, describing it as “embryonic or emerging.”34   
 
In particular, there is a need to clarify for Australia the “competing agendas”35 revealed by 
the analyses undertaken by the House of Lords in OBG v Allan
36
 and Revenue and Customs 
Commissioner v Total Network,
37
 two somewhat contradictory cases reported within a single 
                                                          
29
 J. Bollinger v Costa Brava Co [1960] Ch 262 at 283, per Danckwerts J. This thinking is reflected in the tort of 
interference with contractual relations. 
30
 Neyers J, ‘Causing Loss by Unlawful Means: Should the High Court of Australia follow OBG Ltd v Allan?’ in 
Degeling S, Edelman J and Goudkamp J (eds), Torts in Commercial Law, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011, p 
117 at p 134. 
31
 Per Cromwell J in AI Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd [2014] SCC 12; [2014] 1 R.C.S. 177 at 195. 
32
 Deakin and Randall, n 4 at 529, referencing Neyers J, ‘Rights-Based Justifications for the Tort of Unlawful 
Interference with Economic Relations’ (2008) 28 LS 215 at 222. 
33
 See the summary of anomalies at the conclusion of Chapter Two of this thesis. 
34
 Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 at 341. 
35
 This phrase is that of Carty: Carty H, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2
nd
 Edition, 2010) at p 168. 
36
 [2008] 1 AC 1. 
37
 [2008] 1 AC 1174. 
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volume of the Appeals Cases in 2008. Those competing agendas relate, in particular, to the 
meaning of the notion of ‘unlawful means’. Neyers has identified critical choices the High 
Court of Australia will face in due course when it considers the key innominate tort of 
causing loss by unlawful means, in the wake of these decisions.
38
 The position has been 
further complicated by the decision in A.I. Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd in which 
the Supreme Court of Canada sought to fashion, for Canada, a ‘best rationale’ for the 
unlawful means tort. There is potential for this case to be highly persuasive as a precedent for 
Australian courts.
39
 
 
In Australia, the status of the unlawful means tort has been clouded by a succession of 
decisions in which lower courts have elected to neither confirm nor deny its existence. The 
view of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Gold 
Coast
40
 was that it was not for first instance or even intermediate courts “to hold that such a 
tort does exist in Australian law.”41 In Canberra Data Centres Pty Ltd v Vibe Constructions 
(ACT) Pty Ltd,
42
 it was said that the question of what the law is on this subject must await the 
authoritative determination of the High Court.  
 
The economic torts have also been adapted in distinctive ways by Australian courts. For 
example, Edmundson traced the way in which tortious conspiracy has developed to operate 
quite distinctly from the position in England.
43
 
 
There has been widespread lack of understanding of the economic torts within the Australian 
legal profession and a seeming reluctance to plead them, given their intricacies and 
complexities and the evidentiary challenges that can arise when they are litigated. They have 
been under-studied by Australian legal academics: few university tort law courses have them 
as a focus in their curricula and many Australian torts textbooks leave the topic out 
altogether. 
 
C Control Mechanisms for the Economic Torts 
 
Concern about the need for control mechanisms to inhibit the scope of the general economic 
torts and prevent them from being unmanageably broad has played a key role in shaping their 
development. In recent judicial and academic analysis of the intentional economic torts in 
England and Canada, the width of the definitions applied to the notion of unlawful means has 
                                                          
38
 Neyers, n 30.  
39
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41
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been seen as one of two alternative control mechanisms that may be levered to inhibit the 
overall scope of the innominate unlawful means tort (with the other being intentionality).
44
 
The first approach deploys a narrow definition of unlawful means as the control mechanism. 
A second approach places emphasis on the requirement of intentionality or ‘targeting’ 
accompanied by malice as a threshold for activation of the torts, and connects this with the 
availability of justification defences. The merits and disadvantages of these alternative 
approaches have been most clearly described by Carty and Deakin, whose viewpoints are 
detailed in Chapter Four of this thesis, in Parts V and VIII respectively. 
 
In OBG v Allan, referring to the differences between viewpoints on the economic torts held 
by judges in that case, Lord Walker said “the most important difference is in the 
identification of the control mechanism needed in order to stop the notion of unlawful means 
getting out of hand.”45 Baroness Hale said it was “consistent with legal policy to limit rather 
than to encourage the expansion of liability in this area.”46 
 
The concern to impose limitations on the unlawful means conspiracy tort was noted by 
Heffey in 1975: 
 
[U]nless limitations…are introduced conspiracy by unlawful means would become too potent a 
weapon in the hands of plaintiffs who are merely incidental victims of combined action involving 
merely incidental or trivial illegalities.
47
 
 
A desire to place boundaries around the scope of the tort had been expressed by the High 
Court of Australia in Sanders v Snell, concerning the tort of causing loss by unlawful means. 
There, the Court noted “difficulties that arise if wrongful acts are not confined” in some way 
and that it might be necessary for certain categories of unlawful act to be “excluded from the 
understanding of what is an unlawful act for the purposes of this tort.”48 
 
Carty referred to “the fear of disproportionate and limitless liability”49 and analysed the 
concern of courts and some commentators to apply control mechanisms to inhibit the 
potentially broad ambit of the torts: 
 
…there are variations in approach as to the best control mechanisms for limiting liability…[and] 
there is a debate whether intention or unlawful means should be the focus for limiting these torts, 
or indeed whether both need to be restrictively defined to avoid an over-broad liability…Finally, 
there are some commentators who believe that these torts do not need to be limited by the interests 
they protect.
50
 
                                                          
44
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Proposals for the imposition of control mechanisms as a matter of policy give rise to the need 
to consider whether the economic torts are best conceived of in terms of distributive justice 
theory or corrective justice theory, or some other basis. This question is addressed in Chapter 
Five of this thesis. 
As indicated above, it can be anticipated that an opportunity may arise in the near future for 
the High Court to conduct a first principles review and to determine the control mechanisms 
it considers should be established to set the boundaries of liability for Australia. 
 
D Illegality and Unlawful Means 
 
The common law has developed differing conceptions of the meaning, and the consequences, 
of the use of unlawful means for different economic torts. As noted by Creighton, legality or 
its absence can have a quite dynamic effect on liabilities under the torts: 
 
...‘unlawful means’ is of the essence of the common law torts of ‘unlawful means’ conspiracy, 
intimidation and the ‘indirect’ form of interference with contractual relations…and in the case of 
‘direct’ interference with contractual relations, will vitiate the defence of justification.
51
 
 
There has been a significant judicial debate about precisely what the implications of illegal 
conduct should be. A series of deliberations arise: how should unlawfulness operate as a 
constituent element of various torts? Which categories of wrongful act should attract the 
application of the torts? Where illegal conduct occurs, what should be the liability 
implications? These questions are considered in Chapters Three and Seven of this thesis.  
 
For the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means the case law has developed two 
alternative conceptions of unlawful means. There is a ‘narrower view’ under which “criminal 
offences and breaches of statute would not be per se actionable.”52 There is also an 
alternative view that ‘widens the net’ of the conduct qualifying as prima facie tortious, based 
around “an objective element of unlawfulness as the boundary of liability”53 which 
“embraces all acts a defendant is not permitted to do, whether by the civil law or the criminal 
law.”54 The case law articulating these two viewpoints is explored in Chapter Three. 
 
There is a need to clarify the position in Australia on the scope of this tort and in particular 
which categories of conduct should be regarded as constituting unlawful means. The High 
Court of Australia recently signalled its interest in having an opportunity to consider the 
issue. In Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Boral Resources,
55
 in concurring 
with the refusal of leave to appeal on the question of whether the tort of intimidation forms 
part of the common law of Australia (regarding that matter as settled) Nettle J said “if the 
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question was whether there was an unlawful means tort part of the Australian common law 
that would be all very interesting.”56 
 
Another key question that arises is whether the conduct of a defendant who has engaged in 
illegal activity, or utilised unlawful means, can ever give rise to a justification defence. The 
employment of unlawful means has conventionally been considered fatal to the pleading of a 
justification defence.
57
 
 
It is also necessary to ask, as a matter of policy: does exclusion of criminal offences and 
breaches of statute from the ambit of the tort undermine the aspiration, which is inherent in 
the torts, to inhibit clearly excessive and unacceptable intentional conduct? 
 
E Combination and Relative Power 
 
A spur to the development of the economic torts in the late nineteenth century – seen in the 
landmark House of Lords cases of Allen v Flood 
58
 and Quinn v Leathem
59
 – was their 
application in the context of trade unionism. The consequences of collective economic 
coercion that causes harm to another party, and the conditions under which that is acceptable 
or should be prohibited, have long been preoccupations of labour law. Indeed, most of the 
relevant case law emanates from labour law. Carty noted that the torts were shaped by 
“judicial hostility to the growth of the trade unions” and later “in the twentieth century by 
concern over the power wielded by trade unions.”60 
 
Elias and Ewing saw potential for large ‘individual’ corporate entities to act in oppressive 
ways and it followed that their view was, especially when seen through the lens of labour 
relations, that the law should be designed to protect the interests of the figurative ‘little 
guy’.61 However, in examining instances of economic coercion that can arise in twenty-first 
century contexts, past assumptions about the relative strength of opposed parties may need to 
be revisited. Questions can arise as to the appropriateness of certain legal rules when there is 
disequilibrium in power and influence between those applying economic coercion and the 
party targeted. Therefore, rather than basing exemptions for conduct on broad categorisations 
of the nature of a defendant interest group (e.g. that they are a trade union, or an 
environmental NGO), or on analysis of their purpose,
62
 it may be that in the course of setting 
boundaries for permissible conduct, the focus should be placed on the nature of the conduct 
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itself. Account might then be taken of factors such as the relative power (including political 
influence) of groups applying coercion and those targeted.
63
 
 
F Limited Recourse to Justification Defences 
 
The notion of justification has been central to the economic torts from their inception but 
limited attention has been paid to delineating the justification defences. In part, this is 
attributable to the tendency courts have displayed to deploy definitions of unlawful means 
and/or intention, malice or purpose
64
 in preference to justification as the control mechanisms 
for the economic torts.
65
 Another potential explanation may be that, when statutes were 
introduced to confer almost total immunity from economic tort liability on collectives 
involved in industrial action, this “in effect fulfilled the function of the defence of 
justification in the labour context…and made unnecessary further judicial consideration or 
development of the common law doctrine.”66 Whatever the reason, the state of development 
of the justification defences remains surprisingly immature. 
 
Chapter Seven of this thesis addresses this gap by reviewing relevant case law precedents, 
examining the role justification defences play within the architecture of the economic torts 
and exploring potential for their future expansion.  
 
G Private Law and Fundamental Rights 
 
The availability of robust private law solutions plays a disciplining role in the overall 
accountability framework for groups acting collectively – if they overstep permissible 
boundaries of conduct, they can be brought to account by aggrieved parties commencing 
litigation. 
 
Blackstone’s original Commentaries on the Laws of England67 conceived a division of 
wrongs into public and private wrongs. Public wrongs were based on “a breach and violation 
of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community.” Private wrongs were seen to 
involve “an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, 
considered as individuals” with tortfeasors required to pay fair compensation for past and 
future economic loss suffered by a plaintiff as a result of an injury.
68
 
 
Burrows defined “the divide between private and public law” as follows: 
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…by private law, I mean that part of the law concerned with the legal relationship between 
individuals – the legal rights that one (legal) person has against another – rather than that part of 
the law (public law) concerned with the state’s legal constitution and the relationship between the 
individual and the state.
69
 
However, there is an emerging trend in legal discourse which seeks to apply principles of 
public law to private law contexts, including that of the economic torts, by a process of the 
invocation of fundamental rights. As Collins has acknowledged, “this insertion of 
fundamental rights into litigation over ordinary contractual, tortious and property disputes is 
perceived to present worrying challenges to basic structures of the legal order and to the 
nature of private law,” at least amongst some private lawyers,70 with a threat that “human 
rights law will colonise the whole of private law and force a fundamental and disruptive 
reorganisation of its existing rules and principles.”71 An example of this trend in action, in 
A.I. Enterprises, is discussed in Chapter Five, Part III C.  
 
H The Encroachment of Legislation 
 
Stevens argued that “by far the greatest challenge to the substance of private law as we now 
know it in the common law world is posed by legislative reform.”72 In his view the process of 
legislative creep “is a ‘one-way ratchet’ which, although it may occasionally slip backward in 
the face of particularly vocal public protest, over the course of time remorselessly tightens its 
grip…complete statutory strangulation of the common law is inevitable in the longer term 
and we should start to prepare ourselves for it, safeguarding ourselves through greater 
alertness to its particular risks and staving off the worst of its excesses.”73 
 
Burrows saw that “the extent to which private law should be developed by the courts or 
whether, on the contrary, reform is best left to legislation” is an issue “of especial importance 
to the future vitality of private law.”74 He noted with concern that the march of legislation 
and the possibility of statute becoming the presumed source of private law may “lead judges 
to disclaim responsibility for making decisions that may need to be made, on the basis that it 
is better to leave matters to the initiative of elected parliaments”75 and that “it is normally an 
unacceptable denial of justice to refuse to develop private law on the ground that reform is 
best left to the legislature.”76 The certainty created by legislation is temporal. Legal principle, 
not politics, can offer certainty and the common law’s critical role in shaping principled 
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settings, and therefore establishing the bedrock of the legal protections Australians enjoy, 
ought not be lightly disregarded. 
 
Parliaments can become involved in defining the circumstances under which collective 
actions are regarded as unacceptable, modifying common law rules. As Heydon noted, 
“Parliament, if it thinks the public interest requires it, can create any special exemptions of 
references needed for particular groups, as happens in England to a large extent with trade 
unions.”77 In the context of collective industrial action in the labour market, exemptions have 
been defined in some detail by statute.
78
 The initial legislation in this area was the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 (UK). Its successor statute, the Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
(UK) Part V has, for decades now, defined acceptable collective industrial action in the 
United Kingdom labour market context.
79
 
 
Australian legislatures have taken similar paths. Forms of the legislative exemptions 
pioneered in the United Kingdom have been adopted and employed in Australia,
80
 although 
“different considerations arguably apply in Australia where the political climate has not 
historically favoured the British example of legislating broad-scale immunities for strike 
action.”81 Balkin and Davis said that: 
 
…judicial development of the economic torts in [Australia and New Zealand] has been somewhat 
different from that in England. In that country, legislation first passed in 1906 has granted to trade 
unions and their members a measure of immunity from actions in tort for activities undertaken in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. The fact of this legislation has, without doubt, 
directed the attention of the courts in England along different paths from those which are 
appropriate in Australia and New Zealand.
82
 
 
The introduction or extension of legislative exemptions from the common law rules to limit 
the scope of application of the remedies to certain interest-holders is now being advocated for 
areas outside labour law. For instance, Chapter Eight of this thesis analyses proposals that 
have been made in Australia for the passage of ‘anti-SLAPP’ legislation to create exemptions 
for environmental groups from ‘strategic litigation against public participation.’ Nevertheless, 
it can be too readily assumed that legislation is the answer to any problem in the law. Stevens 
foresaw a risk of “complete statutory strangulation of the common law” and cautioned that 
there is “a real risk of damage being done to private law by a blundering legislature that does 
not understand the value of the judge made laws we currently have.”83 As Stevens ventured: 
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We should care deeply about the common law not because of its source, but because of the basic 
rights it seeks to protect. That does not mean it is illegitimate for a legislature to replace either all 
or part of it, but there are dangers involved in doing so that need to be guarded against.
84
 
 
III.              ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM – THE ARGUMENT 
 
The economic torts are politically contentious, a legacy of their intermittent deployment 
against trade unions.
85
 On occasions in Australia, calls have been made for their abolition, or 
for them to be severely restricted in their application to particular contexts, by statute.
86
 As 
was seen in Part II C above, the need for control mechanisms to restrict the boundaries of the 
general economic torts has been strongly asserted. The torts have been regarded as a means of 
“suppressing public debate and participation.”87 
 
This thesis, however, argues that the principles developed by the common law by the medium 
of the economic torts, and under competition laws prohibiting secondary boycotts, have 
enduring relevance and can offer coherent solutions to the legal problems discussed in this 
study. They set boundaries for permissible conduct, defend legitimate economic interests and 
afford protection against capricious and unrestrained economic coercion by groups. 
 
It is important that the capacity of groups to utilise unlawful means to injure others is 
restricted in some way. In particular, it is desirable to impede the causing of deliberate injury 
to others, which has been described as the “gist” of these torts.88  
 
The torts therefore have a vital ongoing role. Nonetheless, the principles underlying the torts 
require adaptation to take account of societal trends and new contexts. There is considerable 
scope for this to occur in a more consistent and coherent manner. It is argued in this thesis 
that, with very limited exceptions, the development of these principles should be guided by 
the precepts of corrective justice theory. Their development should occur with a view to the 
nature of the rights at stake in a given contest.
89
 The scope for intermediate theories to be 
developed should also be acknowledged.  
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The economic torts are complemented by statutory prohibitions on secondary boycotts and 
boycotts affecting international trade, which are an important dimension of the legal rules 
which inhibit economic coercion by groups.
90
  
 
 
IV.               METHODOLOGIES EMPLOYED 
 
The primary methodology deployed in this thesis is doctrinal research. Doctrine involves “a 
synthesis of rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and values.”91 Doctrinal legal 
research is concerned with the philosophy of law, the nature of law and legal authority and 
the theories behind a particular area of substantive law. It also concerns legal decision-
making processes and theories of legal interpretation and legal reasoning.
92
 In general, the 
objective of a doctrinal approach is to build an in-depth analysis of the legal reasoning and 
theories underpinning an area of law. A reason legal rules are often described as doctrinal is 
because “they are meant to be rules which apply consistently and which evolve organically 
and slowly.”93 
 
Extensive analysis of judicial opinions is undertaken in this thesis, focusing on the study of 
law ‘as is’. Descriptive analysis sets out the facts, the holdings and the courts’ analyses of 
particular cases relevant to the research questions studied. This involves careful study of the 
facts of the cases and the reasons behind courts’ decisions, and assessment of how judges 
have identified and applied legal principles in particular ways in reaching their decisions. The 
contrasting views held by a range of commentators on the validity of various decisions, and 
the differing views expressed by different courts on particular issues, are studied.
94
 This 
builds a base for the arguments made in the course of the thesis as to how best to resolve 
conflicts of views. 
 
This thesis also employs non-doctrinal research: the method which can be used to consider 
the impact of legal phenomena on a range of social institutions, businesses and citizens, 
recognising that the study of legal literature may provide insights or criticisms about the 
practice of law and law's effects upon different individuals or social groups.
95
 Non-doctrinal 
research is concerned with understanding the legal doctrines and practices being studied in 
their social context. This can include critiquing and commenting on legal doctrine and 
practices from the perspective of a range of sciences, like economics, politics and sociology.  
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The thesis takes into account the insights of interdisciplinary researchers from the domain of 
economics. When examining the activities and effects of environmental activist groups, and 
their contributions to improved societal welfare,
96
 there is reference to the views of policy 
economists. This provides valuable insights into the law in context, including how the laws 
studied operate in the real world. 
 
The main data sources used in this thesis are set out in the Bibliography. 
 
 
V.               ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
 
This introductory chapter has introduced the reader to the topic and the research. It has also 
presented contextual background to help explain the drivers that have led to the development 
of the central research question. It has described the principal methodologies and research 
paradigms relied upon in this study. 
 
Chapter Two will define and outline the current state of Australian law applicable to each of 
the torts, including their distinctive elements and how they differ from one another. 
Anomalies which continue to affect the torts will be summarised. 
 
Chapter Three will trace the historical development of the general economic torts and 
summarise the outcomes of a trilogy of important recent cases: OBG, Total Network and A.I. 
Enterprises. It will then analyse alternative conceptions of the notion of ‘unlawful means’ 
that have been developed by the case law and review recent judicial debates about what the 
implications of illegal conduct should be in the application of the torts. 
 
Chapter Four will provide an overview of a range of academic perspectives on the torts, 
reviewing the various attempts that have been made to categorise and classify them. The 
main conceptual maps that have been suggested for the torts will be described. 
 
Chapter Five will consider which of two alternative conceptions of the purpose and function 
of tort law – corrective justice theory or distributive justice theory – provides the clearest 
explanation for economic tort liability. As corrective justice and distributive justice theories 
are not the only plausible and alternative explanations, Chapter Five will also review the 
potential for the development of intermediate theories. 
 
Chapter Six will explore the application of notions of rights and interests to the general 
economic torts, and the potential for a stronger emphasis on public interest considerations. It 
will also examine case law which gives guidance on the approach courts should take to the 
weighing of competing rights and interests. 
 
Chapter Seven will review the role justification defences play within the architecture of the 
economic torts and consider the potential that exists for their future expansion, based on a 
review of relevant case law precedents. 
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Chapter Eight will assess and test potential frameworks for the future development of the 
economic torts by focusing on an important twenty-first century context for economic 
coercion by groups acting in concert – environmental activism. It will review the Victorian 
Gunns cases
97
 and the Canadian Resolute Forest Products case
98
 which illustrate the 
application of the torts in this context. It will also undertake a critical evaluation of proposals 
that have been made in Australia for the passage of ‘anti-SLAPP’ legislation intended to 
prevent ‘strategic litigation against public participation’. Chapter Eight will include an 
examination of the potential for statutory interventions in favour of particular interest groups 
to create new exemptions from the common law restrictions on economic coercion. 
 
Chapter Nine will analyse the statutory provision, s 45DD(3) of Australia’s Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which exempts conduct from the general prohibitions in that Act 
on secondary boycotts and boycotts affecting international trade if “the dominant purpose for 
which the conduct is engaged in is substantially related to environmental protection.”99 It asks 
the question: should Australian competition law allow groups to arrange boycotts of some 
other person or entity because that person or entity does business with a third person to whom 
the boycotters object on environmental or consumer grounds? This will serve as a case study 
illustrating the effect of a legislative intervention developed as a counterpoint to the 
applicable common law principles. 
 
Chapter Ten will then summarise the key research findings of this study and describe the 
potential value of this research for practitioners and policy-makers. The likely consequences 
of the key findings, if adopted by policy-makers, will be discussed. Some areas for future 
research will also be suggested. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL ECONOMIC TORTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The expression ‘the economic torts’ is not a precise term1 but a generic one used in legal 
parlance to refer to a series of causes of action developed by the common law over more than 
150 years. A wide range of distinct torts fall within this general description. At least seven 
key causes of action can be identified, from an Australian perspective, within the family of 
the economic torts: inducing breach of contract; conspiracy; intimidation; causing economic 
loss by unlawful means; injurious falsehood; passing off; and deceit.
2
 (Other tortious actions 
can also be considered when corporations or individuals suffer loss as a result of economic 
coercion by groups, including recourse under defamation and trespass laws. These torts are 
however outside the scope of this thesis). 
 
Injurious falsehood, passing off and deceit have been significantly affected by the evolution 
of Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act and can be argued to have been overtaken by 
legislation.
3
 It should be noted that, as Erbacher highlighted, there has been something of a 
resurgence in recourse to injurious falsehood since the reforms to Australia’s national 
defamation laws which came into effect in 2006 that prohibited “large” for-profit 
corporations (i.e. those with 10 or more employees) from suing in defamation.
4
 
 
This thesis is principally concerned with a subset of the torts listed above – inducing breach 
of contract, conspiracy (in both its “lawful means” and “unlawful means” forms); 
intimidation; and causing loss by unlawful means. There are two sub-groups of the economic 
torts. It has been argued that, in one sub-group (of the torts with which this thesis is 
concerned) the main complaint of the plaintiff is that “the defendant has deliberately caused 
him loss.”5 In the other sub-group (injurious falsehood, passing-off and improper use of trade 
secrets) the main complaint of the plaintiff is that the defendant has made a gain which 
properly belonged to the plaintiff.  
 
The five individual torts under study have in common, broadly, that they are concerned with 
inhibiting interference with a plaintiff’s economic interests.6 Carty reasoned that the most 
appropriate collective label for them is the “general economic torts,” albeit that they are often 
                                                                
1
 Edmundson P, ‘Conspiracy by Unlawful Means: Keeping the Tort Untangled’ (2008) 16 Torts Law Journal 
189 at 190. 
2
 Balkin R and Davis J, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 4
th
 Edition, 2009) at p 579 [20.1]. 
3
 Ibid at p 582 [20.6]. 
4
 This trend is referenced by Sharon Erbacher in Mendelson D, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 
South Melbourne, 3
rd
 edition, 2014) at pp 213-4. 
5
 Heydon JD, ‘The Future of the Economic Torts’ (1975) 12 UWAL Rev 1 at 1. 
6
 Balkin and Davis, n 2 at p 579 [20.1]. 
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referred to as the “industrial” torts “due to the fact that they commonly arise in the course of 
industrial action.”7 In this thesis, Carty’s classification is adopted. Her classification, which 
shapes the structure of her book An Analysis of the Economic Torts: 
 
… separate[s] the economic torts into two categories: the general torts and the misrepresentation 
torts, the latter comprising deceit, malicious falsehood, and passing off. This categorization is 
argued to mirror the fact that in the general economic torts the defendant seeks to attack the 
claimant.
8
 
 
Each cause of action falling within the ‘family’ of the economic torts has its own distinctive 
features. The constituent elements of the torts vary in sometimes subtle, important ways. 
Carty noted that “each tort has a separate basis and rationale.”9 
 
Illegality is a required element in many instances, albeit that interpretations of the meaning of 
unlawful means vary from tort to tort.  Lee observed that “in each case the tort is founded on 
the combination of a particular course of conduct with the requisite unlawfulness.” She also 
highlighted that “although the element of illegality is necessary for founding liability, it is 
not, by itself, the sole rationale of any of the torts.”10 
 
This chapter examines the composition and elements of each of the general economic torts, as 
they are likely to currently apply in Australia. This requires discussion of the starting-point 
positions developed under English law. Each of the causes of action is considered in turn, 
with the component elements of the various torts identified. The central concerns of each 
individual tort, and the principal elements or ‘ingredients’ of each of them, as currently 
understood to be the law in Australia, are briefly described. The aim of this discussion is to 
establish understanding of the commonalities between the torts, and also how they differ from 
one another. 
 
The concluding Part VII of this Chapter describes some open questions of interpretation, not 
yet finally settled by the High Court of Australia. Key anomalies that still exist within the 
framework of liability, which have been argued to impede the coherence of these torts as a set 
of remedies, are summarised. 
 
  
                                                                
7
 Carty H, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2
nd
 Edition, 2010) at p 3. 
8
 Ibid at p 3. 
9
 Carty, n 7 at p 18. The rationale for each of the torts is analysed in Chapter Six, Part IV below. 
10
 Lee PW, ‘Causing Loss by Unlawful Means’ [2011] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 330 at 332. 
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II. INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT 
 
The tort of inducing breach of contract has been described as the most important of the 
general economic torts in terms of practical relevance.
11
 One reason for its importance has 
been the use of this tort “to cover cases in which the defendant used unlawful means to cause 
damage by interfering with the performance of a contract without any voluntary or even 
compelling participation on the part of the contracting party.”12  
 
As Carty explained, inducing breach of contract has been “surrounded by uncertainty and 
complexity”13 and had an “uncertain ambit,” partly because of an overcomplicated judicial 
approach to the tort and partly due to the pursuit of a “unified theory” for the economic torts 
which has led to “misconception surrounding the extent of the tort, compared to the area 
covered by the wider unlawful means tort.”14  Attempts have also been made to fashion 
additional variants of the tort – for example, in OBG, the claimants “sought to use the 
economic tort of ‘interference with contractual relations,’ the existence of which was 
accepted by the Court of Appeal.”15 (That claim was, however, rejected by the House of 
Lords.) 
 
The requirements of this tort, famously first delineated in Lumley v Gye, were elucidated by 
the House of Lords in OBG v Allan. Recent decisions of the Federal Court of Australia
16
 have 
distilled the Lumley v Gye
17
 tort into five elements: there must be a contract between the 
plaintiff and a third party; the defendant must know such a contract exists; the defendant must 
know that if the third party does (or fails to do) a particular act, that conduct of the third party 
would be a breach of the contract; the defendant must intend to induce or procure the third 
party to breach the contract by doing or failing to do the particular act; and the breach must 
cause loss or damage to the plaintiff.
18
 These elements were summarised in Traffic Calming 
Australia v CTS Creative Traffic Solutions which concerned a falling out between former 
business partners. The case discussed “differences of emphasis or in degree” about these 
elements and noted “there appears to be no judgement of the High Court of Australia which 
unites the difference.”19 
                                                                
11
 Stewart A, Forsyth A, Irving M, Johnstone R and McCrystal S, Labour Law (6
th
 Edition, Federation Press, 
Sydney, 2016) at p 954 [26.80]. 
12
 OBG v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [28], per Lord Hoffmann, referenced by Carty, n 7 at p 32. This case is referred 
to hereafter as “OBG”. 
13
 Carty, n 7 at p 31. 
14
 Ibid at p 32. 
15
 Ibid at p 34. See also the discussion in Chapter 3, Part III A, which follows. 
16
 Daebo Shipping Company Ltd v The Ship Go Star (2012) 207 FCR 220 [88] (Keane CJ and Rares and 
Besanko JJ); Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Limited [2015] FCA 498 (Beach J).  
17
 (1853) 118 E.R. 749. 
18
 In Allstate Life Insurance v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26 it was said that “the gravamen of the 
tort is intention” and that “the requirement of knowledge of the contract … is an aspect of intention.” 
19
 Traffic Calming Australia v CTS Creative Traffic Solutions [2015] VSC 741 at 20. 
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Proof of malice, or spite or ill-will, is not a necessary element of this tort.
20
 However, Carty 
emphasised that “liability under the tort requires both that the defendant know of the 
existence of the claimant’s contract and that he have an intention to cause a breach of that 
contract.” Thus, elements of knowledge and intention are “connected, forming a ‘twofold’ 
requirement: without knowledge there can be no intention.”21 
 
Two other key points should be noted. It is necessary for a claimant to show that a target 
contract’s performance has been hampered in some substantial way.22 The scope of the tort is 
limited to inducing breach of an existing contract; it is not a tort (if no conspiracy is involved) 
to simply induce a party not to enter into a contract,
23
 although there is some support for an 
alternative view that interference with pre-contractual negotiations that results in a contract 
not being entered into is actionable.
24
 
 
Over time, two distinct forms of the tort have been identified. The first is direct interference. 
Typically, this is where persuasion, or another form of procurement, is directed at one of the 
parties to a contract. For example, this would arise in a labour law context when a defendant 
persuades a person to breach their contract with the plaintiff, or physically prevents that 
person from being able to perform their contract. 
25
 
 
The second form, indirect interference, arises where a defendant commits or threatens to 
commit some act which is unlawful in itself and which has the effect of interfering with a 
contract to which the plaintiff is a party. In OBG, the House of Lords saw that indirect 
contractual interference should properly be seen as falling within the ‘genus’ of causing loss 
by unlawful means (not as a subset of inducing breach of contract), although it is not yet 
entirely clear if this logic will be picked up by Australian courts.
26
 
Lord Hoffmann in OBG said that in Lumley v Gye the court based its decision on “the general 
principle that a person who procures another to commit a wrong incurs liability as an 
accessory” and that “the real question” to be asked in relation to inducing breach of contract 
is “did the defendant’s acts of encouragement, threat, persuasion and so forth have a 
sufficient causal connection with the breach by the contracting party to attract accessorial 
liability?”27 Carty suggested that continuing confusion may result from these comments. 
                                                                
20
 See Fleming’s Law of Torts, 10th Edition at p 778, referencing Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 at 510; also 
South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1905] AC 239 at 250. 
21
 Carty, n 7 at p 38. 
22
 Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106; Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 
570. 
23
 Balkin and Davis, n 2 at 592 [21.5]. Allen v Flood; Sorrell v Smith; McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343 at 
358-9 per Dixon J, at 369-70 per Evatt J. 
24
 Stickley A, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2016) at p 627 citing James v Commonwealth 
(1939) 62 CLR 339. 
25
 See Stewart et al, n 11 at p 954 [26.80]. 
26
 Ibid at pp 958-59 [26.87].  
27
 OBG, n 12 at [3] and [36] per Lord Hoffmann. See Carty, n 7 at p 51.  
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III. CONSPIRACY BY LAWFUL MEANS 
There are two ‘traditional’ forms of conspiracy: ‘conspiracy by lawful means’ and 
‘conspiracy by unlawful means.’ The conspiracy torts are activated when a ‘combination’ 
acts ‘in concert.’28 
 
A notable feature of lawful means conspiracy is that “a plaintiff may have an action against 
each of two or more parties where their actions, if performed by one party alone, would not 
give rise to a remedy.”29 Goodman observed that unlawful means conspiracy “requires an act 
which would be ‘unlawful’ even if that act were done by one person acting alone, whereas in 
[unlawful means conspiracy] all acts done to achieve the purpose of the parties to the 
combination would be ‘lawful’ if done by one person alone.”30 By contrast, the other general 
economic torts are capable of being performed by a single party acting alone. 
 
The elements of conspiracy which need to be present are discussed at length in Quinn v 
Leathem.
31
 Three elements are common to both forms of conspiracy. These are summarised 
by Balkin and Davis as a) an agreement between two or more persons; b) which was carried 
into execution (or acted upon); and c) which caused damage.
32
  
 
Conspiracy by lawful means
33
 occurs when two or more persons (the potential defendants) 
act in concert to deliberately inflict economic loss on a plaintiff. The tort is committed where 
there is a combination between two or more parties, the combination is acted on, harm is 
caused to the plaintiff and the conspirators have a “predominant purpose of injuring the 
plaintiff.” 34  This tort may potentially apply if conduct amounts to “a combination or 
conspiracy aimed at harming the plaintiff in his trade or business” (the classic Quinn v 
Leathem test) and if it is also found to have been motivated by malice. 
 
The tort enables a plaintiff to bring a suit “if two (or more) people combine with the 
predominant purpose of causing economic loss to the plaintiff, even if this loss is 
accomplished using otherwise lawful means which do not violate any public or private law 
prohibition (other than that posited by the law of conspiracy itself.)”35 Deakin and Randall 
                                                                
28
 See Creighton WB, ‘Secondary Boycotts Under Attack – The Australian Experience’ (1981) 44 Modern Law 
Review 489 at 491. 
29
 Edmundson, n 1 at 191. 
30
 Goodman E, ‘Civil Conspiracy: Better Dead than Alive?’ (1991) 3 Bond L R 66 at 67. 
31
 [1901] AC 495. See also Sorell v Smith [1925] AC 700 (723 per Lord Dunedin; 748-9 per Lord Buckmaster). 
32
 Balkin and Davis, n 2 at p 615 onward. 
33
 This tort is sometimes referred to as ‘conspiracy to injure’ or ‘simple conspiracy’ – see Neyers J, ‘Causing 
Loss by Unlawful Means: Should the High Court of Australia follow OBG Ltd v Allan?’ in Degeling S, 
Edelman J and Goudkamp J (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011) 117 at p 131.  
34
 See McKernan v Fraser, n 23 at 362. This was the case in which the lawful means conspiracy tort was 
recognised by the High Court of Australia. See also Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30. 
35
 Neyers, n 33 at p 132, discussing Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd  v Veitch [1942] All ER 142. 
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framed the proscribed interference as “combination coupled with ‘predominant purpose to 
injure’.”36 
 
The courts are vigilant to address situations where the predominant purpose of the conspiracy 
has been a malicious desire to harm the plaintiff.
37
 Key to the decision in Quinn v Leathem
38
 
– a case which involved a trade union taking action against a butcher who had employed non-
union labourers by compelling his largest customer to discontinue business with him – was 
the jury’s finding (which the House of Lords declined to meddle with) that the defendants 
had been motivated by malice against the plaintiff, in the sense of having no just cause or 
excuse for their actions. However, the Lords did not limit liability to cases where the officials 
were motivated by malice, spite or ill-will. 
 
The requirement a plaintiff must demonstrate that bringing about the particular harm in focus 
was the ‘predominant’ motive of a defendant constitutes a “heightened standard”39 (higher 
than for unlawful means conspiracy),
40
 beyond just having to show intent to harm a plaintiff. 
Lee observed that “lawful means conspiracy requires proof of ‘improper motive’ – which in 
practice is often equated with a predominant intention to injure.”41 Edmundson argued that 
the element of intention within the tort of lawful means conspiracy has been framed so as to 
require a plaintiff “to show that intention to harm dominates the defendants’ motives.”42 
 
In McKernan v Fraser Dixon J (as he then was) said lawful means conspiracy required an 
intention to injure to be “the sole, the true, or the dominating, or the main purpose.”43 Evatt J 
said that if the agreement to cause injury to the plaintiff is made “solely with the object or 
motive of causing such damage” and “for no reason at all beyond the mere infliction of 
injury” or if the agreement is “stamped with wantonness” then the intention to injure will be 
presumed and conduct will exhibit “the necessary malicious character.” If, for example, the 
common purpose or object is “to do harm because the plaintiff is hated for some personal 
reason and his harm is desired as an end,” liability is clear.44 In the same case, Dixon J (as he 
then was) said lawful means conspiracy required an intention to injure to be “the sole, the 
true, or the dominating, or the main purpose.”45 
                                                                
36
 Deakin S and Randall J, ‘Re-thinking the Economic Torts’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 519 at 552. Their 
terminology ‘predominant purpose to injure’ is drawn from Lord Walker’s dictum in Total Network. 
37
 See, for example, Huntley v Thornton [1957] 1 All ER 234. 
38
 [1901] AC 495. 
39
 Neyers, n 33 at pp 131-32. 
40
 See Northern Territory v Mengel [1995] HCA 65; (1995) 185 CLR 307 at 537.  Also Ansett Transport 
Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots [1991] VR 637 (SC) at 668. 
41
 Lee Pey Woan, ‘Civil conspiracy in the corporate context’ (2016) 23 TLJ 257 at 260. 
42
 By contrast, as Edmundson, n 1 at 191 explained, for unlawful means conspiracy (in Australia) “intention to 
harm the plaintiff need only be one purpose of the conspirators, not necessarily the dominant purpose.” 
43
 McKernan v Fraser, n 23 at 363, per Dixon J. 
44
 Ibid at 399-400, per Evatt J. Discussed by Goodman, n 30 at 78. 
45
 Ibid at 363, per Dixon J. 
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Goodman noted that there is a distinction “between ‘intention’ and ‘motive’ or ‘ultimate 
purpose’…the immediate intention of parties to a combination may be to cause harm; the 
ultimate ‘motive’ or ‘purpose’ may be the furtherance of interests. Liability is therefore 
dependent upon the answer to the question: why did the defendants injure the plaintiff?”46 
 
Liability for lawful means conspiracy is limited by the additional need to establish that 
defendants were not acting in furtherance of their own economic interests. A proposition of 
law established by Sorrell v Smith is that, if parties to a combination can show their motive 
was one of legitimate self-interest, they will avoid liability.
47
  
 
Complexities can arise when it is necessary for a court to analyse the presence of mixed 
motives amongst conspirators.
48
 An intention to cause harm may co-exist with an ultimate 
intention to further legitimate personal interests. As Goodman noted, parties may not all share 
the same motive for joining together: 
 
An inquiry into the ‘motive’ or ‘purpose’ of a combination may reveal that the combiners had 
more than one purpose, or put another way that there was not a sole common intention among the 
combiners. For example, the combiners may perceive protection of their interests to be their main 
purpose for combining and at the same time some or all of the parties to the combination may 
relish the thought of harming the plaintiff.
49
 
 
Salmond wrote that: 
 
The same individual may be inspired by more than one motive, or different parties to the 
combination may be inspired by different motives. In the former case liability will depend upon 
ascertaining which is the predominant object or the true motive or the real purpose of the 
defendant.
50
 
 
Simon LC in the Crofter case said “if there is more than one purpose actuating a 
combination, liability must depend on ascertaining the predominant purpose.” He went on to 
note that: 
 
The combiners may feel that they are killing two birds with one stone, and, even though their main 
purpose may be to protect their own legitimate interests notwithstanding that this involves damage 
to the plaintiffs, they may also find a further inducement to do what they are doing by feeling that 
it serves the plaintiffs right.
51
 
 
                                                                
46
 Goodman, n 30 at 78. Goodman noted that this was the proper question to ask. 
47
 Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700. See also McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 
165 ALR 409 at 434-35, 439-45. 
48
 This was shown in McKernan v Fraser, n 23 at 399-408, referenced by Neyers, n 33 at p 131. 
49
 Goodman, n 30 at 78. 
50
 Stallybrass W, Salmond’s Law of Torts, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1945) at p 609. 
51
 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd and Others v Veitch [1942] All ER 142 at 149. 
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In McKernan v Fraser, Evatt J “commented that if an alleged conspiracy had as its purpose 
the carrying out of some religious, social or political object, the law prefers to examine the 
motive or object in each case before pronouncing an option.”52 
 
Lawful means conspiracy can arise if there is unjustified combination leading to economic 
pressure or harm (even if no unlawful means is used). By contrast to unlawful means 
conspiracy, ‘simple’ conspiracy does not require independently unlawful means.53 It does not 
matter that the defendant has not done any act that is unlawful in itself – the unlawfulness of 
the conspiracy rests purely in the fact of acting in concert with the intention of inflicting 
harm, and without a legitimate interest.  
 
  
                                                                
52
 Goodman, n 30 at 69 referencing Evatt J in McKernan v Fraser, n 23 at 400. 
53
 Neyers, n 33 at p 132. 
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IV. CONSPIRACY BY UNLAWFUL MEANS 
The tort of conspiracy by unlawful means involves defendants, acting in combination, 
deliberately inflicting loss on a plaintiff by doing an act which is in itself unlawful, or for a 
purpose which is inherently unlawful.
54
 In addition to the three common elements of 
conspiracy, there must have been an intention to harm the plaintiff, together with the critical 
ingredient of unlawful means, which converts a ‘simple’ conspiracy into an ‘unlawful means’ 
conspiracy. 
 
As Lee recently highlighted, uncertainty currently surrounds the elements and rationale of 
unlawful means conspiracy and this has given rise to potential for broadening of the tort, and 
at the same time possibilities that may “emaciate” it.55 
 
The first, pressing difficulty is the failure of the courts to settle upon a clear test of the scope 
of unlawful means for the purpose of the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means, with 
differences between the standards adopted by courts in England and Australia. 
 
Australia’s law on unlawful means conspiracy has consistently accepted that crimes and 
breaches of statutory provisions can count as unlawful means.
56
 According to what Neyers 
has termed “the Australian conspiracy analysis” 57  the requisite unlawful means may be 
furnished by breach of contract
58
 and conduct which is unlawful as a crime or a tort
59
 or 
breach of statute.
60
 Neyers’ view was that, for this tort, breaches of statutes and crimes can 
become tortious (possibly even contrary to parliamentary intention) “when coupled with an 
intention to injure.”61 
 
There has been a clear Australian view that conspiracy may be alleged in instances where 
defendants have conspired to commit a tort against the plaintiff, whether this be assault and 
battery, intimidation, fraud or defamation
62
 or tortious conversion.
63
 In Williams v Hursey,
64
 a 
                                                                
54
 See generally Edmundson, n 1. 
55
 Lee, n 41 at 3 and 4. 
56
 Neyers, n 33 at pp 130-31. Balkin and Davis, n 2 cite Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30. See also Coal 
Miners’ Industrial Union of Western Australia v Amalgamated Collieries of Western Australia Ltd (1960) 104 
CLR 437. 
57
 Neyers, n 33 at p 131. 
58
 See Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; Total Network [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [44] and [116]. See also Stanley 
v Layne Christensen Co [2006] WASCA 56. 
59
 Williams v Hursey, n 56; Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843. 
60
 See generally Creighton and Stewart, n 4 at p 800. 
61
 Neyers, n 33 at p 131. 
62
 See Balkin and Davis, n 2 at 617 [21.51]. 
63
 McWilliam v Penthouse Publications Ltd [2001] NSWCA 237. 
64
 Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30. 
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majority of the High Court held defendants liable for conspiracy based on false imprisonment 
and assault. In Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant it was held that there is no requirement in Australia 
that the unlawful means must be tortious in themselves.
65
  
 
The Australian cases have found a wide range of acts to be a basis for unlawful means, 
including agreement to commit a crime,
66
 criminally receiving or soliciting a secret 
commission,
67
 breaching enforceable undertakings given to the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission,
68
 various breaches of directors’ duties 69  and infringements of 
copyright.
70
 
 
Lee highlighted that “expansion of the tort to encompass non-actionable unlawful acts has 
been endorsed in other Commonwealth jurisdictions.” 71  In Wagner v McGill the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal accepted that a breach of fiduciary duty may, in principle, constitute 
a form of unlawful means but noted that whether it does so may depend on whether it is a 
two-party or three-party conspiracy. There, the Court of Appeal declined to apply the tort of 
conspiracy, seeing the need to place limits on the encroachment of common law into the 
regulation of economic competition, for policy reasons. It did so by preferring “to retain the 
requirement that the conduct must be directed at the claimant.”72  
 
The Australian position differs from the prevailing position in England where a narrow 
interpretation of unlawful means for the tort was adopted by the House of Lords in OBG. 
According to Edmundson’s diagnosis, in England this tort “is not yet at the stage where the 
precise scope of its elements can be set down with confidence,” for “no clear test has been 
stated of the scope of unlawful means” and currently there is insufficient case law to distil 
true “patterns in the law” and general rules.”73 Edmundson saw, however, that following 
Total Network “the tort is now free to evolve on a case-by-case basis.”74 
 
                                                                
65
 Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678 at 684. 
66
 Williams v Hursey, n 56. 
67
 Coomera Resort Pty Ltd v Kolback Securities Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 1 at 37. 
68
 Dresna Pty Ltd v Misu Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 169. 
69
 Chen v Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 at [28]; Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411. 
70
 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1. 
71
 Lee, n 33 at 6, referencing the Singapore cases of Beckett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG [2009] 3 SLR (R) 452 
at [120] and EFT Holding, Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 at [91]. 
72
 Wagner v Gill [2015] 3 NZLR 157 at [71]. Discussed by Lee, n 33 at 5 and 18-9. 
73
 Edmundson, n 1 at 189, 198 and 202. 
74
 Ibid at 198. Edmundson saw that the opportunity available for this tort was in contrast to the narrow 
interpretation of unlawful means adopted by the House of Lords in OBG. 
Chapter Two: The Composition of the General Economic Torts 
 
30 
 
The question of whether crimes can constitute unlawful means in the context of conspiracy, 
which had previously been unclear, was settled for the UK in Total Network.
75
 In that case it 
was held that “the crime of cheating the revenue” in respect of contentious VAT claims 
provided the basis for a finding of unlawful means conspiracy.
76
 A key theme in the Lords’ 
speeches was that crimes in general can provide sufficient unlawful means,
77
 although the 
bench stopped short of saying all crimes would always be sufficient. Lee observed that, 
although “the House of Lords was unequivocal that ‘unlawful means’ for purposes of a two-
party conspiracy were not confined to actionable civil wrongs…their Lordships furnished 
scant guidelines as to how far beyond traditional crimes the tort would extend.” She further 
noted that “cases subsequent to Total have generally eschewed the suggestion that any form 
of illegality would suffice [but]…At the minimum, the breach has to be either a civil or a 
criminal wrong.”78 
 
The House of Lords declined to set down a general rule defining what would constitute 
unlawful means, seeing this as undesirable in view of the wide range of possibilities.
79
 They 
did, however, canvass limits such as the requirement that there should “be some link between 
the unlawful act and the harm caused” – for example “that the crime must be the instrument 
of infliction of the harm.”80 
 
The question of “whether the unlawful act must be independently actionable against one of 
the putative conspirators” was also addressed in Total Network. There, unlawful acts were 
very clearly directed at the plaintiff and very intimately linked with the harm caused.
81
 Lord 
Hope characterised the claim as of a type involving a loss caused by an unlawful act directed 
at the claimants themselves, not a third party, a different case from situations where harm is 
“parasitic on the unlawful means used by a defendant against another party” where he saw 
that greater caution was needed.
82
 His Lordship found sufficient unlawful means despite the 
fact that the unlawful means were not in themselves actionable, taking the view that sufficient 
unlawful means were present because the acts were directed, targeted or aimed at the 
claimant.
83
 
                                                                
75
 It should also be noted that, prior to Total Network there may have been a misconception in the UK that 
unlawful means conspiracy required a dominant intention to harm, based on interpretations of a precedent in 
Powell v Boladz [1998] Lloyds Rep Med 116. This was put to rest by the House of Lords in Total Network (per 
Lord Hope at [45] and Lord Neuberger at [217]) and Powell v Boladz was overruled. 
76
 See the discussion in Edmundson, n 1 at 196-7. 
77
 Ibid at 196. 
78
 Lee, n 41 at 5, referencing Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch.) and 
Anthony McGill v The Sports and Entertainment Media Group [2014] EWHC 3000 (QB). 
79
 See Lord Walker in Revenue and Customs Commissioner v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [96], 
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Edmundson argued that efforts to “define exhaustively what amounts to sufficient unlawful 
means” are unwise and unlikely to lead to certain outcomes and that “the presence of 
sufficient unlawful means should depend upon the facts of a case and not whether the 
unlawful act was of a certain type.”84 His view was that “categorical statements of what can 
and cannot be sufficient unlawful means are not helpful.” He contended that “instead of 
seeking to determine what is relevantly unlawful by this type of act … it should be 
acknowledged that all unlawful acts provide potential unlawful means.”85 
 
Apart from the unlawful means element, the other key ingredient of the tort of conspiracy by 
unlawful means is that the defendants, by their agreement, must have intended to cause harm 
to the plaintiff. An implication of defining unlawful means broadly, as has occurred in 
Australia, is that courts may then place pressure on findings of intention, as a way of keeping 
the tort in check.
86
  
 
The necessary intention to harm the plaintiff in particular must be more than simply the 
foreseeable consequence of harming someone (who turns out to be the plaintiff): “it is not 
sufficient merely to show that their conduct necessarily involved injury to the plaintiff, or that 
the plaintiff was reasonably contemplated as likely to suffer harm.”87 
 
In three UK decisions, Lonrho Ltd and Others v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd and Others,
88
 Allied 
Arab Bank Ltd v Hajjar and Others (No 2)
89
 and Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin 
& Jenrette Inc and Anor
90
 it was apparently confirmed that predominant purpose to injure the 
plaintiff’s interests was an essential ingredient of the tort of conspiracy irrespective of 
whether the damage was achieved by legal or illegal means. Goodman commented that “by 
requiring that defendants have as their predominant purpose an intention to injure the plaintiff 
… even where unlawful means have been used, the House of Lords has effectively curtailed 
the ambit of this tort.”91 
 
That approach was not, however, followed in Australia. It was held in Carlton and United 
Breweries Ltd v Tooth & Co Ltd
92
 that once it was established that the defendant had 
committed an unlawful act, it was not necessary to establish that the predominant motive of 
the defendant was to injure the plaintiff. Further, in Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant the New South 
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 See the comments made by Heffey P, ‘The Survival of Civil Conspiracy: A Question of Magic or Logic’ 
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Wales Court of Appeal found that, in Australia, conspiracy by unlawful means required that 
harm to the plaintiff must be intended by the defendant, but this need not be the predominant 
intention. Although it is “necessary to prove that one of the things the defendant was trying to 
achieve was damage to the plaintiff,” an “intention to harm the plaintiff need only be one 
purpose of the conspirators, not necessarily the dominant purpose.”93 The recent decision in 
Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd and others v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union affirmed that a ‘sole or dominant purpose’ is not an element of conspiracy to injure by 
unlawful means in Australia, and for that tort “it is enough if one of the purposes of the 
conspiracy was to injure the plaintiff.”94 The requirement of intention under unlawful means 
conspiracy is therefore different to that for conspiracy by lawful means.
95
 
 
As Lee highlighted, it should also be noted that in OBG: 
 
Lord Hoffmann had explicated the concept of ‘intention’ to mean that the defendant must have 
intended the claimant’s breach or loss either as an end in itself or a means to an end [and] … Although 
OBG did not concern liability for conspiracy, the Court of Appeal applied this definition in Meretz 
Investments NV v ACP Ltd to unlawful means conspiracy. In the yet later Total case, which concerned 
unlawful means conspiracy, the House of Lords did not expressly disagree with OBG’s formulation of 
intention. However, the Law Lords also variously referred to the notions of ‘directed at’ and ‘targeted 
at’ causing commentators to speculate that they hint at a reversion to a more traditional and stringent 
test than that endorsed by OBG.
96
 
 
Conspiracy actions face real practical difficulties. In Gunns Ltd v Marr (No 2) Bongiorno J 
was concerned by the plaintiffs’ attempt “to characterise virtually all of the defendants’ 
activities as being in furtherance of one extensive conspiracy,” noting that “conspiracy trials 
tend to be of inordinate length.” His Honour referred to a general reluctance of the Victorian 
Supreme Court to entertain civil conspiracy trials, observing that in the criminal jurisdiction, 
“such trials are now a rarity and are strictly controlled by statute.”97 
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 Edmundson, n 1 at 191, referring to Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678 at 681, per Campbell J. 
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 Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2014] VSC 429 at [111], per Derham AsJ, referencing Fatimi. 
95
 As discussed in Part III above, sole or predominant purpose is an element of the tort of conspiracy to injure by 
lawful means: Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2014] VSC 429 at [98]. 
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V. INTIMIDATION 
 
The tort of intimidation arises where a defendant has, “by a threat to commit an unlawful act, 
coerced another person into acting in a way in which the latter did not wish to act, the 
defendant having thereby intended and caused economic damage to the plaintiff.”98 There are 
two basic forms of the tort. Intimidation can arise both where a threat made by a defendant 
has been directed to coercing a third party and where a threat is directed to a plaintiff. 
 
The tort can be committed when a defendant threatens the plaintiff with unlawful acts unless 
the plaintiff takes action detrimental to their own interests (‘two party intimidation’). In the 
two-party form of the tort, “the defendant, A, will be liable by threatening to commit an 
unlawful act as against the plaintiff B, unless B refrains from pursuing a particular course of 
action, thereby causing (as A intended) economic loss to B.”99 In OBG, Lord Hoffmann noted 
that two party intimidation raised “altogether different issues” from third party 
intimidation.
100
 
 
The more usual circumstance is that threats made by a defendant are directed to coercing a 
third party. ‘Third party intimidation’ arises where one party (the defendant), intending to 
cause loss to the plaintiff, threatens a third party with violence or serious damage to property 
unless the third party does something which is harmful to the plaintiff. Balkin and Davis 
described the situation in which three parties are involved, as follows: “if A, intending to 
injure C, by threatening B that he will commit an unlawful act as against B, unless B refrains 
from exercising his legal right to deal with C, induces B to refrain from so doing, A commits 
a wrong actionable at the suit of C.
101
 
 
There are three distinct elements to this cause of action. First, the defendant has made a 
demand, coupled with a threat, to either the plaintiff or a third party. Second, the threat must 
have been to commit an unlawful act. Third. the party threatened must have complied with 
the demand, thereby causing loss to the plaintiff.
102
 It is also necessary to prove that the 
defendant intended to cause injury to the plaintiff.
103
 Intimidation is an instance of a tort 
which has as its “essence” the use of unlawful means, and according to Lord Denning the 
requisite illegality may include “violence, tort and breach of contract.”104 
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100
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Prior to 1964, the tort had operated in cases involving physical violence and threats. For 
example, in Garret v Taylor the defendant had persuaded customers of the plaintiff (a 
quarryman) from continuing to buy quarry stone from the plaintiff by threatening them with 
“mayhem.”105 
 
The modern tort of intimidation stems from the 1964 case of Rookes v Barnard, in which a 
plaintiff had (lawfully) been dismissed by his employer (an airline) due to pressure placed on 
the employer by the defendant. The required unlawful actions were present: a number of 
employees had indicated they would “breach their contracts of employment (by going on 
strike) if the airlines did not terminate the employment of a fellow-worker who had resigned 
his union membership.” The House of Lords held that liability for intimidation could arise 
“even if it did not involve violence or threat to property”106 and extended to the threat of a 
breach of contract.
107
 Lord Reid held that “threatening a breach of contract may be a much 
more coercive weapon than threatening a tort” and that “there is no technical reason requiring 
a distinction between different kinds of threats.”108 Carty noted that the effect of this decision 
was to deny the defendants the extensive statutory immunities then contained in the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 (UK). 
 
The status of intimidation as part of the law of Australia was established in two key cases – 
Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia
109
 and 
Latham v Singleton. In Latham other employees walked off the job each time the plaintiff 
arrived for work and it was found: 
 
… that the majority of the defendants acted in concert when they walked off the job on the 
appearance of the plaintiff at the depot and that their actions were meant to constitute a threat to 
the city council which would be forced to take action against the plaintiff if it was unable to 
maintain the garbage and sanitary services of the City of Broken Hill.
110
 
 
Recent instances of the application of the tort of intimidation in Australia include AS v 
Murray,
111
 Ballard v Multiplex
112
 and Jack Brabham Engines Limited v Beare.
113
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Carty contended in her 2001 book that intimidation should be considered as part of the 
innominate unlawful means tort, and attract the same definitions of intention and unlawful 
means as apply in that tort.
114
 It has been argued that this is now the likely position in 
England (as far as the three-party version of the tort is concerned), based on dicta of Lord 
Hoffmann in OBG.
115
 Carty summarised comments supportive of this viewpoint made by 
Stevens
116
 and by Neyers, who said “three-party intimidation does not raise any meaningful 
conceptual issues that are distinct from the issues raised by the unlawful interference tort.”117 
 
However, the position in Australia is that intimidation remains a distinct cause of action, 
which has not been subsumed within the innominate tort. In the recent case of Boral 
Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU
118
 the Supreme Court of Victoria reaffirmed (on appeal) 
the availability of intimidation in Australia, finding that it was obliged to follow the authority 
of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the Sid Ross case. The Court rejected “the 
proposition that the tort of intimidation is a variant of the tort of interference with business by 
unlawful means and is not at this time a part of the common law of Australia.”119 
 
The conduct complained of in Boral Resources was that the defendant trade union enforced a 
policy that prevented businesses and individuals that managed or performed work in 
Victorian construction projects from receiving, using or working with concrete supplied by 
the plaintiff companies. Builders were threatened with organised disruption at their building 
sites if they sourced concrete from the plaintiffs, conduct which was unlawful as either a 
breach of workers’ contracts or of s 45D of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Law.
120
 
 
When, in 2015, an application was made to the High Court of Australia for leave to appeal 
the Boral decision on the question of whether the tort of intimidation forms part of the 
common law of Australia, leave was refused on the basis the High Court regarded the matter 
as settled.
121
 It had been argued in this case that the continuing recognition of the tort of 
intimidation needed to be questioned in view of the statutory framework operating in 
Australia for the taking of lawful industrial action in the context of bargaining for a new 
‘enterprise agreement.’122 
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Chapter Two: The Composition of the General Economic Torts 
 
36 
 
Not all English commentators concur with the position described by Carty. Deakin and 
Randall suggested that “the tort of intimidation survives, and…must be distinct from the 
unlawful means tort expounded by the House in OBG,” largely on the basis that “application 
of the doctrine of precedent precludes any conclusion which is inconsistent with the ratio 
decidendi of Rookes.” They acknowledged, however, that “this is a result with which nobody 
concerned with doctrinal coherence in tort law can feel particularly happy” and that “if 
intimidation survives as a distinct tort in its own right…we have two very similar torts co-
existing alongside one another, one of which requires independent actionability and the other 
of which does not.”123 
 
Finally, reference should be made to one of the key “modern controversies surrounding the 
tort of intimidation” relating to “the scope and implications of the two-party version of this 
tort,” that is “when might two-party as opposed to three-party liability arise in the tort?” 
Although the tort typically arises in a three-party scenario, as in the Boral case, it can also 
“arise in a two-party setting, ie where the defendant makes the unlawful threat directly to the 
claimant in order to injure him (by causing him to act to his detriment)” – for example, “a 
trader who has been compelled to discontinue his business by means of threats of personal 
violence made against him by the defendant.”124 
 
An example occurred in the Canadian case of Mintuck v Valley River Band,
125
 where: 
 
…the defendant Indian band had, by continued but sporadic acts of trespass on the plaintiff’s 
farm, nuisance and assault, and implied threats to continue these activities, demanded that the 
plaintiff abandon the farm, which he leased from the federal government…The court upheld his 
claim based on the damages, both past and prospective, suffered as a result of his submission to 
the defendant’s demands.  
 
Carty speculated that after the divergent analyses in OBG and Total Network it may be that: 
 
…we will see the development generally of two-party economic torts with a different rationale to 
three-party economic torts, and different definitions of unlawful means. Conversely, we may see 
the courts drawing back from some of the wider implications flowing from the decision in Total 
Network and restrict two-party liability to the tort of intimidation, limiting it at the same time to 
the tort of intimidation.
126
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VI. CAUSING LOSS BY UNLAWFUL MEANS 
 
The fifth cause of action to discuss is the tort most commonly described, in modern-day 
parlance, as ‘causing loss by unlawful means.’ This was the terminology deployed by Lord 
Hoffmann in OBG v Allan
127
 and adopted by the majority in Total Network.
128
 
 
As Carty has highlighted, the nomenclature for the cause of action is probably not, as yet, 
well-established.
129
 In A.I. Enterprises v Bram Enterprises Cromwell J observed that: 
 
The tort of unlawful interference with economic relations has also been referred to as ‘interference 
with a trade or business by unlawful means’, ‘intentional interference with economic relations’, 
‘causing loss by unlawful means’ or simply as the ‘unlawful means’ tort.
130
 
 
The tort was formerly often referred to as “unlawful interference with trade.”131 Whereas 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in OBG referenced it as “the tort of unlawful interference,”132 
Lord Walker in Total Network used the shorthand “the intentional harm” tort. 133  In a 
significant Australian case discussed in Chapter Eight, Gunns Ltd v Marr (No. 2)
134
 the cause 
of action was pleaded as “interference with trade and business” but by the time of Gunns 
Limited & Ors v Marr & Ors (No. 4)
135
 it was re-pleaded as “intentional injury to the 
plaintiffs in their trade and business.”  
 
In view of ongoing judicial evaluation of the nature of the ingredients of the tort, discussed 
below, these differences about nomenclature amount to more than mere semantics. 
 
From an Australian vantage point, there are four key sets of questions concerning this tort 
which require discussion. Firstly, does the tort exist at all in Australia? Here the Australian 
precedents must be contrasted with clearly established positions in New Zealand, in England 
in the wake of OBG, and now, in Canada.
136
  Second, the precise nature of each of the 
elements of this tort have not been determined in Australia. Third, what are (and should be) 
the limits of the tort? Fourth, is the tort anomalous and what are the implications of this? The 
first two of these questions are covered in this chapter; the third and fourth questions are 
addressed in Chapter Four below. 
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Although it has not yet been authoritatively adopted in Australia in its modern incarnation, 
the tort of causing loss by unlawful means has received judicial support.
137
 In Hardie Finance 
Corporation Pty Ltd v Ahern the Western Australian Supreme Court accepted “that the 
unlawful means tort forms part of the Australian common law on the basis that the decision in 
OBG v Allan is well-reasoned, has been applied in Canada, and is not inconsistent with any 
decision of the High Court.”138 
 
By contrast, decisions of lower Australian courts have challenged the existence of the tort,
139
 
leading the Victorian Court of Appeal to acknowledge in 2015 that “appellate courts in 
Australia have expressed reservations about accepting the broader tort in this country.”140 In 
Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia a single judge of the Federal 
Court, Moore J, said that the tort does not from part of the landscape of the Australian 
common law.
141
 McDougall J, a single judge of the New South Wales Supreme Court, 
applying Qantas in Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 2) said “I expressly find the unlawful 
means tort does not form part of the landscape of the Australian common law.”142 
 
In Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Gold Coast McMurdo P of the Queensland 
Court of Appeal expressed the view that the existence of the unlawful means tort had not 
been successfully established in Australia.
143
 In a separate judgment in that case Williams JA 
said that, in light of the reasoning of the High Court in Sanders v Snell, it was not for first 
instance or even intermediate courts “to hold that such a tort does exist in Australian law.”144 
 
Neyers
145
 attributed the relative lack of recourse to this tort in Australia to Sanders v Snell, in 
which the High Court left open the question of whether or not causing loss by unlawful 
means is part of the law of Australia, describing it as “embryonic or emerging.” While 
expressly declining to determine whether “a tort of interference with trade or business 
interests by an unlawful act should be recognised in Australia” the Court equally did not rule 
it out from being formally recognised in the future.
146
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The status of the tort has also been clouded by other decisions in which lower courts have 
elected to neither confirm nor deny its existence. In Canberra Data Centres Pty Ltd v Vibe 
Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd it was said that “what the law is in Australia on this subject 
must await the authoritative determination of the High Court.”147 
 
The High Court has recently signalled its interest in having an opportunity to consider the 
issue. In CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd in 2014 the Victorian Court of Appeal 
resisted the appellant’s invitation to find that the tort was available under Australian law. 
When an application was then made to the High Court for leave to appeal on the question of 
whether the tort of intimidation forms part of the common law of Australia, leave was refused 
on the basis that matter was settled. However, Nettle J indicated the High Court’s interest in 
having an opportunity to consider the status of the broader tort, saying “if the question was 
whether there was an unlawful means tort part of the Australian common law that would be 
all very interesting.”148 
 
The confused position in Australia contrasts with certainty as to the tort’s availability in New 
Zealand
149
 and the recent clarifications that have been undertaken in the United Kingdom and 
Canada. It will be recalled that causing loss by unlawful means was “decisively affirmed” by 
the House of Lords in OBG. and by the Canadian Supreme Court in AI Enterprises.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the uncertainty surrounding the precise dimensions of this cause of action in 
Australia appears to have affected the frequency with which it is litigated. Writing in 2011, 
Neyers observed the surprisingly limited impact of OBG on Australian jurisprudence (relative 
to other common law jurisdictions) since the case was decided in 2007. He noted that as of 
January 2011 OBG was making a significant impact in Canada, having been cited in fifteen 
first instance and appellate decisions, whereas by contrast in Australia at the same point “it 
was cited in only seven first instance decisions and one appellate decision.”150 
 
Although there had been a long-running debate as to whether the inducing breach of contract 
tort might be “subsumed in the tort of causing loss by unlawful means,” Lord Hoffmann 
decisively opined on this in the negative.
151
 Thus, following OBG, “it is now clear that the 
unlawful means tort is (unlike the Lumley v Gye tort) not a form of accessory liability but a 
primary and substantive tort” and that causing loss by unlawful means is not a general 
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principle or “genus” tort.152 One of the key elements of the decision in OBG was to affirm 
that inducing breach of contract and causing loss by unlawful means are separate actions.
153
 
Neyers characterised the “classic example” of the unlawful means tort in action as follows: 
“the defendant assaults third parties (such as customers of the plaintiff’s shop) with the 
intention of driving them away and harming the plaintiff.”154  
 
The general Australian consensus, in cases where the tort has been applied, is that it has two 
essential ingredients: a) a wrongful interference with the actions of a third party in which the 
plaintiff has an economic interest (ie. unlawful means); and b) an intention thereby to cause 
loss to the claimant.
155
 This aligns with the English case law precedents. These elements have 
application, in one way or another, (but in nuanced ways) across the majority of the economic 
torts: Carty noted that “most commentators agree that the economic torts require intentional 
harm and unlawful means” as key ingredients.156 
 
The case law has developed two alternative, conceptions of unlawful means for the 
innominate unlawful means tort: a ‘narrower view’ and a ‘wider view.’ There is a need to 
clarify for Australia the question of which categories of conduct should be regarded as 
constituting unlawful means for the purposes of the innominate tort. This issue will be 
discussed in Chapter Three below. 
 
The second major ingredient of the unlawful means tort, intention, has also been the subject 
of judicial and academic debates. Carty described the “orthodox view” of the requirements of 
intention for the unlawful means tort that existed prior to OBG as being “the harm needed to 
be aimed, directed or targeted in the sense that ‘causing the [plaintiff] economic harm will be 
a specific object of the conduct in question’.”157 This orthodox view can be traced from Lord 
Watson’s dictum in Allen v Flood 158 through to Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty 
Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots.
159
 
 
However, in OBG the House of Lords sought to re-cast the definition of intention in the 
context of this tort, stating that it should be thought of in terms of means and ends. Carty said 
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that in OBG “the orthodox definition of intention for this tort appeared to be rejected.”160 The 
majority in OBG decided that the unlawful means tort required active “proof of an intention 
to injure the plaintiff and that therefore proof that the harm was merely a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions did not suffice to impose liability.”161 
Lord Hoffmann saw this adjusted approach as preferable to “the danger of giving a wide 
meaning to the concept of unlawful means and then attempting to restrict the ambit of the tort 
by giving a narrow meaning to the concept of intention.”162 He said: 
 
[I]t is necessary to distinguish between ends, means and consequences. One intends to cause loss 
even though it is the means by which one achieved the end of enriching oneself. On the other 
hand, one is not liable for loss which is neither a desired end nor a means of attaining it but merely 
a foreseeable consequence of one’s actions.
163
 
 
This approach has been criticised. Carty said that a straightforward (and deliberately narrow) 
definition was replaced with one that has an uncertain scope.
164
 
 
Neyers suggested that if at some future time the High Court is to clarify the position of the 
unlawful means tort in Australia it should more explicitly take ‘targeting’ into account in 
assessing transgression of the torts. He advocated a “return to using the orthodox ‘aimed, 
directed or targeted’ understanding of intention”165 which acknowledges “the plaintiff’s right 
not to have others act with the predominant purpose of causing them injury.”166  
 
Deakin and Randall also encouraged a reformulation - one which would focus “more on the 
nature of the interest at stake, and on the need for ‘targeting’ of the claimant” and advocated 
that “the general requirement for liability in tort for interfering with trade … should be 
restated in terms of the defendant ‘aiming at’ or ‘targeting’ his conduct at the [plaintiff].”167 
They saw ‘targeting’ as “where the defendant’s conduct directly interferes with the trade or 
business of the other (and is also illegitimate, as in the sense of involving unlawful means or 
combination.)”168  
 
                                                                
160
 Carty, n 7 at p 79. 
161
 Neyers, n 33 at p 118. 
162
 OBG, n 12 at [135], per Lord Hoffmann. 
163
 Ibid at [62], quoted by Neyers, n 33 at p 128. 
164
 See Carty, n 101 at 660. 
165
 Neyers, n 33 at p 128. 
166
 Ibid at pp 137-38. 
167
 Deakin and Randall, n 36 at 552. Deakin and Randall’s approach generally is described at Chapter Four, Part 
VIII of this thesis. 
168
 Ibid at 540-41. It should be noted that targeting can occur via means directed at a third party. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: OPEN QUESTIONS SUMMARISED 
The discussion above has highlighted the central issues which create difficulty in the practical 
application of the general economic torts. It can be seen that these torts continue to be 
affected by a large number of areas of uncertainty. Doctrinal incongruence and 
inconsistencies have meant that commentators continue to characterise aspects of the torts as 
anomalous or, in the words of Lord Nicholls in OBG, “passing strange.”169As a result of the 
judicial and academic scrutiny they have been subjected to over the past decade, the torts may 
not be as “obscure”170 as before, but they are far from settled. Four of the most important 
areas of uncertainty are briefly summarised below. 
 
The first point to note is that there have been misconceptions about the scope of the tort of 
inducing breach of contract and its relationship with the broader tort of causing loss by 
unlawful means. This can be partly explained by the efforts that were made to develop “a 
unifying ground of liability”171 for the torts. Whilst it is now established “that there is no 
unified theory linking the tort of inducing breach of contract with the tort of unlawful 
interference with trade, and that the two are quite separate wrongs”172 the precise boundaries 
of these two torts are still being clarified. 
 
Second, some argue that the lawful means conspiracy tort is anomalous, and the validity of 
basing liability for lawful means conspiracy on “the mere fact … of a combination of 
persons” has been criticised.173 It would be helpful if there was re-confirmation by a superior 
court of the exact dimensions of this tort in Australia. It is well-established that this tort 
requires a ‘heightened standard’ of purpose – that bringing about the harm was the 
‘predominant’ motive of a defendant – but additional clarification of the exact nature of this 
test would be welcome. 
 
Third, there has been a failure to date to state a clear test of the scope of unlawful means for 
the purpose of the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means, with differences between the 
standards adopted by courts in England and Australia. The resulting uncertainty is 
compounded by the adoption of starkly different interpretations of the meaning of ‘unlawful 
means’ depending on whether the tort of unlawful means conspiracy or the tort of causing 
loss by unlawful means is in focus. 
 
Fourth, there is a continuing need for Australia’s High Court to affirm the existence in 
Australia of the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means, to delineate precisely 
how it varies from the tort of intimidation and to clarify the tests applicable to its constituent 
elements. In particular, there is a need to resolve the divided views (reflected in the majority 
                                                                
169
 OBG, n 12 at [162], per Lord Nicholls. 
170
 See Hoffmann L, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Economic Torts in Torts in Commercial Law’ in Degeling, 
Edelman and Goudkamp, n 33 at p 105. 
171
 The quest for a unifying ground of liability was traced by Balkin and Davis, n 2 at 580 [20.4] and 20.6 at 581 
[20.6], and by Deakin and Randall, n 36. 
172
 Balkin and Davis, n 2 at 592. 
173
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and minority judgments in OBG and the subsequent Total Network case) about what should 
count as unlawful means under this tort. 
 
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the analysis required to determine whether a 
particular form of coercion is proscribed, and whether viable causes of action exist, requires 
scrutiny of difficult-to-fathom concepts: interests, intention, purpose and unlawful means, as 
well as justification, which is analysed in Chapter Seven below. The tests applicable to these 
concepts under Australian law remain uncertain. It is difficult to anticipate the choices which 
may be made by the High Court of Australia when it eventually has the opportunity to 
deliberate upon and clarify the open questions for Australia. 
 
Chapter Three which follows briefly summarises the common law’s evolution of the general 
economic torts and focuses in particular on the problem of clarifying the meaning of 
‘unlawful means’.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ECONOMIC TORTS AND THE 
UNLAWFUL MEANS DEBATE 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The common law’s development of the economic torts has resembled the journey of an 
automobile running out of petrol. Intermittent shudders and vibrations are followed by 
extended periods where the vehicle glides under its own momentum. Periodically, new 
shakes and ructions leave the passengers startled and uncertain as to their destination. The 
last decade has been one of these turbulent phases. After a long period in which the general 
economic torts had been “quiescent,”1  they came into focus at the highest levels of the 
English judicial system in two significant cases reported in 2008 within a single edition of the 
Appeal Cases. In OBG v Allan
2
 and then in Revenue and Customs Commissioner v Total 
Network,
3
 the House of Lords sought to recalibrate the general economic torts. In A.I. 
Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd
4
 the Supreme Court of Canada endeavoured to 
interpret the House of Lords decisions for Canada. 
 
The decisions in these cases, the most important economic tort judgments of the past decade, 
demonstrate the operation of the torts in a commercial context. OBG concerned the actions of 
defendants who took control of the claimant company’s assets as receivers appointed under a 
floating charge which proved to be invalid. In Douglas and another v Hello!,
5
 the second of 
three conjoined cases heard on appeal in the OBG matter,
 
an action for causing loss by 
unlawful means was brought by the actors Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones against 
a magazine which had published surreptitiously-taken photographs of their celebrity 
wedding, despite knowledge that a rival magazine had paid US$1 million for the exclusive 
right to photographs of the wedding. In Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young
6
 a financier 
facilitated the actions of two employees of a property company who had, in breach of their 
contracts, diverted a development opportunity to a joint venture in which they were 
interested. Total Network involved a conspiracy to defraud the taxation revenue authorities, 
whilst A.I. Enterprises involved machinations amongst family members over the sale of a 
valuable investment property. 
 
In the past, discussion of the economic torts usually occurred in the context of labour law, the 
primary battleground for their development in the twentieth century. Carty’s view was that 
the torts were shaped by “judicial hostility to the growth of the trade unions” and concern 
                                                                
1
 Deakin S and Randall J, ‘Re-thinking the Economic Torts’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 519 at 524. 
2
 [2008] 1 AC 1. This case is referred to hereafter as “OBG”. 
3
 [2008] 1 AC 1174. This case is referred to hereafter as “Total Network”. 
4
 [2014] SCC 12; [2014] 1 R.C.S. 177. This case is referred to hereafter as “A.I. Enterprises”. 
5
 [2007] UKHL 21. 
6
 [2005] IRLR 964. This was the third of the conjoined cases heard on appeal with OBG. 
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over the power they can wield.
7
 She saw them as “muddled” by courts’ “inability to 
appreciate the legitimacy of collective pressure.”8 As a result of their intermittent deployment 
against trade unions,
9
 the general economic torts have been politically contentious. 
 
However, the new focus on application of the torts in commercial (and other)
10
 contexts 
means that the principles which underpin them must be generalisable across the full range of 
contexts. This need has reinvigorated debates about the implications, under these torts, of the 
employment of unlawful means by a defendant. Which categories of wrongful act should 
attract the application of the torts? 
 
At the same time, the Australian common law regarding the general economic torts is at a 
surprisingly early stage of development. As was seen in Chapter Two, there is continuing 
uncertainty as to the elements which constitute a number of them – a result of judicial 
inattention and the lack of opportunity, thus far, for the High Court of Australia to clarify the 
‘competing agendas’ revealed in OBG and Total Network. 
 
This chapter will explore the potential implications for Australian common law of the trilogy 
of important recent United Kingdom and Canadian decisions: OBG, Total Network and A.I. 
Enterprises. It is important to begin with a brief review of the historical development of the 
general economic torts, a task which inevitably involves review of the English precedent 
base. This will occur in Part II. Part III will summarise key principles enumerated in OBG, 
Total Network and A.I. Enterprises. Part IV will examine the alternative conceptions of the 
notion of ‘unlawful means’ that have been in focus in the recent cases, and consider whether 
a narrower or wider view of unlawful means should be preferred. 
 
  
                                                                
7
 Carty H, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2
nd
 Edition, 2010) at p 10. 
8
 Ibid at p 3. 
9
 See Balkin R and Davis J, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 4
th
 Edition, 2009) at p 579 [20.1]. 
10
 The relatively new context of collective environmental activism is in focus in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC TORTS 
 
A The Early Cases 
 
It has been said that the economic torts barely existed before Miss Johanna Wagner, a popular 
Covent Garden opera singer of the 1840s who was under contract to sing at Her Majesty’s 
Theatre in London, failed to honour that engagement.
11
 Mr Gye, a rival opera impresario to 
the proprietor of Her Majesty’s, Mr Lumley, induced her to break her contract. The 
subsequent litigation, in Lumley v Gye
12
 established the modern incarnation of the tort of 
inducing breach of contract, the progenitor from which the other economic torts have derived. 
The effect of the case was to settle a principle that, despite the frequently ruthless nature of 
competition between businesspeople in the mid nineteenth Century, there were “limits, 
boundaries to permissible competitive behaviour” and “Mr Gye had exceeded the bounds of 
decent behaviour in his chosen line of business.”13 
  
Over time, the ambit of the incipient new family of torts began to expand. Lord Hoffmann 
surmised that “the judges in Lumley v Gye must have thought that poaching someone who 
was contracted to provide her services to a rival was crossing a bright line which could be 
enforced without practical or conceptual difficulties.”14 However, because the common law 
trades in broad general principles, the judges’ original narrow purpose of laying down “a 
common rule about what amounts to unfair competition” became overwhelmed by wider 
applications of its principles.
15
  
 
The sentiment of Lumley v Gye was reinforced, and broadened, by key principles stated by 
the English Court of Appeal in Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co.
16
 The case 
involved a trading cartel of shipowners, working in concert to establish a monopoly of an 
important trade in tea, and to secure high profits.
17
 The conduct of the cartel, outrageous by 
modern-day standards, included the offering of loss leaders and special rates to those refusing 
to deal with its competitors. Lord Bowen said: 
 
No man, whether trader or not, can … justify damaging another in his commercial business 
by fraud or misrepresentation. Intimidation, obstruction, and molestation are forbidden; so is 
the intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other, assuming 
always that there is no just cause for it.
18
 
                                                                
11
 Hoffmann L, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Economic Torts in Torts in Commercial Law’ in Degeling S, Edelman 
J and Goudkamp J (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011) p 105. 
12
 (1853) 118 ER (749) (QB). 
13
 Hoffmann, n 11, pp 106-7; Waddams S, ‘Johanna Wagner and the Rival Opera Houses’ (2001) 111 LQR 431. 
14
 Ibid at p 107. 
15
 Ibid at pp 106-7 comprehensively discusses the historical setting for Lumley v Gye. 
16
 (1889) 23 QBD 598. 
17
 The facts of Mogul Steamship are concisely described in Elias P and Ewing K, ‘Economic Torts and Labour 
Law: Old Principles and New Liabilities’ [1982] 41 Cambridge Law Journal 321at 322. 
18
 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889) 23 QBD 598 at 614, per Bowen LJ. 
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B The Inhibition of Trade Union Activities 
 
The social development that spurred the take-off of the economic torts was the rise of the 
trade union movement. The strike, or the threat of a strike, which had become “the ultimate 
bargaining weapon of a nineteenth century trade union,” 19  quickly became an object of 
judicial consternation.
20
 
 
In two important cases at the turn of the twentieth century the House of Lords explored the 
question of whether there should be liability for abuse of economic power and for putting 
pressure on an employer “even where no independently unlawful act is committed.”21 In 
Allen v Flood
22
 the House of Lords saw there was no such liability. This case involved a 
dispute between ironworkers and shipwrights, where the ironworkers union urged an 
employer to terminate the employment of shipwrights, failing which a strike would occur. 
The employer dismissed the shipwrights, and they brought an action against the key union 
official alleging malicious interference with their employment. The action failed on the basis 
nothing unlawful had been done – the shipwrights had been dismissed lawfully and not in 
breach of contract. 
 
Carty characterised the majority in this case as taking an “abstentionist approach to liability 
for intentionally inflicted economic harm,” even “where intentional and unjustified economic 
harm was inflicted, liability would only follow where unlawful means were used.”23  
 
The subsequent case of Quinn v Leathem
24
 also involved actions by a trade union, but this 
time the House of Lords took a different view. A butcher (the plaintiff in the action) had 
employed non-union labourers, and was urged by the defendants to dismiss them in order to 
employ union workers. When the butcher refused, the union officials took action to 
effectively compel his largest customer to stop dealing with him, by threatening a strike of 
the customer’s union labour. The House of Lords in this case found a conspiracy to injure, as 
the defendants had been actuated by malice, having had “no just cause or excuse for their 
actions.” 25  This was the genesis of “bad motive” conspiracy. The case established the 
principle that it is a tort deliberately to harm another without justification, and specifically 
that “a combination or conspiracy aimed at harming the plaintiff in his trade or business was 
actionable if it was motivated by malice against him.”26 
                                                                
19
 Hoffmann, n 11 at p 108. 
20
 Ibid at p 109. Hoffman commented that in Temperton v Russell [1983] 1 QB 715 (CA) “one cannot read the 
description of the union’s activities by the Master of the Rolls without seeing disapproval dripping from every 
sentence.” 
21
 Elias and Ewing, n 17 at 322. 
22
 [1898] AC 1. 
23
 Carty, n 7 at p 17. 
24
 [1901] AC 495. 
25
 Elias and Ewing, n 17 at 323. 
26
 Deakin and Randall, n 1 at 522. 
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Carty has criticised Quinn v Leathem as “sowing the seeds of confusion” and sidelining a 
coherent framework articulated by Lord Watson in Allen v Flood.
27
 The orthodox view of 
these cases is that the element of conspiracy in Quinn v Leathem is the distinguishing feature 
between the two fact situations: 
 
In Allen a single trade union official was the defendant; in Quinn v Leathem a group 
of trade unionists were combining together. So motive and purpose became relevant 
where a combination of persons was acting together. The apparent justification for 
this was the belief that the coercive pressure of a group far outweighed that of an 
individual acting alone.
28
 
 
The establishment of liability for “abuse of the right to combine” was a major threat to the 
union movement. After political manoeuvrings, “Parliament came to the rescue” with passage 
of the Trade Disputes Act (UK) 1906 which contained an immunity from the tort of simple 
conspiracy for defendants “acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.”29  
 
Elias and Ewing characterised Mogul Steamship, Allen v Flood and Quinn v Leathem as “the 
trilogy of cases where the ground rules of the economic torts were established.”30 As will be 
seen in Part III of this chapter, over the past decade, fresh impetus for the development of the 
torts has been provided by a ‘new trilogy’ of cases. 
 
C The Twentieth Century ‘Muddle’ 
The further evolution of the torts over the course of the twentieth century has been 
chronicled by a number of English academics.
31
 In Carty’s view, from a doctrinal 
perspective, they got “into a muddle” during the middle years of the century. 32 
 
In a series of cases, starting with Sorrell v Smith 
33
 and culminating in Crofter Hand 
Woven Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch,
34
 “the courts accepted that the pursuit of union objectives 
as the predominant motive would constitute a justification and remove any liability for 
conspiracy.” 35  The judges in Crofter required “disinterested malice” on the part of 
conspirators, and accepted the following precept: 
                                                                
27
 Carty H, ‘The Economic Torts in the 21st Century’ [2008] LQR 641 at 644-645. See also Carty, n 7 at p 18. 
28
 Elias and Ewing, n 17 at 324. 
29
 Ibid at 325. See also Hoffmann, n 11 at pp 110-111. A form of this Act remain in place in the UK to the 
present day. 
30
 Ibid at 335. To this list must be added the “new trilogy” discussed in Part III of this chapter. 
31
 See Deakin and Randall, n 1; Carty, n 7; Elias and Ewing, n 17. See also Chapter Four of this thesis. 
32
 Carty, n 27 at 641.  
33
 [1925] AC 700 (HL). 
34
 [1942] AC 435. 
35
 Elias and Ewing, n 17 at 324. 
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… the pursuit of union objectives as the predominant motive would constitute a 
justification and remove any liability for conspiracy. However unethical, self -interest 
provides protection for trade unionists no less than for traders.
36
 
 
Crofter involved an embargo imposed against producers of Harris tweed, whose spinning 
mills were located on an island. The embargo was organised by officials of the Transport 
and General Workers Union, who had instructed dockers to refuse to handle yarn from 
the mainland consigned to the plaintiffs. The House of Lords held that “the predominant 
purpose of the combination was the legitimate promotion of the interests of the persons 
combining, and since the means employed were neither criminal nor tortious in 
themselves, the combination was not unlawful.”37 
 
Malice was interpreted as “the absence of economic justification; that is to say, the 
critical issue was whether the combination could be justified by the economic self -
interest of the group.”38 For liability to arise, the court required “an intention to injure 
unaccompanied by any wish to advance their own interests.”39 
 
Later, there came “an unexpected late revival of the economic torts” driven by an upsurge in 
the exercise of union power in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s which alienated the public, and 
judges.
40
 Rookes v Barnard (No. 1),
41
 in that it involved union officials urging an employer to 
terminate the employment of non-unionists, presented a set of facts quite similar to Allen v 
Flood six decades earlier, except that “the workers involved in Rookes were employed under 
contracts containing lengthy notice periods, so that the threatened strike action was 
unlawful.”42 Rookes has been widely seen as a turning point which opened up new avenues of 
liability, including the tort of intimidation.
43
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 Ibid. 
37
 Crofter Hand Woven Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435 at 435. 
38
 Deakin and Randall, n 1 at 522. 
39
 Hoffmann, n 11 at p 111. 
40
 See Hoffmann, n 11 at pp 112-113. He noted that the union excesses of the 1960s and 1970s led to passage of 
revised industrial relations legislation in the UK in the 1980s by the Thatcher government, the essential 
framework of which persists to the current day. The scheme of this legislation is to accept that, at common law, 
virtually all forms of industrial action are unlawful, but the legislative provisions make virtually all forms of 
industrial action lawful (if preconditions such as secret ballots have been met). 
41
 [1964] AC 1129. 
42
 Deakin and Randall, n 1 at 522. 
43
 Ibid at 524. According to Lord Hoffmann (n 11 at p 112) in Rookes “the antique cases about using violence to 
frighten away customers or suppliers were generalised into a tort of intimidation, using threats of unlawful 
action against a third party to cause damage to the target.” 
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III. THE NEW TRILOGY: KEY RECENT CASES 
  
A OBG v Allan 
 
OBG has been described as “a magnificent attempt to take the economic torts bull by the 
horns.”44 In this case the House of Lords deliberated on three conjoined appeals, which the 
Lords decided to hear together because of their overlapping legal issues concerning the 
intentional harm tort. 
 
The lead OBG case involved a “claim by a company in liquidation for damages in respect of 
losses sustained by the company through acts done by administrative receivers whose 
appointment was later held to be invalid”45 in which the appellants sought to widen the scope 
of the tort of conversion which mean that “the principles behind economic tort liability were 
raised.”46 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd47 (which was also reviewed as part of the OBG appeal) the 
focus was on the role of intention in the torts and issues about breach of confidence arising 
from publication of photographs taken surreptitiously at a celebrity wedding (the wedding of 
the actors Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jones).
48
 Mainstream Properties Ltd v 
Young
49
 concerned wrongful interference with contractual relations and alleged breaches by 
directors of their obligations to their company. Although this case might have been treated as 
a claim for dishonest assistance in breach of fiduciary duty its consideration by the House of 
Lords enabled “the essentials of the Lumley tort” to be addressed.50 
 
The facts and background in OBG have been concisely summarised by Hazel Carty: 
 
The claimant company sought damages in respect of losses resulting from acts done by 
receivers who had been invalidly appointed over them. The claimants were aggrieved that the 
receivers’ handling of the ‘run off’ from of the claimants’ contracts led to less satisfactory 
outcomes than the claimants would otherwise have achieved through their liquidators. 
However, neither bad faith nor negligence was alleged in the defendants’ management of the 
claimants’ contract claims. Rather, the claimants objected per se to the receivers’ invalid 
assumption of control over their contracts.
51
 
 
  
                                                                
44
 Carty, n 7 at p 23. Carty saw (at p 25) that “an agenda for the twenty-first century appeared to have been 
drawn up.” 
45
 Ibid at p 137. 
46
 Ibid at p 23. 
47
 [2007] UKHL 21. 
48
 See the comments made on this case by Carty, n 7 at pp 23 and 138. 
49
 [2005] IRLR 964. 
50
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51
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The House of Lords rejected the claim in OBG. In a split decision, the majority 
“distinguished the conspiracy tort from the unlawful means tort and held that a more flexible 
definition of ‘unlawful means’ was needed in the conspiracy context.”52 More important than 
the findings around liability in the case itself were the ground-breaking statements in the 
judgements about the patterns of liability underpinning the general economic torts. Lord 
Brown perceived a need “to confine [the tort of causing loss by unlawful means] to 
manageable and readily comprehensible limits.” Lord Walker concurred, expressing the 
challenge as “the identification of the control mechanism needed in order to stop the notion 
of unlawful means getting out of hand.”53 (A similar desire to place boundaries around the 
scope of the tort had previously been expressed by the High Court of Australia in Sanders v 
Snell.
54
) 
 
The majority judgments in OBG were primarily concerned with establishing (or re-affirming) 
the existence of the tort of unlawful means, tracing the history of its development and 
advancing the process of defining the nature of the elements of the tort. The judges 
comprising the majority did not concern themselves in any detail with specifying the 
rationale for the tort. Lord Hoffmann (representing the majority view which favoured a 
‘narrower’ interpretation of the tort) dealt only lightly with rationale, by referring to Quinn v 
Leathem and the way “the rationale of the tort was described by Lord Lindley” in that case.55 
 
A noteworthy feature of the claimants’ arguments in this case was that they sought to 
combine favourable ingredients of two torts – inducing breach of contract and the ‘unlawful 
means’ tort – in order to arrive at a new extended form of economic tort liability. They did 
this in order to overcome limiting features of the well-established torts: “they could not show 
that the receivers employed unlawful means, nor that they intended to cause OBG any loss, 
ruling out the unlawful means tort. Nor could they show any contract breach was involved, 
ruling out the Lumley tort.”56 As Carty highlighted, the method used by the claimants to plead 
this ‘hybrid’ tort was to rely on “a ‘broad reading’ of Lord Macnaghten’s dictum in Quinn v 
Leathem – that Lumley liability was based on a violation of a legal right through interference 
with contractual relations without sufficient justification.”57  Whilst these arguments were 
accepted by the Court of Appeal the majority of the House of Lords rejected them. 
 
Neyers saw four main elements of the OBG decision in relation to the unlawful means tort: 
 
                                                                
52
 This interpretation of the OBG decision was expressed by Cromwell J in A.I. Enterprises [2014] SCC 12; 
[2014] 1 R.C.S. 177 at [53], cross-referencing paragraphs [44], [76]-[77] and [94] of Lord Hoffmann’s speech in 
OBG. 
53
 OBG, n 2 at [266], per Lord Walker. 
54
 Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 at 341. This case was referenced in Chapter One, Part II (C) of this 
thesis. 
55
 OBG [2008] 1 AC 1 at [46], per Lord Hoffmann, referring to Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495, 534-535. 
56
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First, that inducing breach of contract and causing loss by unlawful means were separate 
actions that cannot be reduced to one genus tort … second … the unlawful means tort 
required proof of an intention to injure the plaintiff and that therefore proof that the harm was 
merely a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions did not suffice to 
impose liability. The third key element was that only means that are actionable by the 
intermediate third party (or would have been so actionable had the third party suffered loss) 
and which affected that party’s liberty to deal with the plaintiff, suffice as the “unlawful 
means” for the purposes of imposing liability. Thus, crimes and breaches of statute were 
excluded as unlawful means for the purpose of the tort … [Fourth] the unlawful means tort is 
a three-party tort involving a plaintiff, a defendant and an injured or threatened third party.
58
 
 
Carty itemised a string of ways in which areas of uncertainty were clarified by OBG: it was 
found that “the unitary approach was fundamentally wrong”59 and “the first in-depth analysis 
of the unlawful means tort was achieved, the majority demanding actionable civil wrongs as 
the basis of this tort.”60 She noted that: 
 
… their Lordships highlighted the danger of accepting the kind of hybrid liability that had 
been suggested. They killed off the tort of interference with contractual relations, as proposed. 
They rejected the ‘unified theory’. They established the only form of the Lumley tort is the 
classic form which focuses on ‘secondary’ liability for inducing a breach of contract.
61
 
 
Carty said the effect of the case was that it “offered as a framework for the general economic 
torts … a two-tort paradigm, based on a three-party scenario, the defendant deliberately 
striking at his target through a third party.
62
 
 
A key issue the House of Lords grappled with in OBG was the nature of unlawfulness 
required to satisfy the first element of the unlawful means tort, of wrongful interference: 
“what should count as unlawful means?” 63  Lord Hoffmann described this as “the most 
important question concerning this tort.”64 As was noted in Chapters One and Two of this 
thesis, the case law has developed two alternative conceptions of unlawful means: a 
‘narrower view’ and a ‘wide view.’65 On the question of which of these conceptions is most 
appropriate their Lordships were divided, with the majority preferring the narrower view, 
according to which unlawful means is only constituted by an ‘actionable civil wrong’. 
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In a subsequent article Lord Hoffmann summarised the effect of OBG: “the tort of causing 
loss by unlawful means was severely restricted to loss caused by acts which were tortious 
against third parties and caused loss to the plaintiff by restricting the ability of the third party 
to deal with him, so pruning the tort back to the original cases of deliberate violence or fraud 
against customers or suppliers for the purpose of taking away a rival’s business.”66  He 
acknowledged that an important reason for this part of the decision of the majority was “a 
wish to confine the economic torts as narrowly as possible, on the grounds that they have 
little rational basis in social or economic policy and that such matters are best left to the 
legislature.”67 
 
The debate around the meaning of unlawful means is analysed in Part IV of this chapter. 
 
B Total Network 
 
The Total Network case involved an allegation that the defendant had conspired with others 
to deprive the Revenue and Customs Commissioners in the United Kingdom of revenue from 
value added tax (‘VAT’) via a series of thirteen ‘carousel frauds’ involving sales of mobile 
phones. The scheme capitalised on the fact that no VAT was payable on imports into the UK 
from a country in the European Union, or exports out of the UK to somewhere else in the 
European Union. The defendant was a Spanish company from whom phones had been 
bought, which was a party to the fraud. The defendant’s conduct constituted the common law 
offence of ‘cheating the Revenue’, but this was not actionable by the Commissioners as a 
civil suit.
68
 
 
The question in issue in the case was whether this crime constituted ‘unlawful means’ for the 
purposes of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy and whether the alleged unlawful means 
employed by the defendant must have been independently actionable by the party against 
whom it was inflicted. An argument made against a crime amounting to sufficient unlawful 
means was that the tort gave effect to a form of accessory liability (i.e. A is liable for a wrong 
committed by B to C, because A agreed with B that B would perpetrate that wrong upon C). 
This argument was unsuccessful. 
 
The defendants also argued, citing the decision in OBG just a few months earlier, that for the 
sake of consistency ‘unlawful means’ must have the same meaning under both the unlawful 
means conspiracy tort and the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means. This 
argument was rejected, for two reasons. First, it was seen that it would be anomalous if a 
claimant could sue in ‘lawful means conspiracy’ where no-one had actually done anything 
wrong to cause loss, that the same claimant could be prevented from suing in unlawful means 
conspiracy simply because the means used were ‘merely criminal’. Second, it was felt that 
Lord Hoffmann’s views in OBG on the meaning of unlawful means might only apply in two-
party cases, ie. cases where a defendant intentionally caused a claimant harm directly (rather 
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than by interfering with a third person’s freedom to deal with the claimant).69 This is an 
important distinction for the purposes of this thesis, because the thesis is primarily concerned 
with the conduct of groups acting in concert. 
 
In Total Network it was unanimously held that, for unlawful means conspiracy, “a common 
law offence could count as ‘unlawful means’ even if it was not separately actionable by the 
claimant. In this connection, the stricter approach in OBG was distinguished as one that was 
intended to apply only to a three-party unlawful means tort.”70 Lord Walker’s concluded that 
the law should be clarified “by holding that criminal conduct (at common law or by statute) 
can constitute unlawful means, provided that it is indeed the means … of intentionally 
inflicting harm.”71 Carty’s brief summation was that “the Total Network panel asserted that 
other two-party economic torts – such as conspiracy – would not necessarily be encompassed 
by the analysis in OBG. Therefore, a different definition of unlawful means could be applied 
to the conspiracy tort compared to the unlawful means tort.”72 She framed the decision in 
Total Network as follows: “crimes (though not all crimes) constituted unlawful means for the 
tort of unlawful means conspiracy, even though OBG established they would not for the 
unlawful means tort.”73 
 
The Total Network decision has been evaluated by a wide range of commentators. Deakin 
and Randall concluded that “the analysis in OBG raises as many questions as it answers”74 
and that the case “while clearing away some doctrinal confusions, has created new 
uncertainties.”75 
 
Lee saw that whilst the case “clarified that ‘unlawful means’ in the context of the conspiracy 
tort should be construed broadly to include crimes that are not also civilly actionable” this did 
not mean that any unlawful act will suffice and it is likely that in the future “greater reliance 
will have to be placed on the need to demonstrate a tight causal link between the unlawful act 
and the injury sustained to rein in the tort.”76 Lee’s assessment, based on analysis of the 
judgements of Lords Hope, Mance and Neuberger, was that they saw the “gist” of the tort of 
unlawful means conspiracy as lying in: 
 
… the intentional infliction of harm through a combination. That being the case there was no 
reason for insisting on a “single consistent approach as to what constitutes unlawfulness in 
relation to all the economic torts” and no reason why unlawful means conspiracy could not be 
established by a crime that was not also actionable as a tort.
77
  
                                                                
69
 McBride and Bagshaw, n 68 at p 710. 
70
 Lee, n 68 at 348. 
71
 Total Network [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [95] per Lord Walker. 
72
 Carty, n 7 at p 27. 
73
 Ibid.  
74
 Deakin and Randall, n 1 at 519. 
75
 Ibid at 552. 
76
 Lee, n 68 at 349. 
77
 Ibid at 348. 
Chapter Three: The Evolution of the General Economic Torts and the Unlawful Means Debate 
 
55 
 
In McBride and Bagshaw’s view, the effect of Total Network is likely to be that courts will 
now develop over time a separate set of rules (distinct from the unlawful means tort) for the 
means required under the tort of unlawful means conspiracy.
78
 
 
Carty’s evaluation of the case was entirely negative. While she assessed the analysis in OBG 
as a “search … for coherence and certainty,” partly accomplished, she despaired that “the 
Total decision has arguably undermined the prospect for clarity that OBG represented, and 
thrown the economic torts back into the mess they were before OBG.”79 Carty commented 
that “the debate as to the existence and scope of two-party economic torts has been set alight 
by the House of Lords decision in Total Network, a debate which may lead to the emergence 
of two frameworks for economic tort liability and possibly the distortion of established areas 
of tort liability.”80 
 
C A.I. Enterprises  
 
In 2010, Carty wrote, following OBG and Total Network: 
 
What is required is that an agreed agenda for development be articulated. This would clarify 
the underlying rationale or rationales of the general economic torts and thereby establish the 
control mechanisms necessary to contain liability.
81
 
- 
In the 2013 A.I. Enterprises case,
82
 a Full Court of the Supreme Court of Canada looked to 
rise to this challenge. The judgement of the Court, authored by Cromwell J, sought to “delve 
deeply into the rationale of the tort [of causing loss by unlawful means] and its place in the 
larger scheme of tort liability for causing economic harm”83 in order to set out the scope of 
liability for the tort for Canada. 
 
A.I. Enterprises involved machinations amongst family members over the sale of a valuable 
investment property: the action was brought by Bram and Jamb, family companies which 
were majority shareholders of a corporation that owned an apartment building in New 
Brunswick, Canada. A minority interest-holder, A.I. Enterprises, whose sole director was A, 
exercised rights it held under a syndicate agreement and its arbitration processes in such a 
way as to delay a sale with the result that the property was eventually sold to A.I. Enterprises 
for $2.2 million, less than the $2.58 million that could have been obtained from a third party 
purchaser. The defendants also “impeded the sale by registering groundless encumbrances 
against the property and denying prospective buyers access to the property.”84 
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The trial judge found that the conduct of A.I. Enterprises and A amounted to interference by 
unlawful means and awarded damages against them reflecting the difference between the sale 
price paid by A.I. Enterprises and the price that a third party would have paid.
85
 A.I. 
Enterprises and A appealed. The Court of Appeal found their conduct did not meet the 
requirements of the unlawful means tort. It nevertheless imposed liability on them on the 
basis of a ‘principled exception’ to the unlawful means requirement. The idea that the 
unlawfulness requirement was subject to principled exceptions was a novel aspect of this 
decision.  
 
When the Supreme Court heard the matter on a further appeal, it rejected the principled 
exception arguments but found that A.I. Enterprises and A were liable for the damages 
because of a breach by A of his fiduciary duties as a director of the family companies – a 
basis unrelated to the economic torts.
86
 
 
The Supreme Court took the opportunity to make a series of statements about the 
composition of the unlawful means tort, although – in view of the fact the matter was decided 
on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty – these might be considered obiter dicta.  
 
After reviewing the authorities Cromwell J observed that there was a need for a rationale for 
the unlawful means tort but there was “no consensus about what that rationale is or should 
be” and “no clear rationale as a matter of historical fact.”87 Lacking such a precedent, he set 
about defining a new ‘best rationale’ for the tort and concluded it “was ‘liability stretching’ - 
a rationale that favours a narrow approach to the unlawful means requirement.”88 
 
Cromwell J favoured a narrow view of unlawful means which required that acts “give rise to 
a civil action by a third party and interfered with the plaintiff’s economic activity.”89 The 
result of this approach was seen to be “extending civil liability without creating new 
actionable wrongs.”90 It would have the effect that “the potential scope of liability is limited 
by both the intention requirement and the more restrictive definition of the conduct which 
will support liability.”91 
 
The Supreme Court’s preferred approach focused on “extending an existing right to sue from 
the immediate victim of the unlawful act to another party whom the defendant intended to 
target with the unlawful conduct.” 92  This would allow “those intentionally targeted by 
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already actionable wrongs to sue for the resulting harm.”93 Liability would arise “where the 
wrongdoer’s acts in relation to a third party, which are in breach of established legal 
obligations to that third party, intentionally target the injured plaintiff”94 The Court’s view 
was that “the gist of the tort” was “the targeting of the plaintiff by the defendant through the 
instrumentality of unlawful acts against a third party.”95  
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ILLEGALITY 
 
A The Difference of Views Surrounding Unlawful Means 
 
As Chapter Two explained, the notion of ‘unlawful means’ is an integral element of inducing 
breach of contract, conspiracy by unlawful means, intimidation and ‘causing loss by unlawful 
means’. The width of the definitions applied to ‘unlawful means’ has been seen as one of two 
potential ‘control mechanisms’ able to be levered to inhibit the overall scope of the 
innominate unlawful means tort (with the other being intentionality).
96
 The precedents 
demonstrate significant variations in judicial approaches. As different definitions of unlawful 
means are applied across the various torts, problems of coherence and consistency arise. 
 
Summarising the position as at 2009, Deakin and Randall observed that “the category of 
unlawful means stretches all the way from serious criminal conspiracies (as in Total Network) 
to threats to commit civil wrongs such as a breach of contract.”97 Heydon’s earlier assessment 
had been that illegal means under the innominate unlawful means tort “may be common law 
crimes like murder of a third party, or breaches of criminal statutes; torts, for example 
nuisance as against third parties, nuisance as against the plaintiff, trespass against the 
plaintiff, violence against third parties, defamation of the plaintiff, injurious falsehood … and 
breaches of contract.”98 
 
Specifically for the unlawful means tort (as shown by the outlines above of OBG, Total 
Network and A.I. Enterprises) the recent common law has developed two starkly different, 
but well-reasoned, conceptions of unlawful means: a ‘narrower view’ under which unlawful 
means is only constituted by an actionable civil wrong
99
 and “criminal offences and breaches 
of statute would not be per se actionable;”100 and an alternative ‘wide view’. The latter 
conception widens the net of the conduct qualifying as prima facie tortious, by embracing 
“all acts a defendant is not permitted to do, whether by the civil law or the criminal law.”101 
 
In the recent cases, the narrower view has been progressing towards orthodoxy. However, 
despite the strong judicial endorsements it has received, the narrower view is far from set in 
concrete, especially from an Australian vantage point. As Lee highlighted, “the debate as to 
                                                                
96
 See Deakin and Randall, n 1 and Neyers, n 58. 
97
 Deakin and Randall, n 1 at 551. 
98
 Heydon JD, ‘The Defence of Justification in Cases of Intentionally Caused Economic Loss’ (1970) 20 
University of Toronto Law Journal 139 at 174. Heydon also (at 173) summarised conduct found not to 
constitute unlawful means: agreements in restraint of trade and “a system of fines and blacklists operated by 
members of a trade association to advance their trade interests” (Ware & De Freville Ltd v Motor Trades 
Association [1921] 3 K.B. 40) and “an invasion of privacy independently of trespass” (Byrne v Kinematograph 
Renters’ Society Ltd [1958] 1 W.L.R. 762) would not constitute unlawful means conspiracy. 
99
 Lord Hoffmann’s preference was based on the view “it is not for the courts to create a cause of action out of a 
regulatory or criminal statute which Parliament did not intend to be actionable in private law” – OBG [2008] 1 
AC 1 at [57]. See also [60]. 
100
 See Total Network [2008] 1 AC 1174 per Lord Walker and A.I. Enterprises [2014] SCC 12; [2014] 1 R.C.S. 
177 at [45]. 
101
 OBG [2008] 1 AC 1 at [162] per Lord Nicholls. 
Chapter Three: The Evolution of the General Economic Torts and the Unlawful Means Debate 
 
59 
 
the scope of ‘unlawful means’ remains very much alive in view of the lack of unanimity 
amongst the Law Lords in OBG.”102 The situation is further complicated by the strength of 
judicial logic underpinning the contrary majority position in Total Network and contestable 
aspects of the analysis in A.I. Enterprises. 
 
B The Narrower View 
 
For the unlawful means tort, the majority in OBG adopted a narrow definition of unlawful 
means, under which “criminal offences and breaches of statute would not be per se 
actionable.”103 Lord Hoffmann’s view was that acts against a third party should only count as 
unlawful means if they are actionable by the intermediate third party and affect that party’s 
liberty to deal with the plaintiff, with one qualification: “that they will also be unlawful 
means if the only reason why they are not actionable is because the third party has suffered 
no loss.
104
 
 
His Lordship added: 
 
It is not for the courts to create a cause of action out of a regulatory or criminal statute 
which Parliament did not intend to be actionable in private law … I do not think that 
the width of the concept of ‘unlawful means’ can be counteracted by insisting upon a 
highly specific intention, which ‘targets’ the plaintiff. That, as it seems to me, places 
too much of a strain on the concept of intention.
105
  
 
Under this view, crimes and breaches of statute would be excluded as unlawful means for the 
purpose of this tort.
106
 Lee concisely summarised the essence of Lord Hoffmann’s position as 
follows: “a person is liable for interference by unlawful means if he deliberately inflicts 
economic injury on another through the commission of civil wrongs against a third party 
intermediary.”107 
 
Lord Hoffmann’s position was supported by others in the majority in OBG.108 
 
The narrow view favoured by Lord Hoffmann was endorsed by a unanimous decision of 
seven judges of the Supreme Court of Canada in A.I. Enterprises. In that case, Cromwell J 
preferred a restrictive rationale for the tort: 
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… because it establishes a clear ‘control mechanism’ on liability in this area of the law, 
consistent with tort law’s reticence to intrude too far into the realm of competitive economic 
activity: OBG, at para. 266, per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe. In the words of Baroness Hale 
of Richmond in OBG, it is ‘consistent with legal policy to limit rather than to encourage the 
expansion of liability in this area.’109 
 
The decision in A.I. Enterprises and the majority view in OBG both reflected a desire to limit 
or inhibit the scope of the unlawful means tort’s availability.    
 
In A.I. Enterprises Cromwell J said that the focus should be “not on enlarging the basis of 
civil liability, but on allowing those intentionally targeted by already actionable wrongs to 
sue for the resulting harm” and that the tort should only be available if:  
 
… under common law principles, those acts also give rise to a civil action by the third party 
and interfered with the plaintiff’s economic activity. For example, crimes such as assault and 
theft would be actionable by a third party in the torts of trespass to the person and conversion. 
But other breaches of criminal or regulatory law will not give rise to a civil action and there 
will therefore be no potential liability under the unlawful means tort.
110
  
 
The Supreme Court expounded four propositions in support of adopting a narrow scope for 
the unlawful means tort, reflecting “the modern role that the tort should play in the broader 
scheme of civil liability.”111 The first was the notion that the common law accords a relatively 
low level of protection to purely economic interests: “tort law has traditionally afforded less 
protection to purely economic interests than to physical integrity and property rights.”112 
 
A second proposition was the idea that “the common law generally prefers a limited role for 
the economic torts in the modern marketplace”113 - it was seen that the common law has 
traditionally been “reluctant to develop rules to enforce fair competition.”114 This is in line 
with the views of Carty, that “the role of fostering a healthy competitive order – whether that 
be by the regulation of monopolies, anti-competitive agreements, or policing trade descriptors 
– is essentially a matter for state regulation, in the interests of the public at large.”115  
Thirdly, there was a concern “not to undermine certainty in commercial law”116 and it was 
noted that “the common law … has generally promoted legal certainty for commercial affairs. 
That certainty is easily put in jeopardy by adopting vague legal standards based on 
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“commercial morality” or by imposing liability for malicious conduct alone.” The Canadian 
Supreme Court harkened back to the view of Lord Morris in Mogul Steamship that 
“regulating commercial activity should not … depend on the idiosyncrasies of individual 
judges.”117 
 
Fourthly and finally Cromwell J listed the concern “that tort liability, if unduly expanded, 
may undermine fundamental rights.”118 He referenced “… the risk that expanded liability for 
the economic torts may be used to undermine legislative choices and perhaps even 
constitutionally protected rights of expression and association” and said that “a narrow and 
clear definition of the scope of liability reduces this risk.” A limited scope for the unlawful 
means tort was supported by: 
 
… the risk inherent in the economic torts generally that they will undermine legislative 
schemes favouring collective action in, for example, labour relations and interfere with 
fundamental rights of association and expression. At one time the common law was ready – 
and many would say overrready – to intervene to prevent economic coercion in the context of 
industrial disputes. The common law’s approach in this area led to legislative intervention to 
grant greater freedom to labour unions by enacting immunities to specific economic torts, in 
legislation.
119
 
 
Cromwell J noted that the common law’s approach in the area of the economic torts led to 
“legislative intervention to grant greater freedom to labour unions by enacting immunities to 
specific torts” (legislation modelled on the UK Trade Disputes Act 1906 and successor Acts). 
This was seen to be one of the factors supporting the “wisdom of viewing the unlawful means 
tort as one of narrow scope.”120 
 
It will now be argued that the judicial viewpoints expressed around these considerations are 
contestable and that the wide view of unlawful means is the preferable conception. 
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C The Wider View 
 
The alternative ‘wider view’ was favoured by a minority of the judges in OBG. It was most 
clearly expressed by Lord Nicholls who said: “the concept of ‘unlawful means’ stretches far 
and wide. It covers common law torts, crimes, breaches of contract, breaches of trust and 
equitable obligations, breaches of confidence, and so on.”121 
 
In making these observations His Lordship relied upon key judicial statements in Rookes v 
Barnard.
122
 In that case Lord Reid articulated a distinction between “doing what you have a 
legal right to do and doing what you have no legal right to do” 123  whilst Lord Devlin 
observed that it was “of course” accepted that a threat to commit a crime was an unlawful 
threat. Lord Devlin went on to note: “It cannot be said that every form of coercion is wrong. 
A dividing line must be drawn and the natural line runs between what is lawful and unlawful 
as against the party threatened.”124 Lord Nicholls said: 
 
I accept the approach of Lord Reid and Lord Devlin and prefer the wide interpretation 
of ‘unlawful means’. In this context the expression ‘unlawful means’ embraces all 
acts a defendant is not permitted to do, whether by the civil law or the criminal law.
125
 
 
Lord Nicholls began his judgment by considering the ingredients of the relevant economic 
torts.
126
 He noted that although “the common law of England has adhered to the view that 
'unlawful' conduct is a prerequisite of liability under the tort of unlawful interference with 
trade” 127  the content of this expression was not well established and there was “some 
controversy” about its scope.128 
 
His Lordship referred approvingly to the writings of the legal academic Tony Weir,
129
 whom 
he described as a “staunch supporter” of the approach of “having an objective element of 
unlawfulness as the boundary of liability.”130  The sympathies of the Canadian academic 
Jason Neyers – derived from a standpoint of ‘strict legalism’ - also tend to align with the 
wider view.
131
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In Lord Nicholls’ view “the true rationale” underlying the lawful interference tort was that: 
  
… by this tort the law seeks to curb clearly excessive conduct. The law seeks to 
provide a remedy for intentional economic harm caused by unacceptable means. The 
law regards all unlawful means as unacceptable in this context.
132
  
 
The wider view was supported by the subsequent comments of Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe 
in Total Network (in which he departed somewhat from his own views expressed nine months 
earlier in the majority in OBG). Lord Walker said that “criminal conduct (at common law or 
by statute) can constitute unlawful means, provided that it is indeed the means … of 
intentionally inflicting harm.”133 His Lordship also said: 
 
… all the statements of general principle in the classic cases seem to me to be 
consistent with the proposition that unlawful means, both in the intentional harm tort 
and in the tort of conspiracy, include both crimes and torts (whether or not they 
include conduct lower on the scale of blameworthiness) provided that they are indeed 
the means by which harm is intentionally inflicted on the claimant (rather than being 
merely incidental to it).
134
 
 
It should be noted that the “Australian conspiracy analysis” applying to the tort of conspiracy 
by unlawful means, under which the requisite unlawfulness can be constituted by breach of 
contract, crimes and breaches of statute, also accords with a wider view of unlawful means.
135
 
 
Two principal objections to the wider view have been expressed in the literature. The first, 
which has been argued by Hazel Carty, a leading advocate of the “narrower view 
conception”136 is that it is important to apply control mechanisms to the general economic 
torts rather than broaden their scope of operation.  
 
A second objection was acknowledged by Lord Nicholls in OBG: that the wider view 
“tortifies” criminal conduct.137 In A.I. Enterprises Cromwell J addressed this, seeing that his 
preferred approach “avoids ‘tortifying’ the criminal and regulatory law by imposing civil 
liability where there would not otherwise be any.”138 
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D Arguments for the Wider View 
There are six reasons why, for Australia, the wider view of unlawful means should be 
preferred over the narrower view. 
 
The first is that the wider view is consistent with important first principles. The starting point 
for the creation of the unlawful means tort was that it was developed in order to inhibit 
“clearly excessive and unacceptable intentional conduct.” 139  The exclusion of criminal 
offences and breaches of statute from the ambit of the tort undermines this aspiration. 
 
In his treatise analysing tort law and economic interests Cane stated three key propositions 
regarding tort law’s discouragement of illegal conduct. The first was that “as a matter of 
public policy, courts are unwilling to give legal remedies to a party who founds his cause of 
action on his own illegal act. The judges do not wish to be seen as giving aid or 
encouragement to law breakers.”140 A second proposition was that if an “illegal act was a 
cause of, or was closely associated with … loss … it would be an ‘affront to the public 
conscience’ to afford relief.”141 Thirdly, a court will not “promote or countenance a nefarious 
object or bargain which it is bound to condemn.”142 The problem with the narrow view is that 
it is at odds with the common law’s traditional intolerance, as a matter of policy, of illegality. 
 
The second reason for preferring the wider view of unlawful means resonates with a 
corrective justice view of tort law.
143
 The efforts of Cromwell J the Supreme Court of Canada 
in A.I. Enterprises to fashion a rationale for the narrower view by introducing a number of 
new labels and categories which seem to be entirely novel formulations, are unconvincing 
and suggest the application of policy-based reasoning. Lee saw potential for the torts to be 
reined in, if a wider view was adopted, by greater reliance on “the need to demonstrate a tight 
causal link between the unlawful act and the injury sustained.”144 
 
Third, the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in A.I. Enterprises is premised on a 
downplaying of the importance of the protection of economic interests relative to other 
interests, which may be regarded as contentious. The view of Cromwell J was that “tort law 
has traditionally accorded less protection to purely economic interests than to physical 
integrity and property rights.” 145  The debate about the relative importance of economic 
interests is discussed further in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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Fourth, the majority judgments in OBG and A.I. Enterprises give the impression that, in their 
grappling with the complexities of the law’s internal coherence, sight may have been lost of 
the “very simple” proposition expounded by Lord Walker in his exegesis on unlawful means 
(in the majority) in Total Network: 
The man in the street, if asked what an unlawful act was, would probably answer ‘a crime.’ 
He might give as an example theft, obtaining money by false pretences, or assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm. He might or might not know that each of these was also a civil wrong (or 
tort) but it is unlikely that civil liability would be in the forefront of his mind … The reaction 
of a lawyer would be more informed but it would not, I suggest, be essentially different. In its 
ordinary legal meaning “unlawful” certainly covers crimes and torts (especially intentional 
torts). Beyond that its scope may sometimes extend to breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and perhaps even matters which merely make a contract unenforceable.
146
 
These words are consistent with the injunction of Lord Nicholls, in the minority in OBG: 
 
It would be very odd if … the law were to afford the plaintiff a remedy where the defendant 
committed or threatened to commit a tort or breach of contract against the third party but not 
if he committed or threatened to commit a crime against him. In seeking to distinguish 
between acceptable and unacceptable conduct it would be passing strange that a breach of 
contract should be proscribed but not a crime.
147
 
 
The fifth reason for preferring the wider view is the desirability of keeping the meaning of the 
‘unlawful means’ as consistent as possible across the torts of unlawful means conspiracy and 
causing loss by unlawful means. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe observed in Total Network 
that difficulties of analysis can result from the fact: 
 
… it has been generally assumed, throughout the 20th-century cases, that ‘unlawful means’ 
should have the same meaning in the intentional harm tort and in the tort of conspiracy. A 
good deal of legal reasoning in the speeches and judgments (as to the ingredients of one or 
other of these torts) has been based on the assumption that the meaning must be the same in 
both.
148
 
 
It may seem a bridge too far, based on the current state of the authorities, to seek to reinstate 
exact consistency across these torts, but the higher courts in Australia should strive towards 
this desired end-point unless there is an overriding reason of principle not to do so.
149
 
 
Sixth and finally, adoption of the wider view of unlawful means would enable an enlivening 
of the justification defences available under the general economic torts. In Heydon’s words, 
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“the wider the net of illegality is thrown, the more the need for a defence of justification.”150 
Chapter Seven which follows later in this thesis will examine more flexible approaches which 
might allow courts to weigh the nature of illegality involved against the strength of potential 
justifying factors. It will explore the potential for future development of the intentional 
economic torts to be shaped by an expansion of justification defences. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As a result of OBG and Total Network, the general economic torts have attained new impetus 
in the twenty-first century, but doctrinal consistency remains elusive. This is exemplified by 
the debate around unlawful means. Some academics argue that unlawful means should mean 
the same throughout these torts, although not all agree on this. 
 
Ideally, there would be a high degree of uniformity on the meaning of unlawful means across 
the torts. Widely different views on similar elements from one tort to the next lead to 
doctrinal confusion and this is one of the factors which, as a practical matter, discourages the 
pleading of the economic torts. Creating as much consistency as possible between the 
elements of the various torts – bringing them into line with one another – continues to be a 
commendable objective.  
 
The adoption of the narrower view by the majority in OBG “has been criticised on account of 
its illogicality
151
 and inconsistency with authorities.”152 Rather than providing clarity, a close 
examination of A.I. Enterprises leads to yet more confusion as to the precise components of 
the unlawful means tort and the difficult question of what should count as unlawful means.
153
 
The ambiguities that have dogged the torts have been compounded by this trilogy of 
important recent cases. 
 
The narrower view of unlawful means was expressly preferred by the majority of the House 
of Lords in OBG and by Cromwell J on behalf of the Full Court of the Canadian Supreme 
Court in A.I. Enterprises (albeit, arguably, in obiter dicta). Undoubtedly, the conclusions of 
these courts will be persuasive when Australia’s High Court eventually has an opportunity to 
determine the status of the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means for Australia. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a strong case for a wide conception of unlawful means to be preferred 
for Australia, for two main reasons. The first is that a wide view would be capable of being 
applied across the innominate unlawful means tort and the tort of unlawful means conspiracy, 
in line with the “Australian conspiracy analysis.”154 The depth and range of the Australian 
case law pertaining to unlawful means for the purposes of conspiracy may be a factor which 
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in due course inclines the High Court to prefer the ‘Nicholls view’ from OBG. Neyers has 
shown that it would be open to the High Court to adopt the wide view.
155
 It may legitimately 
be asked: for the sake of consistency and coherence, why should crimes and torts be 
disregarded as qualifying forms of wrongful interference for one tort when they are sufficient 
for another?
156
 
 
A second strong reason for preferring the wide view is that – in deeming torts but not crimes 
or statutory breaches ‘unlawful’ – the narrower view fails the ‘man in the street test’ framed 
by Lord Walker in Total Network.
157
 It is undesirable to deny the unlawful means tort remedy 
to a plaintiff who has been caused loss, and targeted, by collective action which constitutes a 
crime or a breach of statute, on the basis of a judicial desire to establish a ‘control 
mechanism’. This can be characterised as “a ‘judicial confiscation’ of what is due to the 
claimant in order to subsidise external policy objectives,” 158  contrary to the precepts of 
corrective justice theory. 
 
The conclusion of this chapter is that, in placing primary emphasis on unlawful means as the 
control mechanism for the unlawful means tort, and preferring the narrower view, the House 
of Lords in OBG and the Supreme Court of Canada pulled the wrong rein. However, because 
of the cogent arguments articulating the alternative wide view which can be drawn from the 
minority judgment of Lord Nicholls in OBG and the observations made by Lord Walker in 
Total Network, the unlawful means horse has not entirely bolted. 
 
The preferable conception is a wide view of unlawful means placing emphasis on ‘targeting,’ 
accompanied by a clearer articulation of principles underpinning justification defences. Such 
an approach was conceived by Heydon in the 1970s, subsequently supported by Weir and 
Sales and Stilitz, and re-advocated by Deakin and Randall in 2009.
159
 A ‘justification-
enabling’ conception of unlawful means would ‘widen the net’ of the conduct qualifying as 
prima facie tortious, and necessitate closer attention to the available defences. The 
implications of such a conception for justification defences under the torts will be explored in 
Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
 
Next, however, it is important to review the key economic torts literature, examining the 
work of the most significant recent academic commentators in the field. This is undertaken in 
Chapter Four which follows. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SEARCH FOR AN IMPROVED CONCEPTUAL MAP 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A series of examinations of the general economic torts by academics have attempted to 
decipher their complexity and categorise and classify the torts in the light of the case law. As 
was evident from the cases referenced in the preceding chapters, there are a range of 
alternative conceptions of these torts. 
 
The torts have been under-studied.
1
 Perhaps this is because, as Heydon observed, “there 
cannot be any account of the economic torts which is comprehensible without effort”.2 In 
OBG, Lord Hoffmann described the economic torts as “an extremely obscure branch of the 
law.”3 Neyers concluded torts such as “unlawful interference with economic relations” were 
“radically under-theorised” and said the economic torts generally “could benefit 
tremendously from more intense academic examination.” 4  The perceived absence of 
comprehensive recent academic scrutiny of the torts was addressed in the wake of OBG and 
Total Network: the two cases spurred a wave of scholarly papers analysing their implications. 
In recent times, the opinions of academic writers have significantly influenced the 
development of the torts.
5
 
 
This chapter seeks to discern the main fault lines of academic opinion and explore the 
effectiveness of various ‘roadmaps’ that have been proposed for the future development of 
the torts. It will firstly (in Part II) consider two significant debates that have preoccupied 
much of the past academic analysis of the general economic torts – the de facto role the torts 
play in regulating competition; and whether it is possible to identify a single coherent 
principle of liability ranging across the various torts. The chapter then reviews the work of 
the most significant recent academic commentators and in each case refers to major criticisms 
that have been, or can be, made of their positions. 
 
First, the views of two outstanding early Anglo-Australian scholars of the torts will be 
summarised – Dyson Heydon, later a judge of the High Court of Australia from 2003 to 2013, 
who was (in the 1970s) the author of two editions of a ground-breaking text titled Economic 
Torts
6
 and several notable journal articles on the torts;
7
 and Tony Weir of Cambridge 
                                                                
1
 See Chapter 1, Part II B. 
2
 Heydon JD, Economic Torts (2
nd
 Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1978, London) referenced by Weir T, Economic 
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4
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University and Trinity College, whose contribution was highlighted by his series of 
Clarendon Law Lectures delivered in Oxford in 1996 and a subsequent book, also titled 
Economic Torts.
8
 
 
Next, the viewpoints of Hazel Carty, perhaps the most influential economic torts scholar of 
the past fifteen years, are summarised. Carty has proposed an optimal framework for the 
further development of the torts. The suggestions made in her book An Analysis of the 
Economic Torts
9
 and a related article
10
 have had a significant impact upon the recent 
evolution of the common law position. 
 
The chapter then reviews the ideas of a number of influential scholars who have examined 
the torts from a rights perspective. The contribution of the corrective justice theorist Ernest 
Weinrib is considered
11
 together with that of Robert Stevens, who based his study of the 
economic torts on a ‘rights model’, reflecting a view that “the infringement of rights, not the 
infliction of loss, is the gist of the law of torts.”12 The recent contributions of the Canadian 
academic Jason Neyers, who in three significant articles, explored the potential for rights-
based theories to provide justification for the economic torts,
13
 expressly reviewed the 
application of corrective justice theory to the torts
14
 and made incisive observations on gaps 
in Australian law,
15
 are also analysed. 
 
Finally, the important contribution of Simon Deakin and John Randall is discussed. Their 
2009 article ‘Rethinking the Economic Torts’16 focused on discerning potential pathways for 
the future development of the torts and suggested a new conceptual map to guide their future.  
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II. THRESHOLD ISSUES 
The general economic torts are concerned with competition, although there are differences in 
views about their precise role in regulating commercial activity. Lord Hoffmann in OBG saw 
the unlawful means tort as designed “to enforce basic standards of civilised behaviour in 
economic competition, between traders or between employers and labour.”17 Carty said “the 
economic torts represent [the common law’s] chosen method to attack excessive (rather than 
simply aggressive) competition or economic endeavour, whether through diversion of custom 
or attacks on commercial links”18  but argued “the courts should accept a minor role in 
policing economic behaviour.”19 Cromwell J in A.I. Enterprises agreed, observing that the 
common law “is reluctant to develop rules to enforce fair competition” and noted that “the 
scope of the unlawful means tort should be understood in the context of the broad outlines of 
tort law’s approach to regulating economic and competitive activity.”20 A “wider competency 
for the common law in the regulation of economic activity”21 is envisaged by Deakin and 
Randall – “maintaining the integrity of the competitive process.”22 
 
The debate about the appropriate role of the torts in regulating competitive conduct or rivalry 
gives rise to interesting questions about the appropriateness of applying those remedies to 
novel settings which fall outside conventional conceptions of competition. Cane noted that 
even “industrial action designed to improve wages and conditions is a form of competitive 
activity, in the sense that the aim of the action is to achieve a redistribution of wealth from 
the employer to the employees just as traders seek to divert wealth from their own 
competitors to themselves.”23 
  
Questions have been asked about whether this ‘competition base’ paradigm should be applied 
to certain groups who are seen to be special cases worthy of distinct and differentiated 
treatment, like environmental NGOs and activist networks.
24
 Interestingly, competition 
arguments have been used to advantage by activist groups – in Gunns Ltd v Marr25 the 
Wilderness Society successfully resisted disclosure of documents relating to its campaigns, 
tactics, strategies and operations on the basis they might give the company it was targeting a 
collateral advantage in its conduct of adversarial dealings, a tacit acknowledgement of the 
competitive context of activism.
26
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Maxwell observed that there are a range of ways in which NGOs operate competitively, for 
example in relation to fundraising and in vying for goodwill in the public domain.
27
 Baron 
and Deirmeier referenced “competition among activist groups in the market for donors and 
volunteers” and saw that “the encounter between the activist and the target is viewed as 
competition. At the heart of that competition is an activist campaign, which is represented by 
a demand, a promised reward if the target meets the demand, and a threat of harm if the target 
rejects the demand.”28 Although it can be argued that activist conduct does not conform to the 
ordinary maxims of competitive rivalry – Maxwell has noted impediments the economics 
discipline has faced in predicting NGO patterns of activity due to comprehension dissonance 
resulting from their diversity and aggregate “lack of a widely recognized objective 
comparable to the profit-maximizing objective of firms”29 – activist groups can be regarded 
as in competition with the corporations they target. 
 
The potential role of the general economic torts in regulating competition between for-profit 
corporations and environmental activist groups will be explored in Chapters Eight and Nine 
of this thesis. 
 
For decades, academic and some judicial consideration of the economic torts was dominated 
by a debate about the possibility of developing a ‘unifying ground of liability’ for the 
economic torts.
30
 However, these efforts to find a single coherent principle of liability for the 
torts have been unsuccessful. 
 
According to Lord Walker in OBG, “the ‘unified theory’ of the economic torts, attractive as it 
is, must be rejected.”31 It has been said that OBG “affirmed that there is no unified theory 
linking the tort of inducing breach of contract with the tort of unlawful interference with 
trade, and that the two are quite separate wrongs.”32 
  
In OBG Lord Hoffmann firstly referenced the observation of Sales and Stilitz that Lumley v 
Gye “was founded on a different principle of liability than the intentional harm tort.” He then 
explained that its extension to the imposition of secondary liability on a person who procures 
a contract-breaker to breach his contract, “it is quite distinct from the unlawful means 
principle, which is concerned only with intention and wrongfulness and is indifferent as to 
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the nature of the interest which is damaged.”33 Lord Hoffmann also envisaged “practical 
disadvantages” with a unified theory.34  
 
As Cromwell J noted in A.I. Enterprises, there is now a settled consensus among scholars 
“that there is no single unifying principle underlying the economic torts generally.”35 Various 
academics have concluded that claims the economic torts are part of a wider principle of 
prima facie liability for intentional harm, or that they are based on a theory of secondary or 
accessorial liability, should be rejected.
36
 Lee observed: “the strict inductive reasoning 
employed by the majority of the Law Lords in OBG appears to have foreclosed the 
development of a broad organising principle. Their Lordships’ preference was to construct 
the law incrementally.”37 
The debate on the prospects for establishing greater uniformity between the various torts is 
especially significant in the context of this thesis when the topic of illegality is in focus (as it 
was in Chapter Three of this thesis).  
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III.  HEYDON: AN EARLY AUSTRALIAN VIEWPOINT 
In his book Economic Torts, the most prominent Australian writer in the field, Dyson 
Heydon, discussed three
38
 “general formulations” for the torts.39 The first formulation he 
identified was the “wider” tort he termed “intentionally causing loss by unlawful means”. He 
identified five drawbacks with this proposed formulation: 
 
First, it fails to take account of the recent protection of the right to work. Secondly, it shares a fault 
of the individual existing torts which would merge with it, parasitic as they are on illegalities…It 
depends on what standards contracting parties have stipulated for each other…A third problem 
…is that some thought would have to be given to ironing out the many inconsistencies among the 
illegalities…[Fourthly,] supposed advantages of certainty would be illusory, because of the 
likelihood of new common law illegalities being discovered and because of the uncertainty in 
operation of each of even the best drafted statutes. Furthermore, the wider the net of illegality is 
thrown, the more the need for a defence of justification.
40
 
 
A second potential formulation Heydon identified was “intentionally causing loss by 
improper means.” He referred to United States cases “where the defendant has used means 
which though improper are not actionable in themselves” (e.g. lies which do not amount to 
deceit or defamation).
41
 Heydon acknowledged, however, that this formulation would be 
“even vaguer than the proposed tort of intentionally causing loss by unlawful means.”42 
 
The third possible general form of liability advanced by Heydon was “if the defendant causes 
damage to the plaintiff intentionally and without justification he should be liable.”43 A basis 
for this formulation was seen to arise from Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow and 
Co
44
 and Skinner & Co v Shaw
45
 as well as logic which could be adopted from American 
jurisprudence, including its ‘prima facie tort’ theory. This placed central focus on the 
importance of justification. 
 
Heydon considered arguments in favour of this potential formulation of the tort and also 
arguments against it. He listed the following “arguments in favour”: 
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First, without substantial change in the incidence of liability, the entire law would be put on a 
much sounder theoretical basis. Secondly, there is much evidence in English law
46
 that we are 
approaching … a possible wider tort. Thirdly, the change would make the law much more capable 
of handling bad behaviour and abuse of rights and of power; much more flexible; and much more 
based on factors of substance rather than technicality. Fourthly, our law remedies intentional 
injuries to the plaintiff’s body, to his nervous system, to his land and chattels; it is anomalous that 
a general theory of intentional tortious liability has developed for injuries to all these interests, but 
not for injuries to the plaintiffs financial interests.
47
  
  
Heydon then detailed arguments commonly used against adoption of a general tort based 
around an absence of justification for intentionally causing damage: “obstacles of precedent” 
deriving from Allen v Flood and Lumley v Gye;
48
 the argument that “to base the law on 
intention, motive and justification would allow a wider scope for prejudice” (including 
against trade unionism, by “property-owning juries”); “that to work out the defence of 
justification would be a difficult and uncertain process”; that “there is little point in changing 
the whole doctrinal basis of the law if the incidence of liability is not going to be much 
changed”; “that there is a danger of burdening commercial mobility by requiring all who 
enter business to answer for their motives”;49 that any extension of liability “will not benefit 
the weak individual citizen, but only the powerful and well-advised company”; and, finally, 
that there are advantages to “limiting recovery for losses to those which occurred because of 
interference with contract” because this would prevent “an excess of litigation”.50 Heydon 
also acknowledged other difficulties involved in placing focus on malice, including that “it 
rarely occurs as the sole or predominant motive” and “it is usually combined with some 
illegality or interference with contract or conspiracy which makes it seem orthodox.”51 
 
In the conclusion of his book, Heydon acknowledged that “a common criticism of any 
generalised tort is that it would be so wide as to render unlawful most acts of ordinary 
business competition, unless a wide defence of justification is permitted” but came to the 
view that “the gains in rationality and predictability of development that follow from 
generalisation and a greater concentration on justification might outweigh any uncertainty: 
the latter problem might only be transitional.”52 
 
Heydon discussed the American case of Tuttle v Buck in which a wealthy banker was held 
liable for spitefully driving the plaintiff barber out of business by opening a rival barbershop, 
and undercutting him.
53
 He saw that it was possible to take two different views of this case – 
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one, that it was “based on abuse of the right to compete” or alternatively on “the broader 
notion of intentionally causing loss without justification.”54 
 
Carty has been strongly critical of viewpoints expressed by Heydon, arguing that he “presents 
perhaps the simplest overarching thesis. He supports prima facie liability based on intentional 
harm.”55 Carty observed that he “bemoans the fact that the English courts did not adopt” 
liability based on malicious motive, as per Tuttle v Buck. She interpreted Heydon’s stance as 
contending that “rejecting malice as the focus of liability…denied the economic torts 
theoretical consistency.”56 Carty went on to state that the aim of her book was to show 
otherwise and to “support Lord Hoffmann’s rejection of Heydon in OBG v Allan.”57 In the 
concluding chapter of her book she cautioned against “focusing on intention as the main 
control mechanism” and argued that this “could move the economic torts even closer to 
Heydon’s agenda, even though this was expressly rejected by Lord Hoffmann.”58 
 
The rejection of Heydon which Carty refers to appears to be Lord Hoffmann’s statement that: 
 
Some writers regret the failure of English law to accept bad motive as a ground for liability, as it is 
in the United States and Germany: see for example Dyson Heydon, Economic Torts 2
nd
 ed (1978) 
p 28. But I agree … that we are better off without it. It seems to have created a good deal of 
uncertainty in the countries which have adopted such a principle.
59
 
   
Carty’s criticisms of Heydon seem overdone and it is possible to interpret his positions more 
sympathetically. In particular, she disregarded the nuanced account of ‘interests’ he 
undertook in his 1970 article The Defence of Justification in Cases of Intentionally Caused 
Economic Loss.
60
 Her comments conveyed the impression that in seeing importance in giving 
weight to malice as a factor, Heydon was arguing for it to be the “focus of liability.”61 
  
An alternative interpretation of Heydon’s views is that he envisaged a menu of options that 
might enable the three considerations of intentionality, unlawful means and justification to be 
‘dialled up or down’ in relative importance. He did not argue for unlawful means to be 
expunged as a consideration, though he did urge that relative importance should be attached 
to intention and malice. His view emphasised the significance and implications of 
unlawfulness as a factor in the torts. 
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IV. WEIR: THE PROPER NATURE OF THE ECONOMIC TORTS 
In his Clarendon Law Lecture series delivered in Oxford in 1996, Tony Weir addressed “the 
proper nature of the torts that redress deliberately inflicted economic harm.”62 Weir searched 
for ways to unify the economic torts. For example, he argued that the specific “tort of 
procuring breach of contract has now been absorbed into the general tort of causing harm by 
unlawful means,”63 a viewpoint that has subsequently been shown to be mistaken. However, 
Weir’s lively and insightful work built foundations for the work of many subsequent 
commentators.  
 
Bagshaw discerned two overarching themes in Weir’s arguments: that there are “good 
reasons for insisting that liability in the economic torts should depend on the unlawfulness of 
the means used to inflict the harm…and that in all the economic torts that are dependent on 
unlawful means the requisite mental element is that the harm was deliberate.”64 The issues 
that surround these two themes are central to current-day debates about the economic torts. 
On the first of Weir’s themes, concerning the scope of unlawful means, Bagshaw framed his 
argument thus: “in order to prevent a trivial illegality triggering the general economic tort it 
may be necessary to hold that breaches of minor provisions in contracts and of irrelevant 
laws do not constitute ‘unlawful means’.”65 (Weir saw that “it would be possible to interpret 
the Lumley v Gye tort so that “not every induced breach contract is relevant, but only 
breaches of principal obligations or relevant laws.”66) With the passage of time and hindsight 
it is now apparent that Lord Hoffmann’s proposed solution in OBG to the potential problem 
of trivial breaches triggering liability, and Carty’s proposals for broadly drawn control 
mechanisms, range well beyond the solution Weir considered necessary to avoid this risk.  
  
As far as “the requisite mental element for the general economic torts” was concerned, Weir 
advocated “a narrow mental element, ‘deliberate harm’, in order to reduce the extent to which 
the economic torts impinge on liberty.”67 Bagshaw saw that “Weir’s version of deliberate 
harm” (which is to say, his interpretation of the state of affairs in the case law as at 1996) 
comprised two elements: “the defendant must intend the harm, as opposed to merely 
expecting it or foreseeing it as a possibility, and the defendant must have been ‘aiming at’ the 
plaintiff” i.e., intending the harm for the plaintiff.68 
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Carty described Weir as a subscriber to the “interventionist” judicial approach, viewing him 
as belonging to the category of commentators who preferred intention rather than unlawful 
means as the prime control mechanism for the general economic torts (and therefore wishing 
to see a broader view of unlawful means employed). She saw that he employed a “limited 
version of an overarching theory” of liability which: 
 
…sees the main control over their scope as being provided by the strict intention required viz the 
orthodox definition of ‘targeted harm’. Mindful of Allen v Flood this policy also requires unlawful 
means, though defined in a wide way. So for Weir it is ‘tortious intentionally to damage another 
by means of an act which the actor was not at liberty to commit’. For this reason he also sees a 
prime role for the defence of justification.
69
 
 
Bagshaw expressed concern at a potential consequence of following Weir’s interpretation. He 
saw that if malice was broadly defined to “mean ‘intending to cause harm without a 
legitimate justification for doing so’” then “the tort [of causing loss by unlawful means] 
would amount to a considerable and unpredictable restriction on freedom … For instance, 
every protest group urging a consumer boycott might be compelled to justify its actions on 
pain of liability for the consequences.”70 
In OBG, Lord Nicholls (who was in the minority in that case) referred approvingly to Weir’s 
writings, describing him as a “staunch supporter” of the approach of “having an objective 
element of unlawfulness as the boundary of liability.”71  
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V. CARTY: PROMOTING THE ABSTENTIONIST APPROACH 
 
In her work, spanning two editions of her book An Analysis of the Economic Torts
72
 and a 
number of influential articles
73
 Hazel Carty addressed the need to find solutions to the 
anomalies that existed within the architecture of the economic torts at the turn of the last 
century. She saw that, by the year 2000, the torts were in a “hopeless muddle”74 with “lack of 
clarity in the definition of key ingredients of the torts,” in particular “no certainty in the 
definition of knowledge or unlawful means…[or] the cornerstone economic tort requirement 
of intentional harm.”75 Carty described the House of Lords’ focus on the torts in OBG as “a 
chance to finally sort out this mess (which had been bubbling away for 100 years)”76 which 
“promised a new dawn for understanding the economic torts.” 77  She noted that the two 
conspiracy torts had been “left hanging” and “remained on the periphery of the economic 
torts in terms of importance.”78 
 
Carty provided a useful concise summary of ‘the academic debate’ regarding the economic 
torts.
79
 She identified four ‘camps’ amongst academic commentators as to the role the torts 
should play in policing economic behaviour and specifically how widely the ingredient of 
unlawful means should be defined. 
 
The first cluster emphasised the importance of conceptions of intention: “Some … see 
intention as the prime control mechanism so that unlawful means can be defined broadly 
(beyond actionable civil wrongs to include crimes and perhaps even wider in the attenuated 
form of ‘doing what you have no legal right to do’).”80 She placed Weir, Sales and Stilitz and 
Deakin and Randall in this camp. Sales and Stilitz, she said, argued “that the common law 
focus on intention and unlawful means in the economic torts could be transferred to a wider 
principle of liability for intentionally causing harm.”81 Carty also noted that “though it would 
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appear that there is agreement that these should be torts of intentional harm, the definition of 
intention remains fluid.”82 
A second camp was described as seeing “unlawful means as the prime control mechanism.” 
Here, reference was made to Bagshaw, who was quoted as suggesting: 
 
…a further limit on ‘unlawful means’ so that only those which ‘are identical with or in some way 
approximates to behaviour that is unacceptable between competitors’ should give rise to liability 
in tort.
83
 
 
A “third group” (Carty placed herself and Eekelaar in this camp) was said to: 
 
… see both intention and unlawful means as important limiting mechanisms. On this view both 
should be narrowly defined, with ‘unlawful means’ requiring actionable civil wrongs.
84
 
 
Carty also observed: “There are some commentators who believe that these torts do not need 
to be limited by the interest they protect: that they point the way forward to a generalized 
model for intentional tort liability.”85 Carty regarded Weir as propounding a “limited version 
of an overarching theory” which saw “the main control over their scope as being provided by 
the strict intention required viz the orthodox definition of ‘targeted harm’,” but also requiring 
unlawful means “though defined in a wide way.”86 
 
Carty was particularly concerned with the need she perceived for tight control mechanisms to 
inhibit the potentially broad ambit of the torts, noting that: 
 
… there are variations in approach as to the best control mechanisms for limiting liability … [and] 
there is a debate whether intention or unlawful means should be the focus for limiting these torts, 
or indeed whether both need to be restrictively defined to avoid an over-broad liability.
87
 
 
Her preference was for “a narrow definition of intention and unlawful means, an almost non-
existent justification defence and a side-lining of conspiracy liability as either unnecessary 
(unlawful means) or anomalous (lawful means).”88 
 
Carty saw the development of the economic torts in the United Kingdom as the result of 
choices made by judges in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in accord with “two 
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antithetical policies”89 – “a policy of judicial abstentionism” and “judicial hostility to the 
growth of the trade unions.”90 In her analysis a policy of abstentionism meant that the courts 
took a policy decision that “motive of itself was not a permissible mechanism for imposing 
economic tort liability.”91 As a result “the general theme of the economic torts was that 
intentionally inflicted economic harm, even if inspired by malice, would not result in liability 
unless unlawful means were used [either by the defendant or through a third party] against 
the claimant.”92 
 
Carty contrasted this approach with the alternative (which she termed “interventionist”) 
approach under which “intentional injury causing loss should be actionable unless public 
policy, in the guise of the defence of justification, indicated otherwise.”93  She saw that, 
whereas the Court of Appeal in Allen v Flood had appeared to favour an interventionist role, 
the majority of the House of Lords in that case rejected it.
94
  
 
Her view was that the general economic torts have been “muddled” by “judicial hostility to 
trade unions or inability to appreciate the legitimacy of collective pressure”95 and attributed 
“the growth and uncertainty” of the torts “to the fact that they commonly arise in the course 
of industrial action.”96 She commented that, for example, to “undermine” a requirement for 
strict intention under the tort of inducing breach of contract
97
 was “hardly legitimate in view 
of the fact that it may deny trade unions the immunities from liability that Parliament 
intended they should have”98 and this affected the economic torts by: 
 
…unsettling the application of these torts when they are pleaded in other contexts. So, the 
uncertainty generated by the application of these torts within the context of an industrial dispute is 
transferred to subsequent commercial or competition cases in which the torts are raised.
99
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Carty detailed her own “preferred agenda” for “the correct definition of ‘intention’ to be 
applied by the courts,”100 involving retention of a ‘target’ test – one which she regarded as 
“traditional,” “orthodox” 101  and “standard”: 102  “the defendant must target or aim at the 
claimant” and “a high degree of blameworthiness is called for.”103 Consistent with her views 
on the three-party nature of the economic torts, Carty saw that “the notion of ‘target’ requires 
that the defendant has to aim at the claimant by also aiming at the intermediary.
104
 So there is 
a series of aimed harm, with the intermediary as piggy in the middle.”105 In her conception, 
‘targeted’ harm “envisages an intended ‘domino’ effect of harm flowing from the defendant, 
through the third party and finally meeting its target, the [plaintiff]”106 and “unless he targets 
the claimant through the intermediary there will be no liability.”107 
 
She noted the following statement of Lord Hoffmann on the definition of intention: 
 
[I]t is necessary to distinguish between ends, means and consequences. One intends to cause loss 
even though it is the means by which one achieved the end of enriching oneself. On the other 
hand, one is not liable for loss which is neither a desired end nor a means of attaining it but merely 
a foreseeable consequence of one’s actions.
108
 
 
Carty observed that this shift to a ‘means and ends’ definition of intention was “a departure 
from the orthodox view that existed prior to OBG v Allan.” As Neyers explained, the 
orthodox view had been that “intention for the purposes of the unlawful means tort required 
that ‘the harm needed to be aimed, directed or targeted in the sense that causing the [plaintiff] 
economic harm will be a specific object of the conduct in question’.”109 The ‘aimed, directed 
or targeted’ understanding of intention was seen by both Carty and Neyers to be “more 
consistent with Lord Lindley’s explication”110 in Quinn v Leathem, where he said: 
 
… if the interference is wrongful and is intended to damage a third person, and he is damaged in 
fact – in other words, if he is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through others, and is thereby 
damnified – the whole aspect of the case is changed; the wrong done to others reaches him, his 
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rights are infringed although indirectly, and damage done to him is not remote or unforeseen, but 
is the direct consequence of what has been done.
111
 
 
Despite her general accord with the views of Lord Hoffmann in OBG, Carty saw that “there 
are dangers in replacing the traditional clear and restricted approach to intention with the 
OBG suggestions,” namely “the ends/means test and the glosses to the definition of ‘unlawful 
means’ proposed by Lord Hoffmann112 and Lord Nicholls.”113 She noted that “the orthodox 
test of targeted harm was rejected by Lord Hoffmann (and apparently also by Lord Nicholls) 
with relatively little discussion”114 and suggested: 
 
… that the OBG definition of intention should be ignored, together with the OBG ‘glosses’. They 
are all unnecessary if the ‘target’ test is retained, a test that reflects the fact that the economic torts 
involve ‘principles of liability for the act of another’.
115
  
 
Carty’s ‘Alternative Agendas’ 
 
Carty identified three alternative agendas which could be the basis for future liability under 
the economic torts which she saw as viable following the OBG and Total Network cases. She 
urged that “an agreed agenda for development” needed to be articulated in order to “establish 
the control mechanisms necessary to contain liability for the deliberate infliction of ‘pure’ 
economic harm.”116 
 
The first proposed agenda she identified, which she called the extended civil party agenda, 
would see “the general economic torts limited to the direct infliction of economic harm and 
‘unlawful means’ limited to actionable civil wrongs.”117 Carty stated that this had always 
been her preferred option.
118
 
 
Requiring an “actionable wrong” as a threshold for bringing a tortious action can lead to the 
imposition of liability on quite an arbitrary basis. In Mbasogo v Logo Ltd (No. 1) it was said 
to be “unattractive and also arbitrary that … [liability] … depends on the virtual 
happenstance of whether or not the unlawful means are actionable at the suit of the 
claimant.”119 
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The second agenda Carty identified, which was said to draw on the analysis in Total Network, 
especially that of Lord Walker - and which she termed “the two-party extended civil liability 
agenda” - would apply the OBG policy only to the indirect infliction of economic harm; “the 
direct infliction of economic harm [would be] subject to an extended definition of unlawful 
means.”120 
 
Carty’s third possible agenda was said to be grounded in Lord Nicholls’ analysis in OBG. She 
viewed this as a “more dramatic version of the Total Network agenda,” involving “an 
extended civil liability agenda for both the direct and indirect infliction of economic 
harm.”121 
 
Carty objected to “extending the scope of unlawful means” to merely “blameworthy conduct” 
or “focusing on intention as the main control mechanism” on the basis this “could move the 
economic torts ever closer to Heydon’s agenda” and submitted that “a narrow remit for these 
torts, based on existing civil liability is the best policy.”122 
 
In the final chapter of the 2
nd
 edition of her book, Carty sought to distil an optimum 
framework for the general economic torts, taking account of OBG and Total Network.
123
 The 
starting point was her construction of a suggested optimum framework in the first edition of 
her book,
124
 which preceded those two cases. There, she saw three distinct categories based 
on different liability justifications. Category A involved the “secondary liability economic 
torts” where liability was “based on inducing a third party to commit an actionable wrong” - 
this included the tort of inducing breach of contract. Category B covered the “unlawful act 
economic torts” where the use by the defendant of “unlawful means to intentionally harm the 
claimant” justified the imposition of liability and where “the necessary nexus between the 
defendant and the claimant must be proved and that nexus is intended harm.” 125 In this 
category were the tort of causing loss by unlawful means and the tort of intimidation. In 
category C was lawful means conspiracy which was seen to “demand its own category” as it 
required “neither unlawful acts nor an attack on the economic interests of the claimant by 
participation in another’s wrong” but rather “concerted action in furtherance of an agreement, 
causing intended harm to the claimant” – in effect a tort of malice.126 
 
Carty viewed the unlawful means conspiracy as belonging in a further, distinctive category 
and in the 2010 edition of her book outlined three potential adjusted frameworks for the torts 
post-Total Network as a result of the House of Lords’ decision in that case to not “contain” 
the unlawful means conspiracy cause of action. One of these involved expanding her 
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Category B to reframe it as “indirect and direct unlawful means liability: nexus plus extended 
unlawful means.” The other options she advocated involved a brand new category expressed 
either as “unlawful means conspiracy liability: nexus plus extended unlawful means” or 
“direct unlawful means liability: nexus plus extended unlawful means.”127 
 
A Critique of Carty 
 
Of modern writers, Carty appears to have had the most impact on the viewpoints of judges 
straining to find a coherent future structure for the general economic torts. Her work has 
strongly influenced the trajectory of the torts since the turn of the last century. Cromwell J, in 
A.I. Enterprises, cited the views of Carty on the “confusion, overlap and inconsistency” 
inherent in the torts
128
 and noted she had “wisely said,” with reference to the innominate 
unlawful means tort, that “the scope of this tort can only be established by clarifying its 
rationale so that there is a principled definition of unlawful means.” He went on to say “I 
agree in general terms with Hazel Carty that ‘a narrow remit … based on existing civil 
liability is the best policy’: An Analysis of the Economic Torts (2nd ed.), at p. 301.”129 Lord 
Hoffmann, in his decision in OBG, also indicated that he had placed some reliance on the 
views of Carty, stating:  
 
In arriving at these statements of general principle, I have derived great assistance from many who 
have written on the subject in addition to those whom I have specifically cited and in particular, if 
what I have said does anything to clarify what has been described as an extremely obscure branch 
of the law, much is owing to Hazel Carty’s book An Analysis of the Economic Torts (2001).
130
 
 
Carty saw great prospects for the law to develop in her preferred direction based on the 
majority decision in OBG, which aligned in key respects with her formulations. She was 
bitterly disappointed by contradictory aspects of the decision in Total Network, handed down 
just six months later, which she described as having “thrown the economic torts back into the 
mess in which they were before OBG”131 and opening up a “can of worms yet again.”132 
 
Carty’s analysis of the economic torts is admirably comprehensive and Lord Hoffmann’s 
endorsement of her work is well-deserved. However, there are four questionable aspects of 
her analysis. The first is that Carty gives the impression her enthusiasm for placing control 
mechanisms around the torts, and for a narrow view of unlawful means, is largely due to her 
views on the importance of granting freedom of action to trade unions.
133
 The context of 
labour relations has strongly influenced the shaping of her views and other contexts have 
been less focused upon. 
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Second, the proposals for future development of the torts she advanced are too complicated – 
in the end, a potpourri of complex amalgams. Her work is motivated by a continuing 
aspiration for theoretical consistency in line with broad organising principles.
134
 Whilst, as 
noted in Part II above, this continues to be a commendable objective, more pragmatic 
solutions seem to be required, in line with Heydon’s preference for “substance rather than 
technicality.”135 As Lee observed “the strict inductive reasoning employed by the majority 
Law Lords in OBG appears to have foreclosed the development of a broad organising 
principle. Rather, their Lordships’ preference was to construct the law incrementally.”136 
There may be good reasons for allowing the individual torts to develop differentially.
137
 
 
Third, Carty favoured statutory solutions over iteration of the common law. In arguing the 
need for an “appropriate level of common law control over economic endeavour” she made 
the contestable claims that there is a “limited ability of the courts” to develop an “appropriate 
balance between policing competition and not unduly stifling it”138 and that “the common law 
can only work as a safety net; rigorous control of competition in the public interest must be 
the function of Parliament.”139 She also saw that “the role of fostering a healthy competitive 
order … is essentially a matter for state regulation, in the interests of the public at large”140 
and that “the economic torts act as residual rules of the game, lacking the fine tuning or 
finesse of statutory law.”141 Thus, her “suggested optimum framework” ascribed “a limited 
role to the judiciary, with the state providing any more complex regulation deemed 
necessary.”142 The impact of this viewpoint is evident in the concerns expressed by Cromwell 
J in A.I. Enterprises about “the risk inherent in the economic torts generally that they will 
undermine legislative schemes favouring collective action” and that “expanded liability for 
the economic torts may be used to undermine legislative choices.”143  
 
The fourth criticism which may be made of Carty is related to the first. In her enthusiasm to 
limit the torts, Carty placed lower emphasis than some other commentators on the importance 
of protecting economic rights and business interests. She lightly noted Weir’s comment that 
“economic torts have something to do with liberty”144 but she certainly did not base her 
approach on the analysis of rights. 
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VI. WEINRIB AND STEVENS: RIGHTS-BASED THEORIES 
By contrast to Carty, adherents to a school of thought based on the ‘rights model’ contend 
that analysis of the general economic torts should be ‘all about rights.’ Ernest Weinrib, whose 
work built important foundations for later rights theorists, wrote that: 
 
…rights provide the space within which all right holders may pursue ends of their own. Such ends 
are consistent with the self-determining freedom of others only if the point of pursuing them is 
independent of the adverse effect on someone else. When all act to pursue ends of their own in 
this sense, they all rank equally as persons whose activities can coexist within the system of rights. 
Conversely, if the freedom to perform an act merely to frustrate the purposes of another were 
legitimate, rights would be transformed from markers of mutual freedom to instruments of 
subordination.
145
 
 
Arguing from the perspective of corrective justice, he observed that the study of the law of 
torts often commences with the “simple and obvious idea” that “the point of a tort action is to 
undo the injustice that the defendant has done to the plaintiff.”146 Rights may be exigible 
against the rest of the world but tort actions are concerned with the effect of conduct by one 
party upon another. Hence, damages are usually assessed on the basis of putting the 
successful plaintiff in the position they would have been in had the action complained of 
never occurred (this can be contrasted with the position in contract law where damages are 
designed to place parties in the position they would have been in had unperformed 
obligations in a contract been performed). Corrective justice “restores the equilibrium, 
through an award of compensation, within the…relationship of the injured plaintiff and the 
defendant”147 where a “bipolar relationship”148 has been disturbed. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Weinrib’s views have been criticised by those who favour “a more contextual 
approach to law” and incorporation into law of “the findings of the social sciences.”149 A 
particular criticism is that “corrective justice is too contested and indeterminate to be 
illuminating.”150 
 
Robert Stevens, in his 2007 book Torts and Rights,
151
 and elsewhere,
152
 has urged that 
understanding of the economic torts should be based on analysis of rights. According to 
Stevens: 
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A wrong is a breach of a duty owed to someone else. A breach of a duty owed to someone else is 
an infringement of a right they have against the tortfeasor. Before a defendant can be characterized 
as a tortfeasor the anterior question of whether the claimant has a right against him must be 
answered. The law of torts is concerned with the secondary obligations generated by the 
infringement of primary rights.
153
 
 
He concluded that “the infringement of rights, not the infliction of loss, is the gist of all 
torts,”154 highlighting that “for those torts which are not actionable per se the infliction of a 
loss is necessary before liability arises, but it is never alone sufficient.”155 He called this 
conception of law “the rights model”156 and contrasted his preferred approach with a “loss-
based model.”157  
 
Neyers, critiquing Stevens, highlighted the argument made in Torts and Rights that an action 
under the unlawful means tort “may be justified on the basis that it prevents [the defendant] 
from deliberately using others as means to his own end” but sees a logical inconsistency in 
that “the justification that Stevens proposes for the exception seems to require that there 
should be no exception – no deviation from the requirement of privity.”158 He argued that 
Stevens’ proposed justification “logically leads to the conclusion not that there should be 
liability to the plaintiff (who has not been used, only harmed) but rather to the third party 
(who has been used).”159 
 
The views of Weinrib and Stevens, and reactions to those views, are further explored in 
Chapters Five and Six of this thesis.  
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VII. NEYERS: EXPLORING RIGHTS-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE TORTS 
In three significant articles published in 2008, 2009 and 2011,
160
 Jason Neyers sought to 
identify a rights basis for the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means. His 2008 
article described this as “the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations” whereas 
in 2011 he adopted the nomenclature “the unlawful means tort.” This reflected the change in 
prevailing terminology that arose from Total Network. 
 
Writing in 2008, Neyers examined whether rights-based theories can explain the tort, seeking 
to identify “an independent right of the defendant” that when violated should entitle a 
defendant to sue in its own right. After considering and largely dismissing ‘right to trade’, 
‘remoteness’ and ‘abuse of right’ as justifying the tort (due to problems of coherence and fit 
with case law), he found potential justification in a ‘public right’ theory: “the plaintiff is not 
suing for a violation of any of her private rights but rather to vindicate her enjoyment of 
public rights created by the criminal law (whether statutory or common law).” 161  He 
explained this theory by reference to the dictum of Palles CB in Leathem v Craig, who saw 
that a civil action could be sustained if a criminal action is “accompanied by damage special 
and peculiar to the individual”:162 
 
… in addition to his own private rights, it is clear that every member of the community has, in 
common with every other member, an individual right that a public right shall not be violated in 
such a way as to cause him special and peculiar damage; and although, for such an invasion of the 
public right as affects all persons alike, an indictment, as distinct from an action, is the only 
remedy, yet, if an individual, by reason of the publication of the public right, sustain an injury 
peculiar to himself, an action lies at his suit against the guilty parties … [This principle is] 
applicable to all acts of commission which are violations of public right, and which cause special 
and peculiar damage to an individual. Thus, it is wholly illogical to restrict the effect of the 
criminality or want of criminality of a particular act to the administration of the criminal law. It 
has a far wider scope. It necessarily affects civil rights.
163
 
 
Whilst not viewing the public right theory as a complete satisfactory justification for the 
innominate tort, due largely to the logical difficulty of “accepting that ‘unlawful means’ 
would be limited to crimes and would not include either torts or breaches of contract,”164 
Neyers saw this theory could potentially be used to “explain the tort of unlawful interference 
with economic relations in a way that does not violate the privity principle.”165 
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Neyers also advanced a separate “justified exception theory” under which “the law creates a 
composite person out of the third party and plaintiff to unify the right with its loss.” He saw 
that a claim for economic loss by unlawful means could be based on a right deriving from 
what he called “the composite justification whereby the plaintiff and the third party against 
whom the unlawful means are directed are treated as a unity with the result that the loss for 
which the compensation is sought is for the infringement of a right of the composite.”166 
 
Neyers further developed his arguments on justifying the tort as an exception to the privity 
principle in his 2011 article “Causing Loss by Unlawful Means: Should the High Court of 
Australia Follow OBG Ltd v Allan?”167 In this paper Neyers set himself the task of asking, 
from the perspective of ‘strict legalism’, “whether the High Court should adopt the reasoning 
of the House of Lords in OBG v Allan in relation to the unlawful means tort.”168 He observed, 
citing Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor
169
 that “it is a 
fundamental principle of the law that tortious liability requires both a right and an 
interference that is not too remote – one without the other will not do.”170 
 
Neyers developed an argument that “the unlawful means tort vindicates the plaintiff’s right to 
not have others act with the predominant purpose of causing them injury” and called this “the 
predominant purpose justification.”171 Neyers’ conclusion was that, if this view was adopted 
by the High Court, “OBG v Allan should not be followed in relation to its definition of 
unlawful means; rather, the courts should use the traditional definition of the concept 
advocated by Lord Nicholls and utilised in Australian cases of unlawful means conspiracy.” 
 
He developed a depiction of liabilities based around the central notion that it is appropriate 
for the law to confer liability when a party imposes gratuitous harm on another.
172
 This is 
built on Weinrib’s “idea that the law should not legitimize the infliction on another of 
gratuitous harm,”173 which Neyers termed “the gratuitous harm principle.”174 
 
Neyers set out to demonstrate that “there exists a right to be free from gratuitous harm and 
that this right can consistently and coherently exist with the other rights recognised by 
law.”175 He achieved this persuasively. He argued that the High Court of Australia should 
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“accept the gratuitous harm understanding of the unlawful means tort”176 and his view was 
that, if it does, important changes to OBG v Allan would be in order – in particular a return to 
the aimed, directed or targeted understanding of intention.
177
 “This is because forcing the 
plaintiff to prove that she was the target of the defendant’s actions allows the courts to 
conclude that the defendant had a purpose of causing harm which can then be grown…into a 
predominant purpose.”178 
Following his review of the principles and justifications underpinning the torts of causing 
loss by unlawful means and of conspiracy, Neyers arrived at a classification of the patterns of 
liability which apply to those torts. His view was that the key to answering questions such as 
“why are unlawful means essential?” and “why should lower thresholds of intention be 
tolerated?” is to “accept that the gratuitous harm principle may take a direct/simple form and 
an indirect/complex form.”179 Neyers summarised the patterns of liability in tabular form as 
follows:
180
  
Claim Direct/Simple Indirect/Complex 
Causing Loss No liability since 
Allen v Flood 
(Lawful Means) 
 
OBG v Allan 
(Unlawful Means) 
Conspiracy Quinn v Leathem; 
McKernan v Fraser 
(Lawful Means) 
Williams v Hursey; 
Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners v Total 
Network SL  
(Unlawful Means) 
 
Figure 1: Neyers’ Summary of Patterns of Liability 
 
Neyers defined the direct/simple form as “where the defendant acts with the predominant 
purpose of injuring the plaintiff and causes economic loss without involving any intermediate 
parties or permitting any otherwise unlawful acts.”181 “Targeted misfeasance” is a term which 
has been used to describe this form of conduct.
182
 
 
The indirect/complex form was said to arise “where the defendant acts with the purpose of 
harming the plaintiff and also the purpose of furthering her own ends (but with means that are 
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unlawful in the sense of breaching the criminal law, a statutory prohibition or the rights of 
third parties).”183 
 
Neyers saw anomaly, not in the acceptance of the unlawful means tort, or lawful means 
conspiracy, but in refusal to acknowledge the imposition of liability where a party has acted 
with the predominant purpose of injuring another, causing economic loss, even if they have 
not involved intermediate parties or permitted otherwise unlawful acts. This is at odds with 
Carty’s views. 
 
Whereas Carty insisted that it is of fundamental importance that the economic torts have a 
three-party structure – to ensure “they do not ‘tortify’ breaches of statute or crimes that under 
the ordinary rules would not be actionable in a two-party situation”184 – and applauded the 
decision in OBG v Allan in this respect, Neyers took a different view. He noted that “under 
the Australian conspiracy analysis…these…torts have a two-party structure whereby 
breaches of statutes and crimes become tortious…when coupled with an intention to 
injure.”185 He took the view that if a “predominant purpose” justification for the innominate 
unlawful means tort were to be adopted, “the tort can apply in either two-party or three-party 
circumstances.”186 
 
Neyers addressed the issue that there “is a problem as to the nature of [the plaintiff’s] right 
which is infringed by the conduct of [the defendant]”187  and argued “that there exists a 
primary right of the plaintiff that is infringed when the defendant injures the third party.”188 
His view was that “the unlawful means tort can be justified … on the basis that the 
defendant’s actions violate a (specially constituted) primary right of the plaintiff” and that 
justification on this basis “has consequences and delivers answers that are somewhat different 
than those offered by their Lordships in OBG v Allan concerning what constitutes intention 
and unlawful means for the purposes of this tort.”189 
 
Neyers suggested that “Sales and Stilitz were on the right track in focusing on (1) the 
defendant’s intention in relation to the third party and (2) Lord Lindley’s explanation of the 
principle at stake in Quinn v Leathem” where his Lordship stated “… if the interference is 
wrongful and is intended to damage a third person, and if he is damaged in fact – in other 
words, if he is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through others, and is thereby damnified 
– the whole aspect of the case is changed; the wrong done to others reaches him, his rights 
are infringed although indirectly.”190 
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Drawing together these threads, Neyers advanced a view which he called the “composite 
justification”: 
 
This view is that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff (and the third party) as a result of the 
defendant intentionally treating the plaintiff and the third party as a unity that could be, and were, 
harmed through her actions. Since it was the defendant who treated the two parties as a unit in the 
furtherance of her own ends, it does not lie in her mouth to claim, when the action comes before a 
court for redress, that the third party and the plaintiff must be treated as separate entities whose 
rights and entitlements should be considered independently. In essence the law will create a 
composite legal person for the purposes of adjudicating the defendant’s liability, where the 
plaintiff is ‘wrongfully and intentionally struck at through others’.
191
 
 
Neyers urged that, when the time comes for the High Court of Australia to deliberate upon 
the nature of the unlawful means tort for Australia, this composite justification should be 
considered for adoption.
192
 
 
Neyers reached an important conclusion, developed from a strict legalist perspective: that 
claims for economic loss caused by unlawful means can potentially be founded on breach of 
a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, the right to be free from the targeted infliction of gratuitous 
harm.
193
 He developed this idea as an extension of the thread of common law, exemplified by 
lawful means conspiracy, which “recognises a claim-right, currently only actionable in 
defined circumstances, for an individual to be free from the targeted infliction of gratuitous 
harm.”194 In his view, if the High Court were to accept a gratuitous harm understanding of the 
unlawful means tort, a return would need to be made to the “orthodox view” of intention that 
existed prior to OBG.
195
 
 
Carty had seen that the statement of Lord Hoffmann in OBG that “intention should be 
thought of in terms of means and ends” was an undesirable departure from the orthodox 
view.
196
 Neyers was concerned that this was potentially “problematic since on the means and 
ends understanding it is possible that a foreseen outcome that is absolutely necessary to 
achieve a desired end will count as ‘means’ and therefore be ‘intended’.”197 For Neyers and 
his advocacy of a composite justification the issue this created was that it is “not consistent 
with basing the tort on the defendant’s intention to treat the third party and the plaintiff as a 
unity” and so he suggested that “should the High Court adopt the composite justification … 
they should return to using the orthodox ‘aimed, directed or targeted’ understanding of 
intention.”198 
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The orthodox view had been articulated by Carty as follows: “intention for the purposes of 
the unlawful means tort required that ‘the harm needed to be aimed, directed or targeted in 
the sense that ‘causing the [plaintiff] economic harm will be a specific object of the conduct 
in question’.”199 
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VIII. DEAKIN AND RANDALL: A NEW CONCEPTUAL MAP FOR THE FUTURE 
In their 2009 article “Rethinking the Economic Torts,”200 Deakin and Randall provided a 
robust framework for understanding the structure of economic tort liability. Following a 
review the status of the economic torts (as applied in the United Kingdom) up to and 
following the 1964 case of Rookes v Barnard
201
 they ventured that the torts (as they were 
understood to that time) could be mapped in terms of two critical dimensions: whether the 
action taken was individual or collective in nature, and whether or not an element of 
unlawfulness - interference with a pre-existing right or the use of unlawful means – was 
involved.
202
 
 
Deakin and Randall arrived at a diagrammatic depiction of the structure of liability in the 
form of a four-quadrant matrix,
203
 the key elements of which are reproduced below: 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Structure of Economic Tort Liability after Rookes v Barnard 
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Deakin and Randall saw that the structure of liability up to the 1960s was “awkward but not 
entirely illogical” and involved three distinctive types of liability depicted in their matrix.204 
(There was no liability in the “innocuous” quadrant of the matrix, where individual action 
blended with lawful means, based on Allen v Flood.) 
 
The first was the category of cases where individual action involved unlawful means, in 
which “the gist … was direct interference with the pre-existing legal rights of the plaintiff.” 
The core tort in this category was inducing breach of contract.
205
 
 
The second type of liability involved situations in which defendants acting in combination 
intentionally interfered with a plaintiff’s trade, business or livelihood using unlawful means. 
In these circumstances it was necessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate that, in addition to being 
unlawful, conduct had been specifically aimed or targeted at the plaintiff’s interests. The 
requirement of ‘targeting’ meant that, no matter how unlawful the means used, incidental or 
unintended victims had no cause of action. An absence of malice was no defence. This 
category of torts was said to have derived from Rookes v Barnard.
206
 
 
In the separate third category of lawful means conspiracy, liability could arise despite the fact 
that no unlawful means were employed and no pre-existing legal right had been interfered 
with. The essence of this tort, according to Deakin and Randall, was unjustified combination 
leading to economic pressure or harm, so that (in effect) malice was required.
207
 
 
Deakin and Randall differed from Carty in seeing a lesser need to deploy a narrow definition 
of unlawful means as the control mechanism for the economic torts: their view was that “a 
requirement that harm should be aimed or targeted at the claimant would be preferable as a 
control device.”208 
 
After analysing the House of Lords decision in OBG with respect to the tort of inducing 
breach of contract, Deakin and Randall observed that the House “limited this tort by 
imposing the additional, double requirement that the unlawful means should be independently 
actionable and should have the effect of interfering with the freedom of the claimant to deal 
with the third party concerned.” They noted how “the first of these requirements departs from 
Rookes v Barnard, with the unintended consequence of thereby decoupling the unlawful 
means tort from the otherwise similar civil wrong of intimidation.”209 Their conclusion was 
that “OBG, while clearing away some doctrinal confusions, has created new uncertainties.”210 
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Deakin and Randall explored an alternative path for analysing the economic torts. They 
proposed a revised conceptual map for the economic torts built around a “more defensible 
conception of these torts in terms of the economic interests which they protect, the kinds of 
interferences which trigger liability, and the nature of justifications which should be accepted 
as defences.”211 Their proposed new conception of the economic torts was summarised in the 
table below:
212
 
 INTERESTS INTERFERENCES JUSTIFICATIONS 
GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMIC TORT 
LIABILITY 
Economic interest in 
trade, business or 
employment 
Direct interference, 
with a presumption 
of ‘targeting’ in cases 
of direct competitors 
and of parties 
involved in direct 
distributional conflict 
Broad range of 
justification defences 
based on collective 
economic self-
interest, pre-existing 
contracts, etc 
    
 
Figure 3: Deakin and Randall’s Suggested Basis for Reformulating the Economic Torts 
Their suggested approach had three essential components. The first was that ‘interests’ 
should be placed at the heart of analysis of the economic torts. They argued there should be 
“closer attention to the interests which the torts protect (substantial interests in a trade, 
business or livelihood).” 213  Central to their proposal was the idea that it is correct to 
characterise the economic torts narrowly as part of a: 
 
… broad class of civil wrongs in which the gist of the action lies not in damage caused by fault, as 
in the case of negligence, but in an interference with an interest which the law protects. It is only 
once that interest is found to be present in a particular case that the court should proceed to 
establish the nature of the liability which could arise, the degree to which fault and damage are 
necessary ingredients of the claim, and the extent of any defences.
214
 
 
The second component was a clearer focus on “the nature of the interferences which they 
proscribe (interventions which are direct and targeted).”215 This required consideration of the 
types of conduct which amount to illegitimate interference with protected interests. 
 
Thirdly, Deakin and Randall saw a need for a more nuanced account of the justification 
defences which determine the outer limits of the torts. Chapter Seven of this thesis aims to 
provide such a nuanced account.  
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Deakin and Randall provided a concise summary of the elements of the economic torts after 
OBG and Total Network, based on their analysis. This is summarised in the table below, 
reproduced from their 2009 article.
216
 
 INTERESTS INTERFERENCES JUSTIFICATIONS 
INDUCING 
BREACH OF 
CONTRACT 
Actionable 
contractual 
expectation (OBG) 
Knowing and 
intentional 
procurement of 
breach 
Limited (e.g. rights 
under pre-existing 
contract: Edwin Hill) 
INTERFERENCE 
WITH TRADE, 
ETC BY 
UNLAWFUL 
MEANS 
Economic interest 
in the relation being 
interfered with 
(OBG) 
Intentional harm via 
independent 
actionable unlawful 
means, limiting 
freedom to trade 
(OBG); or threat of 
unlawful conduct 
(‘intimidation’) 
(Rookes) 
None 
LAWFUL MEANS 
CONSPIRACY 
Economic interest 
in a trade, etc 
(Mogul, Allen, 
Quinn) 
Combination 
coupled with 
‘predominant 
purpose to injure’ 
(Total, dicta of Lord 
Walker) 
Collective economic 
self-interest (Crofter) 
UNLAWFUL 
MEANS 
CONSPIRACY 
Economic damage, 
not confined to 
trade interests 
(Total) 
Combination 
coupled with 
intention to harm; 
need not be 
independently 
actionable (Total) 
None 
 
Figure 4: Elements of the Economic Torts after OBG & Total Network: Deakin & Randall 
The Deakin and Randall proposal involves paying attention to the essential ingredients of the 
torts from the perspective of market regulation. They saw that a key advantage of the 
conceptual basis they proposed was that it was true to their historical role of regulating the 
competitive process: “the economic torts exist to govern market relations and in particular to 
police the competitive process.” It would also, they argued, “ensure greater consistency of 
approach across the different torts, and go a long way to restoring doctrinal coherence.”217 
 
The Deakin and Randall proposal has similarities to the analysis of Neyers in that both attach 
importance to the sanctioning of conduct which inflicts gratuitous harm and involves 
targeting. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that, although some areas of uncertainty affecting 
the general economic torts have been clarified in recent cases, continuing complexity and 
doctrinal inconsistencies are inherent in this complex field of law. It is also clear that the 
ongoing lack of academic consensus has resulted in a confusing and jumbled set of potential 
pathways for their future development. For Australia, a clear roadmap needs to be settled by 
the High Court, based upon a revised conceptual map. 
 
Heydon, writing at a quite early stage in the torts’ development, saw a wide range of 
possibilities for the ways they might develop. He was prepared to countenance a formulation 
aligned with American jurisprudence which would place strong emphasis on notions of 
intention, motive and justification. For this, he has been criticised, especially by Carty. His 
priority was to establish a framework for the torts which provided robust protection for 
economic interests, subject to a nuanced approach to justification. 
 
Carty, on the other hand, was motivated to establish the tightest possible control mechanisms 
to limit the scope of the torts, preferring narrow definitions of intention and unlawful means 
and an “almost non-existent” justification defence. Carty acknowledged that “there are 
important differences between commentators as to the importance that the economic torts 
should play in protecting economic interests”218 and her comments indicated that she tended 
to afford less priority to the protection of business interests than some others. Her preference 
was to erect a series of hurdles to ensure the inhibition of the torts. She would approve of the 
kinds of “additional, double” requirements identified by Deakin and Randall.219 
 
The contribution of Neyers, building on ideas developed by Weinrib and Stevens, was in the 
articulation of the gratuitous harm principle, the suggestion of a rationale for basing the 
unlawful means tort on the defendant having the predominant purpose of injuring another and 
his description of a pattern of liability that has both a direct/simple form and an 
indirect/complex form.
220
 He also saw potential for the tort to apply in both two-party and 
three-party circumstances. 
 
Deakin and Randall constructed, in this writer’s view, a robust framework for the future 
development of the general economic torts, centred on the economic interests which they 
protect, the kinds of interferences which trigger liability and the nature of the justifications 
which should be accepted as defences. Their proposals take account of the implications of 
illegality and unlawful means. Another important attribute of their approach is that it 
resonates with the ideas of Weinrib and Stevens, by inviting courts to backtrack and pay 
attention to first principles: what are the interests which the law is designed to protect; and 
how should priorities of interests be resolved in circumstances where they conflict? 
 
A point of difference with the Deakin and Randall proposal (relative to other English 
commentators) was that they did not see the choices made by the English courts as 
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irredeemable. Certainly for Australia, as Neyers highlighted, there is scope for the High Court 
to set the torts upon a revised path.  
There is a need for more detailed evaluation of Deakin and Randall’s proposals. In A.I. 
Enterprises, Cromwell J, though purporting to conduct an extensive analysis of the rationale 
for the economic torts, briefly referenced these authors’ view that “the tort seeks to maintain 
the integrity of the competitive process by curbing conduct that deserves to be called 
cheating.”221 However, he did not otherwise engage with their arguments and their proposed 
roadmap. The difficulty with Deakin and Randall’s presentation of arguments is that it only 
offered a high-level sketch and did not flesh out each of the considerations upon which their 
conception is based. 
 
In Chapters Six and Seven which follow, the notions of interests, interferences and 
justifications these authors have raised will be more fully explored, to test their suitability as 
a base for further development of the general economic torts. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE APPLICATION OF POLICY TO SHAPE THE ECONOMIC TORTS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It was seen in the literature review conducted in Chapter Four that there is a wide spectrum of 
views amongst commentators as to the optimal direction for the future development of the 
general economic torts. 
 
Underpinning the academic debates, there are two main conceptions of the purpose and 
function of tort law: corrective justice theory and distributive justice theory. This chapter 
considers which of these alternative conceptions provides the clearest explanation for 
economic tort liability and explores the possibility and implications of one conception being 
preferred over the other to guide the development of the torts. 
 
Simply stated, the question to be examined is whether it is appropriate to determine cases 
based on considerations of justice between the parties to a particular dispute, or factors which 
relate to broader community interests. A corrective justice approach “restores the 
equilibrium, through an award of compensation, within the … relationship of the injured 
plaintiff and the defendant”1 where, as Weinrib would term it, a “bipolar relationship”2 has 
been disturbed. By contrast, those who prefer distributive justice “treat private law as a tool 
of public policy and focus their attention on the policy implications of private law rules.”3 
 
The difference between distributive and corrective justice was described by Dworkin as that 
between arguments of policy and principle: 
 
Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects 
some collective goal of the community as a whole … Arguments of principle justify a political 
decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right.
4
  
 
Part II of this chapter outlines the corrective justice theory framework, and reviews the recent 
literature which has applied this framework to the general economic torts as well as the 
literature which criticises the framework. It also explains the implications of adopting an 
approach based on corrective justice theory. 
 
Part III briefly describes distributive justice theory and considers the suitability of this theory 
as a framework for the future development of the general economic torts. It then analyses the 
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Canadian case A.I. Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd
5
 to illustrate the application of an 
approach based on distributive justice. 
 
Part IV considers the potential emergence of mixed or intermediate theories that seek to blend 
the distributive and corrective justice conceptions, which might provide an alternative basis 
for courts to take account of broader policy considerations in further developing the torts. 
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II. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE THEORY 
 
A The Corrective Justice Viewpoint 
 
Corrective justice makes claims to be a predominant organising principle of the law of torts. 
As Erbacher described it, “corrective justice theory regards tort law as a rights-based 
instrument of corrective justice designed to rectify wrongs committed by one person against 
another in a relationship.”6 This aligns with the view of Wright that the purpose of the law of 
torts is to adjust losses, affording “compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the 
result of the conduct of another.”7 Weinrib wrote that: 
 
… rights provide the space within which all right holders may pursue ends of their own. Such ends 
are consistent with the self-determining freedom of others only if the point of pursuing them is 
independent of the adverse effect on someone else. When all act to pursue ends of their own in 
this sense, they all rank equally as persons whose activities can coexist within the system of 
rights.
8
 
 
In his extensive and decades-long scholarship of tort theory, Weinrib developed an 
increasingly clear conception of corrective justice, which involved attention to “exhibiting the 
presence of correlativity in the doctrines of tort law, linking it to ideas of bilateral fairness 
and coherence, incorporating it into a methodology of inquiry about tort law as a normative 
practice, and connecting it to the classic philosophical expositions of natural law and natural 
right.” 9  Weinrib’s “juridical conception of corrective justice” aimed to reflect “the 
justifications internal to tort law, treating them as normative in their own terms rather than as 
the disguised surrogates for extrinsically justifiable social goals.” He viewed “the 
determination of liability as a distinctive domain of practical reason that subjects the 
interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant to a coherent ordering.”10 
 
Two complementary abstractions are synthesised within Weinrib’s juridical conception of 
corrective justice – correlativity and personality: 
 
Correlativity articulates at the most general level the relationship between the interacting parties as 
doer and sufferer of the same injustice. Personality, i.e., the idea of purposiveness regardless of 
one’s particular purposes, similarly articulates at the most general level the conception of the 
interacting parties that is presupposed in a regime of rights and their correlative duties.
11
 
 
One of the distinguishing features of corrective justice is that its primary function is to 
“provide a conceptual framework for understanding and analysing private law, rather than to 
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state prescriptively what the law should be.”12 Weinrib speculated that the renewed interest in 
corrective justice over recent decades may be due to its appeal to “theorists who viewed tort 
law as a repository of moral reasoning about responsibility for harm, rather than as a device 
for promoting economic goals” and because of “the clash between economic analysis and the 
moral approaches that reacted to it.”13 There is a moral foundation for corrective justice, 
which Weinrib explained as follows: 
 
… a particular principle or decision will reflect corrective justice (and hence the law’s internal 
coherence) where it reflects the morality of correlativity: ‘tort law reflects the morality distinctive 
to the relationship of doing and suffering harm’. Thus, tort law has its own ‘special morality’; it 
does not express ‘morality at large’ but has a ‘special moral nature … as a medium for the 
vindication of the claimant’s rights against the defendant’.
14
 
 
Weinrib observed that the study of the law of torts often commences with the “simple and 
obvious idea” that “the point of a tort action is to undo the injustice that the defendant has 
done to the plaintiff.”15 Perhaps the main feature of corrective justice theory is that “there is a 
‘unity of doing and suffering’: that is, a correlation of the doing of, and the suffering of, 
harm. The claimant’s right and the defendant’s duty not to interfere with that right are 
correlative, and the reasons for imposing liability on the defendant must correlate with the 
reasons for the claimant’s right.”16 Weinrib argued: 
 
… the parties are viewed as purposive beings who are not subject to a duty to act for any purpose 
in particular, no matter how meritorious. The capacity for purposive action underlies the rights and 
duties that are its juridical manifestations. Personality signifies that all persons possess an equal 
capacity for rights and duties without being obligated to act toward any particular purpose; it 
therefore reflects the structure of the law of obligations as a series of negative duties of non-
interference with the rights of others. This does not mean that so circumscribed, a notion of duty is 
exhaustive of one’s moral obligations in all moral contexts.
17
 
 
 
B The Application of Corrective Justice to the Economic Torts 
 
Recent theorising on the application of corrective justice principles has largely occurred in 
the context of the law of negligence, as Witting and Beever have noted.
18
 The ways in which 
the principles of correlativity and personality apply to the context of the law of negligence is 
now well understood: the harm suffered by the claimant is to a right such as bodily integrity 
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or a proprietary interest, with the defendant breaching a duty which correlates with that 
right.
19
 Only in recent years has scholarship of the economic torts begun to be influenced by 
corrective justice theory. 
 
In two articles published in 2008 and 2009, Jason Neyers addressed this gap. Previously, the 
general economic torts had been perceived as a pocket of the law of torts which was 
“inconsistent with the private law principles accepted by rights-based theorists.”20 There had 
been concerns about violation of the doctrine of privity of contract, perceived infringement of 
a basic private law principle that liability should only attach to the person who has infringed a 
plaintiff’s right, and the anomaly that certain of the torts allow suits for losses ‘parasitic’ on 
unlawful acts committed by defendants against third parties. 
 
Neyers concluded that each of the general economic torts was capable of being 
conceptualised as a manifestation of corrective justice and that the torts were able to be 
justified from a rights-based perspective.
 21
 
 
The reasons for Neyers’ conclusions can be concisely summarised. He identified a specific 
primary right that is interfered with for each individual tort, and coupled this with an analysis 
of which interpretative theory is most appropriate in each case.
22
 He also specifically 
examined whether rights-based theories can explain the innominate tort of causing loss by 
unlawful means (which he termed, in his 2009 article, “unlawful interference with economic 
relations”). For this tort, Neyers sought to identify “an independent right of the defendant” 
that when violated should entitle a defendant to sue in its own right. He considered and 
largely dismissed ‘right to trade’, ‘remoteness’ and ‘abuse of right’ as justifying the tort (due 
to problems of coherence and fit with case law). He then found potential justification in a 
‘public right’ theory: “the plaintiff is not suing for a violation of any of her private rights but 
rather to vindicate her enjoyment of public rights created by the criminal law (whether 
statutory or common law).”23 
 
As was seen in the preceding Chapter Four, Part VII, Neyers explained this theory by 
reference to the dictum of Palles CB in Leathem v Craig.
24
 
 
Whilst not viewing the public right theory as a complete satisfactory justification for the 
innominate tort, due largely to logical difficulties in “accepting that ‘unlawful means’ would 
be limited to crimes and would not include either torts or breaches of contract,” Neyers saw 
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this theory could potentially be used to explain the tort of unlawful interference with 
economic relations in a way that would not violate the privity principle.
25
 
 
Neyers said: “the law is correct to award damages for economic loss in situations of inducing 
breach of contract, conspiracy and unlawful interference with economic relations quite 
simply because the ‘key to recoverability’ is the fact that economic loss flows from a 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights.” He also noted that a rights-based view of tort law can 
readily explain both three-party and two-party intimidation, for example where there is “a 
threat by D to destroy X’s personal property unless X refrains from a contemplated course of 
action.”26 
 
Neyers advanced a separate ‘justified exception theory’ under which the law creates a 
composite person out of the third party and plaintiff to unify the right with its loss.
27
 He saw 
that a claim for economic loss by unlawful means could be based on a right deriving from 
what he called “the composite justification whereby the plaintiff and the third party against 
whom the unlawful means are directed are treated as a unity with the result that the loss for 
which the compensation is sought is for the infringement of a right of the composite.”28 
 
In a subsequent 2011 article Neyers concluded that an action for economic loss caused by 
unlawful means can potentially be founded on breach of a primary right of the plaintiff, the 
right to be free from the targeted infliction of gratuitous harm. He rejected the claim that the 
torts can only be understood from the perspective of policy or of distributive justice.
29
 
 
C Critiques of the Corrective Justice Framework 
 
Various criticisms have been made of corrective justice theory by those who prefer a 
distributive justice approach. Erbacher summarised the main concerns about corrective 
justice as: 
 
… that it provides no criteria for choosing one liability rule over another in a particular case; that 
it is wrong (even absurd) to suggest that torts law does not, or should not, pursue external goals; 
that it is overly dogmatic and fails to account adequately for the need for pragmatism, flexibility 
and discretion [in negligence law]; and that it is an ideologically right-wing explanation of torts 
law. Contemporary corrective justice theorists are criticised for ‘re-writing or re-engineering the 
case law’.
30
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Neyers himself suggested a series of reasons why corrective justice theories have been 
considered “suspect” in connection with tort law, including their inability to account for the 
strict liability imposed by vicarious liability, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher or trespass torts.
31
 
 
He also highlighted a number of ‘heterodoxies’ embodied in the general economic torts 
which have been argued to undermine any claim that they are a manifestation of corrective 
justice. The first is that inducing breach of contract, which “places burdens on strangers” 
seemingly “converts the in personam right created by the law of contract into an in rem right 
for the purposes of tort law … in violation of the doctrine of privity of contract … [and] the 
basic private law principle that the only person on whom liability is to be foisted is the person 
who it can be said has infringed the plaintiff’s right.” The unlawful means tort and three-party 
intimidation “allow a plaintiff to sue a defendant for a loss that is ‘parasitic’ on an unlawful 
act committed by that defendant against a third party” which again “seemingly violates the 
basic private law principle of privity … the plaintiff is only a secondary and indirect victim of 
the wrongdoing.” The tort of conspiracy, in both forms, “changes generally unactionable 
activities into torts when they are done in combination with another with the requisite intent” 
- raising the question whether this is “an instance of the generally prohibited damnum absque 
injuria since no primary right of the plaintiff has been violated.”32 
 
Various commentators have challenged Neyers’ arguments. Lunney described Neyers, in his 
2011 article, as making “heroic and scholarly attempts to make the results fit the rights’ 
model but whether they are convincing depends on whether one sees the need to make the 
law conform to the theory.”33 This reaction is typical of those who doubt the success of the 
effort (to date) to identify a rights basis for the unlawful means tort. 
 
Bagshaw questioned whether Neyers selected the most appropriate claim-right for 
investigation. He suggested the focus might instead have been on “a right not to have others 
intentionally cause harm to you by using unlawful means to interfere with the liberty of third 
parties to deal with you.” He also observed that some would argue that “an appropriate 
balance between facilitating a flourishing market and preserving valuable liberty” would be 
struck by protecting a claimant’s interest in the freedom of third parties against those who 
intentionally seek to damage that interest and use unlawful means.” Bagshaw asked whether 
an alternative underlying theory for the tort might be “the importance of third parties’ 
freedom to human flourishing in a society where competitive markets are relied on as a major 
mechanism for allocation.” He pondered whether a better balance might be struck by 
broadening the definition of ‘unlawful means’ whilst insisting that the means must be the 
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‘instrumentality’ by which the defendant causes loss to the claimant, i.e. adopting the ‘wider 
view’ of unlawful means favoured by Lord Nicholls in his dissenting judgment in OBG. 34 
 
McBride noted that Neyers canvassed a wide range of rights of the plaintiff that might be the 
basis for the unlawful means tort, but expressed particular discomfort with Neyers’ 
proposition that a plaintiff might have a ‘general right to trade’. He saw that this would have 
the result that “everyone else has a duty not to get in the way of her trading; or she has 
nothing. There is no ‘in between’ right allowed – but why not?”35 McBride preferred an 
approach whereby a plaintiff might have “a measured or limited right by reference to 
considerations of the public interest.”36 McBride was strongly critical of the rights-based 
theorists’ view that a rights-based account “should provide us with an account of tort law that 
makes no reference to the public interest, and should certainly not see tort law as existing to 
serve the public interest.”37 The implications of these ideas will be explored in Part IV below. 
 
Weinrib’s viewpoints have been criticised by those who favour “a more contextual approach 
to law” and incorporation into law of “the findings of the social sciences.” 38  Priel 
characterised those with “allegiances to Weinrib’s view of tort law” as subscribing to 
“autonomy versus community.”39 He rejected “the view that solutions to problems of social 
order can be found through a scientific-like process of investigation, largely because these 
one-size all solutions are imposed on society from outside”40 and preferred approaches which 
take account of questions of moral responsibility, distributive justice and appeal to broader 
‘policy’ considerations.41 
 
Cane referred to the argument for the ‘priority of rights’ as ‘rights-fundamentalist’ because 
“it sets out to explain all the features of a legal phenomenon such as private law … in terms 
of the single concept of a ‘right’.” He observed that adherents to this view, because they 
privilege coherence, “have few qualms about dismissing aspects of the law as ‘mistakes’ if 
this is necessary to reveal it in the best light, as conceptually unified and internally coherent.” 
He acknowledged that the concept of rights must be taken into account in any analysis 
because “private law is riddled with rights and rights-talk” but dismissed the view that 
primary rights provide a ‘sufficient’ explanation of private law as ‘ideologically based.’42 
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Cane concluded that: 
 
… contrary to what fundamentalists want to argue, private law is not ‘all about rights’ and the 
fundamentalist concept of primary rights is not sufficient adequately to explain the shape and 
scope of liability in private law. Protection of individual autonomy is certainly one of the values 
underpinning private law, but it also protects social interests.
43
 
 
It was acknowledged by Neyers that there has been an unevenness of adherence to principle 
in the common law cases which have developed the economic torts. This ‘incompleteness’, 
he conceded, could potentially lend weight to those who might claim that these torts could 
only be understood from the perspective of policy or of distributive justice.
44
  
 
D Implications of an Approach based on Corrective Justice 
 
Despite the various criticisms that have been made of the rights theorists and their advocacy 
of corrective justice theory, the case for deciding economic tort suits according to corrective 
justice principles has been strongly made. Corrective justice theory aims to provide a clear 
explanation of economic tort liability, on the basis of consistency of principle, coherence and 
alignment with the precedents.
45
 
 
If corrective justice theory were to be accepted as providing the best framework for the 
resolution of general economic tort claims, there would be a number of important 
implications. One implication would be that “the focus must be on considerations that are 
relevant to both parties to the interaction”46  – “considerations that reflect the correlative 
situation of the two parties set terms for their interaction that take account of their mutual 
relationship and therefore are fair to both parties.”47 This is because “a singular focus on the 
claimant’s conduct privileges the defendant at the expense of the claimant.”48 
 
Corrective justice is structurally rigid. It manifests firm principles of correlativity and 
personality, which must be present and act as reference points for the availability of the 
remedies. As Erbacher explained, corrective justice sees that “it is inconsistent with the 
correlative structure of corrective justice to decide liability and entitlements by reference to 
considerations that focus solely on the conduct of one party.” Expressed differently, it is seen 
as inappropriate to “focus unilaterally on the conduct of one of the parties, or on the effect of 
the claim on third persons who are not parties to the claim, rather than relationally on the 
parties to the interaction.”49 
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External policy considerations would therefore need to be largely disregarded in the 
formulation of the key principles attending the torts. Corrective justice insists that a claim 
must be assessed “according to its justificatory structure rather than external policy 
considerations or social goals.” 50  As Weinrib argued, “tort law is not public law in 
disguise.”51 Stevens reiterated this, asserting that “the law of torts is not a proxy for the 
achievement of [social] goals.”52 
 
A further implication of embracing corrective justice theory, then, is that “judges should be 
focused only on factors that pertain to the relationship between the parties as doer and 
sufferer of the same harm, and should not impose on the relationship an independent policy 
of their own choice.” Otherwise, what may occur is “a ‘judicial confiscation’ of what is due 
to the claimant in order to subsidise external policy objectives.”53 
 
III. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE THEORY 
 
A The Distributive Justice Viewpoint 
 
The alternative conception of the purpose and function of tort law, distributive justice theory, 
has been favoured by ‘instrumentalists’ who regard tort law as functionalist (consequentialist) 
in nature.
54
 It has been said that “most policy arguments are consequentialist: they justify or 
oppose a legal rule or outcome because of the consequences that a rule or outcome of that 
type is expected to produce.”55 Distributive justice can be “a vehicle for promoting wide 
social or economic goals such as loss-spreading, deterrence and retribution.”56  
 
For decades, proponents of distributive justice held sway in the academic discourse around 
tort law in Australia, due largely to the ascent of legal realism. Weinrib chronicled the way in 
which, by the second half of the twentieth century, corrective justice was largely supplanted 
by instrumental conceptions of law and “displaced by policy analysis and its concomitant 
intellectual disciplines.”57 The term ‘policy’ can be understood as referring to “normative 
reasoning – reasoning about what the rights and obligations of individuals ought to be.”58 
 
There are two main strands of distributive justice. The first is economic analysis of the law 
which pursues the policy goal of wealth maximisation. This has been described as the most 
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common type of consequentialism.
59
 Erbacher commented on the extent to which law and 
economics theorists and legal realists have been centrally involved in instrumentalism.
60
 An 
illustration is provided by the work of Lipstein who, in 1963, wrote that “the protection of 
private interests against external interference must vary with the change in the evaluation of 
those interests in a changing society and economy.” What he appeared to have in mind was 
the need to foster the postwar proliferation of commerce: “modern conditions require the 
protection against indirect violations of the economic potential of the individual and of 
commercial or industrial enterprises.” Lipstein noted that by 1963, tort law had developed a 
higher level of concern with “indirect violations of the economic potential of the individual 
and of commercial and industrial enterprises.”61 He contended that the range of protected 
interests changes with the evaluation of those interests in a changing society. 
 
The second major strand, which has grown in prominence in recent decades, seeks to promote 
‘community interests.’ Robertson saw a distinction between approaches based on “policy 
considerations relating to the interests of the community” and those emphasising 
“considerations of justice or fairness to or between the parties to a particular dispute.”62 
 
B The Application of Distributive Justice to the Economic Torts 
 
Legal realists regard policy as instrumental to torts decisions and see potential for the 
application of policy to promote social and economic goals across the spectrum of tort law.
63
 
An Indian Supreme Court decision, Rohtas Industries v Its Union,
64
 starkly illustrates the way 
the law develops in divergent ways depending on the societal lenses being applied. In 1948, 
in an area of India, workmen went on an illegal strike on account of trade union rivalry. 
Arbitrators awarded ‘huge compensation’ against the workmen for losses incurred by their 
employers during the strike period, based on common law principles relating to the tort of 
conspiracy. The Supreme Court’s decision, finally handed down in 1975, said: 
 
The English cases laying down the rule of common law were a response to the requirement of 
Industrial civilisation of the 19
th
 Century England. Trade and industry on the laissez faire doctrine 
flourished and the law of torts was shaped to serve the economic interests of the trading and 
industrial community. Whatever the merits of the norms … it is a problem for creative Indian 
jurisprudence to consider how far a mere combination of men working for furthering certain 
objective(s) can be prohibited as a tort according to the Indian value system … English history, 
political theory and life style being different from Indian conditions where the Father of the 
Nation organised boycotts and mass satyagrahas we cannot incorporate English conditions without 
any adaptation into Indian law.
65
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Robertson, although not himself a supporter of rights theories, has highlighted that “the 
legitimacy of community welfare or policy considerations in deciding cases and shaping 
private law rules has recently come under sustained attack from scholars advocating a strict 
corrective justice or rights-based approach.”66 The questions that need to be considered for 
the purposes of this thesis are: is it desirable to determine the outcome of economic tort 
litigation according to policy considerations, in line with distributive justice theory; and 
should an approach grounded in this theory guide the future development of the torts? 
 
There is now a well-developed school of thought that says ‘no’ to these questions. There are 
at least four reasons to be wary of the use of policy-based reasoning in connection with the 
general economic torts. 
 
The first reason is of fundamental importance. Analysis of a tort scenario based mainly on 
extrinsic considerations and social policy inevitably diminishes the autonomy of the plaintiff. 
In Dworkin’s conception of autonomy, ‘self-rule’ requires two conditions: independent 
deliberation and choice free from the manipulation of others.
67
 Economic coercion (whether 
it is applied by a trade union, a business rival or an activist group) can transgress rights and 
cause economic dislocation and other pernicious economic effects,
68
 and therefore threatens 
this autonomy. 
A second concern is based on precedent. In 2001, the High Court of Australia clearly 
expressed its preferred position on ‘policy’ in the context of judicial decision-making in 
Sullivan v Moody.
69
 This was the watershed case in which the Court rejected the three-stage 
test of the duty of care in negligence applied in English courts. In a single judgment of its full 
bench the Court said: 
 
… [t]here are policies at work in the law which can be identified and applied to novel problems, 
but the law of tort develops by reference to principles, which must be capable of general 
application, not discretionary decision-making in individual cases.
70
 
 
In Sullivan v Moody the High Court indicated its lack of appetite for formulating wide social 
policy, or reasoning by way of ad hoc policy considerations, preferring “to reason by 
reference to policy already inherent in the law.” The Court showed a “desire to reason by 
reference to principle – and to avoid the use of policy – in determining duty of care issues,” 
noting also that where it “has no choice but to reason by reference to policy, it would prefer 
to reason by reference to established policies rather than ad hoc policy concerns.”71  
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As Witting noted, since (and despite) Sullivan, the High Court has regularly engaged in “in-
depth consideration of ad hoc policy issues” in the context of negligence.72 It therefore cannot 
be discounted that in the future a High Court constituted by members sympathetic to 
distributive justice theory may bring policy considerations into scope in its consideration of 
the economic torts. Stevens remarked upon the advocacy of American-style legal realism by 
former High Court judge Kirby J, who favoured “openly deciding cases according to the 
relevant policy concerns,” contrasting this with the views of his contemporary on the Court, 
Heydon J, who argued for a return to strict legalism.
73
 
 
A third reason for concern, which has been argued by Stevens, is that trusting the future 
development of areas of law such as the economic torts to approaches steeped in distributive 
justice would logically ultimately lead to the need for American-style initiatives: public 
scrutiny of proposed new judicial appointees’ views on social issues prior to confirmation of 
their appointment, or perhaps even the necessity to elect judges.
74
 
The fourth objection to an approach grounded in distributive justice, frequently highlighted 
by rights-based scholars, is that “judges who take account of policy considerations in private 
law decision-making exceed their judicial role and improperly act as legislators.”75 Some 
argue that the economic torts can only be understood through an examination of the extrinsic 
goals they are said to serve, with the evolution of those extrinsic goals guided by judges.
76
 
However, there is greater strength in the opposed argument that, in connection with these 
torts, courts should be wary about the use of policy-based reasoning because policy is 
‘unstable’ and incapable of consistent application. An important concern is that courts are 
“limited in their ability to predict the future consequences of different legal rules for disparate 
parties.”77 
 
Stevens has noted that the temptation for judges, particularly at appellate level, “to seek to 
shape the law of torts according to the exigencies of policy concerns,”78 often arises because 
“on a loss-based model of the law of torts, a judge has no option but to weigh the policy 
factors which militate in favour of and against liability.”79 To highlight the dangers of this 
approach he referenced Mogul Steamship Co v McGregor Gow & Co
80
 and Allen v Flood.
81
 
He saw these cases as “illustrative of the difference between the powers of the courts and the 
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legislature to make law” and of the issue that “within a liberal democracy unelected judges 
lack the political competence to weigh competing policy claims.”82 He asked “How can a 
court draw such boundaries? It cannot.”83 
 
It must be acknowledged that these sentiments play into broader debates about the merits of 
‘judicial activism’. The counter-view is that activism balances out the past tendency of 
conservatively-minded judges to subconsciously impose their own values when deciding 
cases, and that ‘judicial activism’ has become code language for denouncing important 
judicial decisions with which conservative critics disagree.
84
 
 
However, a rights-based approach offers the solution that, rather than having no option but to 
apply a normative evaluation of the societal merits of parties’ opposed arguments, judges 
who zero in on the nature of the respective rights at stake will find a more objective basis on 
which to conduct their evaluation. 
 
The preferred position of rights theorists is that “judges should adjudicate on rights and leave 
issues of policy to be discussed by academics, and determined by the legislature.”85 Stevens 
encapsulated this argument: 
 
Our rights should not be decided, or altered, according to a judge’s personal assessment of the 
balance of a basket of policy concerns … The claim that a judge can act as a spokesman for 
society and its values is implausible. The judge does not have, and should not claim, special 
competence to assess this. Further, we no longer live in a homogeneous society, if we ever did. In 
a pluralist society attempting to decide a case according to whether it accords with general current 
social mores is, put at its lowest, naïve.
86
 
 
Therefore, Stevens said: “we should not, and could not, seek to justify private law in terms of 
its extrinsic ends, regardless of whether those extrinsic ends come from social practice, 
morality, economic efficiency, or anything else.” Although “there is nothing objectionable to 
assessing the law of torts according to external criteria (eg. Is it efficient? … Does it lead to a 
fair distribution of resources?)” he argued that “the law of torts cannot be understood by 
reference to such criteria.”87 This echoes former Chief Justice Mason’s view that, while 
“legal principles are applied to decide cases … policy considerations can only be used to 
inform the development of legal principles.”88 
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These arguments lead to the conclusion that departures from established common law 
precedents should, ideally, be achieved overtly via legislation and political processes, not 
through judicial activism. Lord Scarman’s view was that, although there are cases in which 
“principle inexorably requires a decision which entails a degree of policy risk,” the court’s 
overriding function is to “adjudicate according to principle, leaving policy curtailment to the 
judgment of Parliament.”89 
 
C A.I. Enterprises: An Illustration of Difficulties Created by the Application of Policy 
 
A.I. Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd
90
 illustrates the blurring of principle that can 
occur when a judicial approach steeped in distributive justice is employed. It will be recalled 
from Chapter Three that in this case a Full Court of the Canadian Supreme Court considered 
the unlawful means tort in the light of the House of Lords decisions in OBG v Allan
91
 and 
Revenue and Customs Commissioner v Total Network
92
 and sought to answer the question 
“what rationale best reflects the modern role that the tort should play in the broader scheme 
of civil liability?” 93  The Court fashioned a ‘best rationale’ for the tort which it termed 
‘liability stretching’.94 
 
Cromwell J based his preference for confining the unlawful means tort “within narrow 
bounds” (and his associated preference for a narrow definition of ‘unlawful means’) on four 
considerations.
95
 The first of these was that “tort law has traditionally accorded less 
protection to purely economic interests than to physical integrity and property rights.”96 The 
second consideration was that the common law has historically been “reluctant to develop 
rules to enforce fair competition” and “generally prefers a limited role for the economic torts 
in the modern marketplace.” Thirdly, there was a concern “not to undermine certainty in 
commercial affairs” which might be “put in jeopardy by adopting vague legal standards based 
on ‘commercial morality’ or by imposing liability for malicious conduct alone.”97 
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Cromwell J’s fourth consideration supporting a limited scope for the tort was that “the history 
of the common law shows that tort liability, if unduly expanded, may undermine fundamental 
rights.”98 He saw a “risk inherent in the economic torts generally that they will undermine 
legislated schemes favouring collective action in, for example, labour relations and interfere 
with fundamental rights of association and expression” and “the risk that expanded liability 
for the economic torts may be used to undermine legislative choices and perhaps even 
constitutionally protected rights of expression and association” but said that “a narrow and 
clear definition of the scope of liability reduces this risk.”99 
 
Lee criticised the A.I. Enterprises decision. Her observations are valid and incisive. She 
observed that Cromwell J seemed to understand himself to be endorsing a rationale in line 
with the majority position in OBG, when he stated “the liability stretching rationale underlies 
Lord Hoffmann’s speech.”100 However, Lee concluded, on close analysis, the decision was 
justified “on a conceptual premise that appears to differ from that assumed in OBG.” In 
particular, she noted that Lord Hoffmann “located the tort’s rationale in the need to protect 
one’s liberty to trade” and said “the tort is ultimately premised on the broader purpose of 
‘[enforcing] basic standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition’.” Accordingly, 
the result of A.I. Enterprises was that Canadian law features “a tort that bears close 
resemblance to that crafted in OBG but which also differs from it in subtle but important 
ways” and “liability-stretching does not really explain the rationale of the tort.”101 
Lee then argued that: 
 
… the true rationale underlying the civil tort of conspiracy by unlawful means is to protect 
members of society against injury that results from the deliberate subversion of the law. On this 
view, it is the agreement among the conspirators to perpetrate an unlawful act that is the essential 
wrong of the tort, while the elements of intention and ensuing injury help to identify the 
appropriate claimant … The law objects to the perpetration of illegality through concerted 
conduct, even if the same act is not civilly actionable when it is done by an individual.
102
 
 
Further flaws in the analysis in A.I. Enterprises can be seen if viewed through the lens of 
corrective justice. What was being suggested in this case was that the matter could be 
determined not by considerations reflecting the correlative situation of the two parties but 
rather macro-level issues such as the common law’s purported attitude towards fair 
competition and concerns the tort might “undermine legislated schemes favouring collective 
action in, for example, labour relations.”103 There was an absence of analysis of the economic 
interests the plaintiff companies were seeking to uphold in the case at hand.
104
 If not for the 
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finding of a breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs might well have been left without remedy 
as the result of the narrow construction of the unlawful means tort adopted by the Supreme 
Court. 
 
The discussion in the case blurred the divide between private and public law which Burrows 
has described.
105
 Cromwell J’s approach conformed to a trend Collins described as the 
“insertion of fundamental rights into litigation over ordinary contractual, tortious and 
property disputes” as part of a broader effort by human rights law proponents to “colonise the 
whole of private law and force a fundamental and disruptive reorganisation of its existing 
rules and principles.”106 The concern expressed about an undermining of fundamental rights 
and legislated schemes (Cromwell J’s “fourth consideration”) was prospective and 
speculative and had nothing at all to do with the conduct in issue in the A.I. Enterprises case. 
It involved making allowance for the potential for future unspecified legislative action, the 
nature of which would in any event be impossible to anticipate. Concerns relating to a 
particular substantive law context (labour law) were made the basis for reshaping a 
generalised common law principle, in a case which was not about labour law.  
 
It can also be argued that an unnecessary insertion of policy considerations into the decision 
was made when Cromwell J said he favoured the liability-stretching rationale “because it 
establishes a clear ‘control mechanism’ on liability in this area of the law, consistent with tort 
law’s reticence to intrude too far into the realm of competitive economic activity.” 107 
Baroness Hale’s statement in OBG that it is “consistent with legal policy to limit rather than 
encourage expansion of liability in this area” 108  was cited, together with Hazel Carty’s 
academic view that “a narrow remit … based on existing civil liability is the best policy.”109 
 
Another perplexing aspect of the analysis in this case was the weight Cromwell J gave to his 
observation that economic interests may rank lower than physical integrity and property 
rights. This may well constitute a factor to be taken into account in any weighing a court may 
undertake of the relative interests at stake (bilaterally) between two parties to a dispute, but it 
hardly provides a basis for a diminution of the priority given to the protection of economic 
interests generally (which would be the effect of the curtailment of the unlawful means tort in 
the way His Honour proposed).  
 
Finally, Cromwell J’s view that the common law inherently prefers a limited role for the 
economic torts is contestable; it is arguably at odds with the historical antecedents of these 
torts. The general economic torts are, at core, about the protection of economic interests. 
Deakin and Randall observed that “all the great cases in the area of the economic torts … 
have been based on the principle that the right to pursue a trade, business or livelihood free of 
certain forms of interference, deemed to be illegitimate, deserves the protection of the law,” 
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with the concept of ‘trade interests’ seen to include “interests bound up in a particular 
commercial business as well as the pursuit of a chosen livelihood or profession.”110 
 
The ‘traditional’ view of the importance of protecting economic interests was encapsulated 
by Glasbeek as follows: “Endeavours which promote free enterprise activity should be 
supported by the law in imposing liability on those who interfere with such endeavours.”111 
Admittedly, the progenitor tort of inducing breach of contract needs to be viewed in its 
historical context: “at the height of the Industrial Revolution, a tort to protect the integrity of 
contract relations would help stabilize the underlying structure of a rapidly developing market 
economy”112 However, the law of torts has traditionally protected economic, trading and 
property interests against intentional intrusion and provides “an uncharacteristically strong 
protection of the plaintiff’s economic interests, a protection that is in apparent contrast with 
the very limited protection given such interests in negligence.”113 
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IV. INTERMEDIATE THEORIES 
 
A number of scholars have noted the potential for development of ‘intermediate’ or ‘mixed’ 
theories that seek to blend corrective and distributive justice theory. One of Porat’s criticisms 
of Weinrib was that he “dismisses deterrence and loss distribution as irrelevant to tort law 
and, consequently, objects to mixed theories that strive to accommodate both corrective 
justice and deterrence within tort law.”114 There is an “emerging intermediate view that tort 
law is primarily concerned with interpersonal justice, but that it is appropriate for courts to 
make reference to broader policy considerations in limited circumstances and under strict 
constraints.”115 Witting argued the terms ‘principle’ and ‘policy’ cannot be spoken of as fixed 
and binary opposites, observing that “policy contributes to the development of principle.”116 
 
Referring to nuisance and trespass cases, Cane noted that there are cases where a landowner 
tends to be held to be “entitled to use the law of tort to protect his legal rights even when, 
judged from a social point of view, his interest in doing so is slight compared with the 
defendant’s interest in interfering with his rights.”117 This example demonstrates the way in 
which the common law may on occasions give differential weighting to certain interests, in 
certain circumstances. Cane saw a “crucial question” as “when the law is justified in giving 
effect to ‘social’ valuations of interests and ignoring the value assigned by the interest-
holder.” He concluded: “English law is prepared to do this only in extreme circumstances.”118 
 
Fleming commented that “much depends on the nature of the plaintiff’s interest that has been 
violated” and elegantly expressed the need for a discriminating allowance ordering various 
interests according to the scale of human values: 
 
… the law has to differentiate between the various kinds of interests for which individuals may 
claim protection against injury by others. Elementary in all legal systems is the protection afforded 
to personal security and the claim to freedom from interference with tangible property … People 
wish to be safeguarded, not only against physical aggression, but also against detrimental 
consequences to their pocket-book. … In each of these instances, the human interest involved 
holds a different place in the scale of social values and for this a discriminating analysis must 
perforce make allowance.
119
 
 
Robertson saw potential for development of a middle way “between unconstrained 
instrumentalism and the policy-free ‘anti-instrumentalism’ of corrective justice and rights-
based theories.” He contended that “considerations of community welfare have a legitimate 
role to play in private law decision-making and in shaping private law rules because they are 
constrained by the framework of judicial decision-making in general, and private law 
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decision-making in particular” and he sought to “sketch the different ways in which common 
law judges are constrained in the use they can make of policy considerations in framing legal 
principles and deciding cases.”120 He identified factors such as institutional constraints on 
judges (including the need to explain their reasons in writing, the desire to maintain their 
reputations and the certainty of peer scrutiny); adherence to the doctrine of precedent; and 
considerations of the form of the law itself (encompassing the need for certainty, coherence 
and consistency with other legal rules).
121
 
 
Robertson argued that, taken together, these constraints “significantly limit the extent to 
which, and the ways in which decision-making in private law can be guided by policy 
considerations” and that their existence “undermines the formalist claim that judges cannot 
take account of community welfare considerations without taking on an illegitimate 
legislative role.” He noted that “policy considerations … underlie and are embedded in many 
private law doctrines and are given effect in many cases where they are not explicitly 
mentioned.”122 
 
Embedded within Robertson’s analysis was the idea of a distinction between forms of taking 
account of policy considerations which would be uncategorically repugnant to rights theorists 
– for example, where “community interests … operate as a trump … in relation to the denial 
of rights that a person would otherwise have”123 – and ‘lighter’ forms of interference with the 
‘purity’ of corrective justice theory. 
 
At their current state of development intermediate theories still fail important tests, which 
Robertson articulated. They do not circumvent the overriding imperative that in each case 
justice should be done to the particular parties before the court. Furthermore, relieving the 
defendant from liability on the basis of an extrinsic consideration “means denying the 
plaintiff” and offends “the bipolarity constraint in private law.”124 However, mixed theory 
ideas, if more fully developed, have the potential to establish a broadly acceptable basis for 
admitting consideration of policy issues into the analysis of an economic tort problem, albeit 
on a limited basis. The question that needs to be addressed is how best to achieve this. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
As has been seen in this Chapter, corrective justice theory and distributive justice theory offer 
alternative and very different approaches. Both theories have potential to provide a 
conceptual framework for the future development of the general economic torts. It is 
important to observe, however, that not all commentators on the economic torts ground their 
views in either corrective justice or distributive justice; some are agnostic as to which of 
these theories is correct. 
 
Some commentators consider the general economic torts a “quintessential embodiment” of 
the concept of corrective justice, as Mendelson described them.
125
 It can be argued that the 
future coherence of the torts depends upon their having an underpinning rationale consistent 
with corrective justice theory, and this being consistently adhered to. Although scholarship 
examining the implications of corrective justice for the economic torts is at a relatively early 
stage of development, the case for accepting corrective justice theory as the explanation for 
liability under these torts is at least as strong as for the law of negligence. 
 
Application of the general economic torts necessitates the assessment of interests and 
rights.
126
 This supports the argument that the rationale of these torts should be consistent with 
the precept of corrective justice that the analysis of liabilities should be founded on scrutiny 
of the bilateral relationship of the claimant and defendant. The guiding star of corrective 
justice theory is its insistence that disputes should be determined based on considerations of 
justice between the parties to a particular dispute, rather than factors relating to broader 
community concerns. 
 
Reliance on policy-based reasoning (for example, the use of policy on the part of judges to 
seek to re-shape the economic torts according to some interest judicially determined to be a 
collective goal of the community as a whole) can lead to unpredictable and selective context-
specific outcomes which fail to pass the tests of coherence. It has been argued in this chapter 
that A.I. Enterprises
127
 demonstrates some of the pitfalls in an analytical approach to the 
general economic torts grounded in distributive justice. When it eventually has the 
opportunity to consider the status of the unlawful means tort in Australia, the High Court of 
Australia should resist the temptation to apply this case as a precedent. 
 
It follows that it is undesirable to approach the general economic torts from a starting-point 
that they need to be inhibited as a matter of policy.
128
 
 
If proponents of a policy-based approach were to go to work on reshaping the general 
economic torts from the standpoint of distributive justice theory, the torts would most likely 
be launched on a pathway to minimisation and, perhaps, eventual irrelevance. But this family 
of torts are of enduring importance. Common law protection of individual economic interests 
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 Mendelson, n 1 at p 314. 
126
 This will be further demonstrated in the following Chapter Six. 
127
 A.I. Enterprises [2014] 1 R.C.S. 177. 
128
 Carty appears to have approached her analysis from this starting point (see n 109 at p 172). As explained 
above in Part IV, the policy-based desire to inhibit the torts was also a basis for the decision of the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in A.I. Enterprises [2014] 1 R.C.S. 177. 
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is vital to the free functioning of markets and the upholding of the freedoms which underpin 
individual autonomy. 
 
Questions may be raised as to whether it is now practical for corrective justice theory to be 
evenly applied to the economic torts, given the extent to which considerations of policy and 
morality, including “commercial morality,”129 have already been introduced into the analysis. 
 
A key difficulty with application of an approach steeped in corrective justice theory, in the 
context of the economic torts, is its inflexibility.
130
 The absolutism of what has been 
denigrated as a ‘rights-fundamentalist’ approach131 presents a problem, in that it seeks to 
completely preclude consideration of policy factors. There are undoubtedly some 
circumstances in which it is legitimate for courts to take into account policy considerations.
132
 
 
For example, as will be seen in the following Chapters Six, Seven and Nine, tests of public 
benefit or public interest potentially have important roles to play in the weighing of interests 
and the determination of liabilities under the economic torts. A range of circumstances can 
arise in which it is necessary to analyse the torts according to extrinsic goals they are seen to 
serve, which might include deterrence, community welfare or wealth maximisation. 
 
The greater flexibility (relative to corrective justice theory) promised by intermediate or 
mixed theories should therefore be welcomed, notwithstanding that the exact character of 
these theories has not as yet become clear. The practical reality is that courts are unlikely to 
feel constrained by any particular theory as the common law evolves (based on the factual 
situations courts are presented with) but there is merit in the development of a structured 
approach grounded in theory which might help guide the courts’ deliberations. 
 
The common law could potentially be developed to implement a mixed theory consisting of 
three core requirements. First, courts faced with the task of determining a matter, and re-
shaping a tort, by reference to policy considerations should only do so following a threshold 
evaluation of the respective rights of the claimant and defendant at play. This would bring to 
bear the valuable contributions rights theorists are making to understanding of the theoretical 
foundations of the torts, and the rights which underpin the torts. Second, the notion of public 
interest would need to be at the centre of any analysis. Third, judges would need to, 
increasingly, engage in the weighing and measuring of competing rights. 
 
To assess how this proposal might work in practice it is necessary to more closely evaluate 
the nature of rights and interests. This exploration is undertaken in Chapter Six which 
follows. 
                                                                
129
 This term was used by Cromwell J in A.I. Enterprises [2014] 1 R.C.S. 177 at 201 [42]. 
130
 By contrast distributive justice, with its ready embrace of policy is highly flexible, arguably too flexible. 
131
 This is Cane’s term, as was explained in Part II C above, see n 42 at p 40. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE CONTEST OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter Five saw scope for development of an intermediate or mixed theory that might 
enable the general economic torts to develop with primary reference to considerations of 
justice between the claimant and defendant, but also take into account public interest 
considerations, in limited circumstances. 
 
The proposal made at the end of Chapter Five consisted of three core components. First, the 
evaluation of the rights and interests at stake in a given dispute. Second, a stronger emphasis 
on public interest considerations. Third, judicial weighing of competing rights and interests. 
 
This chapter explores how each of these three components might be put into effect. Parts II, 
III and IV are concerned with the analysis of rights and interests and, in turn, address three 
important questions. What are the essential features of a rights-based view of tort law, and 
how does this view apply to the general economic torts? Is it sufficient for something having 
the status of a mere interest to constitute the basis for an economic tort cause of action, or 
should these torts have a basis in a higher-order right? What are the rights and interests that 
have been argued to be protected by each of the torts? 
 
In Part V public interest is addressed. The notion of public interest is vexed because the 
mechanisms for assessing it are undeveloped and ambiguous, evaluations can be value-laden 
and courts are reluctant to become involved in weighing competing interests. Part VI reviews 
the case law which provides guidance on how courts should approach the task of evaluating 
countervailing rights and interests. 
 
Economic tort litigation is essentially about a contest of rights and interests. A claimant seeks 
(explicitly or implicitly) to ground its claim in the infringement of a right or an interest which 
it possesses. Defendants will counter that no such legitimate right or interest exists, or – if a 
justification defence is to be run – that it is outweighed by some higher countervailing right 
or interest which justified the defendant’s conduct. The proposition advanced in this chapter 
is that the resolution of disputes in this area of law should involve evaluation of the respective 
rights of the claimant and defendant. 
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II. THE RIGHTS-BASED VIEW OF THE ECONOMIC TORTS 
 
The articulation of a rights basis for tort law is not novel, but rather a re-assertion of the 
historical origins of tortious remedies. Edelman, Goudkamp and Degeling described these 
origins in the foreword to Torts in Commercial Law: 
 
… the great common law scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries … argued 
passionately that the law of torts could be systematically organised. More specifically, they 
asserted that torts protected particular rights (for example, rights to reputation, rights to the 
security of one’s goods, rights to liberty and rights to land) … That conception of the law of torts 
was met head-on by Lord Atkin … in Donoghue v Stevenson. He posited that the law of torts is 
based upon “a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay” 
[and] conceived of torts as based on fault … [But] the law of torts that emerged after Donoghue v 
Stevenson was not based exclusively upon Lord Atkin’s conception of fault. The law of torts 
continued to protect particular rights … The result was that the law became, and remains, bi-focal 
… Liability might arise as a result of the fault of the defendant. But it also might be imposed as a 
consequence of the infringement of particular rights … the law of torts was divided into two 
categories: one category focused upon liability for harm caused by fault and another upon 
infringement of particular, nominate rights.
1
 
 
Addressing this distinction, McBride challenged other tort academics to think of tort law as 
“concerned to provide us with a range of rights against other people, and help us vindicate 
those rights when they are violated or threatened with violation” rather than simply 
“concerned to determine when we can sue other people for compensation for losses.” 2 
Goldberg and Zipursky saw that one of the main senses in which rights figure in the law of 
torts is that relational norms of conduct impose duties on defendants not to mistreat others 
and recognise correlative claim rights not to be mistreated.
3
 
 
The literature review conducted in Chapter Four showed a distinction in approach between 
‘rights theorists’ and those, such as Carty, who are comfortable with the admission of policy 
considerations into the determination of economic tort disputes. Fundamental to the ‘rights-
based view’ of tort law is the idea that judges do not have a general jurisdiction to reallocate 
losses from plaintiffs to defendants just because they think it would be ‘fair, just and 
reasonable’ to make the defendants bear losses.4 Instead, liability needs to be grounded in the 
existence of a right. 
 
‘Rights-based’ analysis is closely related to corrective justice theory, in that it depicts various 
aspects of tort law as “driven, primarily or exclusively, by the recognition of the rights we 
have against each other, rather than by other influences on private law, such as the pursuit of 
                                                                
1
 Edelman J, Goudkamp J and Degeling S, ‘The Foundations of Torts in Commercial Law’ in Degeling S, 
Edelman J and Goudkamp J (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011) p 1 at pp 1-2. 
2
 McBride N, ‘Rights and the Basis of Tort Law’, Chapter 12 in Nolan D and Robertson A (eds), Rights and 
Private Law (Hart, Oxford, 2014), p 331 at p 341.  
3
 Goldberg J and Zipursky B, ‘Rights and Responsibilities in the Law of Torts’ in Nolan and Robertson, n 2, 
Chapter 9, p 251. Goldberg and Zipursky saw three further senses in which rights figure: power is conferred on 
victims to hold wrongdoers liable, the legal principle of civil recourse recognises a victim’s claim right, good 
against the state, to hold the wrongdoer accountable; and there is a ‘natural right’ of response to wrongdoing (at 
pp 261-70). 
4
 McBride, n 2 at p 335. 
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community welfare goals.”5 Nolan and Robertson cautioned that it would be unwise to treat 
rights theories and corrective justice theories as synonymous,
6
 noting that some rights 
theorists, such as Stevens, are expressly critical of corrective justice. Contradicting this, 
Neyers said corrective justice and a rights-based approach “can be treated as synonyms and 
refer to a legal and philosophical tradition that simultaneously defines the rights persons hold 
against each other and elucidates how courts should respond to violations of those rights.”7 
 
The school of thought which is based on the ‘rights model’ tends to envisage the 
infringement of something having the status of a right as “the gist of all torts.”8 Stevens’ 
pithy summary was as follows: “A tort is a civil wrong. A civil wrong is the breach of a duty 
owed to someone else. The breach of a duty owed to someone else is, synonymously, the 
infringement of a right they have against the tortfeasor.”9 
 
For Stevens, torts are about the infringement of primary rights. In his conception, certain 
rights (but not all) are ‘primary’ rights, the violation of which gives rise to ‘secondary’ 
obligations. The essence of a ‘wrong’ is “the infringement of a primary right which generates 
a secondary right, commonly but not always a liability to pay compensation.”10  Stevens 
viewed rights of reputation, rights of bodily safety and freedom and rights of property as 
examples of “classes of rights which are personal and which are exigible against the rest of 
the world.”11 Hohfeld, he said, had distinguished between four usages of the word ‘right’: “a 
claim right, a liberty (called by Hohfeld a privilege), a power and an immunity.”12 
 
The distinction between a right and a ‘liberty’ was particularly important to Stevens. He 
explained that “in many situations we have a liberty to act in a certain way and this liberty is 
further protected by one or more claim rights,” noting that “once we have a picture of our 
rights, the negative is an image of the liberty of others.” Stevens’ use of the term ‘rights’ 
means “either specific claim rights, or the claim rights which arise together for a common 
reason and which are specific to a larger bundle of different species of rights.”13 
 
The practical effect of this analysis is demonstrated by this example provided by Stevens:  
 
                                                                
5
 Nolan and Robertson, n 2 at p 1. 
6
 Ibid at p 26. 
7
 Neyers J, ‘The Economic Torts as Corrective Justice’ (2009) 17 Torts Law Journal 162 at 163. 
8
 Stevens R, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at p 2. Stevens’ views were briefly 
introduced earlier at Chapter Four, Part VI. He contrasted the rights model with a “loss-based model” (at p 307). 
9
 Ibid at p 39. 
10
 Ibid at p 287. 
11
 Ibid at p 5, referring to the list of personal rights itemised by Cave J in Allen v Flood [1898] 1 AC 1 at 29. 
12
 Ibid at p 4, citing Hohfeld WN, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 
23 YaleLJ 16. 
13
 Ibid at p 4. 
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On this approach we do not have a ‘right’ at common law to freedom of expression. I have a 
liberty as against everyone to speak as I choose. Subject to exceptions, no one has the right to stop 
me. If you do not like what I say, I have a right that you do not punch me on the nose, or lock me 
up. However, these rights are not specifically tied to the liberty to speak. You have a duty to me 
not to do these things regardless of your motivation. By contrast my liberty to go where I choose 
is protected by a right against others that they do not detain me against my will, a right specifically 
tied to my liberty of movement.
14
 
 
The rights-based view has particular strength when applied to the general economic torts, a 
species of tort which is built upon the transgression of rights (primarily, economic rights).
15
 
Deakin and Randall identified this in their 2009 article Re-thinking the Economic Torts when 
they said that “the economic torts belong to that broad class of civil wrongs in which the gist 
of the action lies not in damage caused by fault, as in the case of the tort of negligence, but in 
an interference with an interest which the law protects.”16  
 
As a practical matter, these insights lead to the conclusion that a three-stage analytical 
process is required when contemplating economic tort litigation. The first stage involves the 
classical assessment of potential tortious causes of action in terms of their component 
elements. All of the necessary elements of a given tort must be proven.
17
 Although Stevens 
has argued that a ‘recipe’ based approach to analysis of the economic torts is fundamentally 
wrong,
18
 in Australia, at least, this remains standard practice. 
 
Stage two is the diagnosis of the rights or interests of the claimant that are being impugned. 
Stevens saw this as a threshold step, and suggested that discussion of the torts should begin 
with a rights-based analysis.
19
 
 
In stage three, any opposed rights or interests the defendant may seek to assert need to be 
discerned. This is relevant to the pleading of a justification defence, a topic which is 
discussed in depth in Chapter Seven. Stages two and three should ideally be undertaken at the 
same time, and at the outset of litigation. 
 
This recommended approach would require courts to adopt the following logic: a tort is being 
alleged here; if we are going to afford a remedy, we must be comfortable that a sufficiently 
important right is at stake that warrants the remedy; and we must assure ourselves that there 
is no countervailing right that affords justification for the conduct. 
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 Ibid at p 5. 
15
 Chapter Five of this thesis explained the reasons for this viewpoint. 
16
 Deakin S and Randall J, ‘Re-thinking the Economic Torts’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 519 at 533. It 
should be noted that Deakin and Randall argued (at 533) that “unless a direct interference with trade, business or 
employment is made out, a vital element of the wrong is missing, even if loss or damage is also present.” 
17
 The elements of each of the general economic torts, under Australian law, were explained in Chapter Two. 
18
 Stevens R, ‘The Non-Existence of the Economic Torts’, paper delivered at ‘Protecting Business and 
Economic Interests: Contemporary Issues in Tort Law’ conference, Singapore, 18-19 August 2016, on file with 
the author. 
19
 Stevens, n 8 at p 39. See also Stevens, n 18. 
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III. RIGHTS AND INTERESTS: DOES TERMINOLOGY MATTER? 
 
Deakin and Randall argued that an interference with an interest which the law protects must 
be present in a particular case before a court should proceed to establish the nature of the 
liability which could arise. Their choice of terminology highlights a significant threshold 
issue: can a mere interest constitute the basis for a cause of action, or in each case is it 
necessary that a higher-order right be at stake? 
 
Leading academics have highlighted the inherent ambiguity of the term ‘right’. Goldberg and 
Zipursky said the term provides “a trap for the unwary and an opportunity for the 
rhetorician.”20 Hohfeld saw it as a “chameleon-hued word” that can be “a peril both to clear 
thought and lucid expression.”21  Cane, referencing Hohfeld, noted that, both within and 
outside the law, the word ‘right’ is given various different meanings. He viewed the term as 
“systematically ambiguous.” As part of his critiquing of rights theorists he argued it was 
particularly important to be alert to this imprecision “when considering arguments that [tort 
law] is not only replete with rights but also built on a foundation of rights, and that every 
other concept found in private law is, in some sense, secondary to and derivative of the 
foundational concept of a right.”22 
 
The term ‘interests’ is similarly broad, and has no technical legal meaning, as Cane 
observed.
23
 Heydon regarded ‘interest’ as “a remarkably ambiguous word.”24 He remarked 
that tests employed under United States law often depended on a balance “not of ‘rights’ but 
of ‘interests’: the plaintiff’s interest in his contractual rights must be balanced against the 
defendant’s interest and the ‘public interest,’ if any.”25 
 
In making sense of the distinction between these notions, the contributions of Hohfeld, 
Stevens and Neyers are helpful. In the early 20
th
 century Hohfeld analysed the meaning of the 
phrase ‘legal rights’ and produced: 
 
… a taxonomy of legal relationships consisting of what he called: claims, privileges, powers or 
immunities. He defined a power as ‘one’s affirmative “control” over a given legal relation as 
against another’. ‘[P]erson (or persons)’, states Hohfeld, ‘whose volitional control is paramount 
may be said to have the (legal) power to effect the particular change of legal relations that is 
involved in the problem’. Power, he also explained, can be understood in relation to its jural 
correlative and its jural opposite. The jural ‘correlative’ to a power results in the imposition of a 
                                                                
20
 Goldberg and Zipursky, n 3 at p 273. 
21
 Hohfeld, n 12. 
22
 Cane P, ‘Rights in Private Law’, Chapter 2, p 35 in Nolan and Robertson, n 2 at p 39. In this passage, Cane 
also observed that the term ‘interests’ has been used to describe a particular theory of rights – the interest theory. 
23
 Ibid at p 35. 
24
 Heydon D, ‘The Defence of Justification in Cases of Intentionally Caused Economic Loss’ (1970) 20 UTLJ 
139 at 142. 
25
 Ibid at 161 and 170-71. 
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‘liability’ in the person over whom control is exerted, or in other words, a ‘subjection’ or 
‘responsibility’.
26
 
Stevens devoted considerable energy to the analysis of various definitions and categories of 
rights. One potential conceptual division he canvassed was “to try and divide the law 
according to the sort of ‘interests’ the claimant’s right seeks to protect,” as this connects with 
“the common but not universal view that ‘rights’ in the general sense are concerned with 
protected interests.” He noted the tendency to confuse so called ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ and 
that “although an interest may be the subject matter to which a right relates (e.g. my interest 
in my body) it is not the right itself.” He saw that a significant disadvantage associated with 
focusing on the interest rather than the right was that an interests-based classification can 
cause sight to be lost of the distinction between a claim-right and a liberty. Stevens concluded 
that “a classification which furthers our understanding of the primary rights we have is to be 
preferred over an interests-based classification.”27 
 
Neyers referenced the following statement in the nineteenth century Privy Council case of 
Rogers v Dutt:
28
 “it is essential to an action in tort that the act complained of should under the 
circumstances, be legally wrongful as regards the party complaining; that is, it must 
prejudicially affect him in some legal right; merely that it will, however directly, do him 
harm in his interests is not enough.”29 Neyers also cited the dictum in Victoria Park Racing 
and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor
30
 that “it is a fundamental principle of the law that 
tortious liability requires both a right and an interference that is not too remote – one without 
the other will not do.”31 
 
These passages challenge Deakin and Randall’s viewpoint that an interference with interests 
can suffice to ground an action under the general economic torts.
32
 Purist rights-theorists 
would argue that the interference should be capable of being substantiated as having the 
elevated status of a right. 
 
However, from the perspective of precedent, the exact nature of the rights and interests 
protected by the various economic torts has not been precisely settled. This can lead to 
confusion. In the literature, a wide range of different notions of rights and interests have been 
argued to underpin each of the general economic torts. These diverse perspectives will now 
be considered.
33
 
                                                                
26
 Feaver D and Sheehy B, ‘Designing Effective Regulation: A Positive Theory’ (2015) 38 UNSW Law Journal 
961 at 975, referencing Hohfeld, n 12. 
27
 Stevens, n 8 at pp 289-90. 
28
 (1860) 13 Moo 208 (PC). 
29
 Neyers J, ‘Causing Loss by Unlawful Means: Should the High Court of Australia follow OBG Ltd v Allan?’ in 
Degeling, Edelman and Goudkamp, n 1 at p 125. 
30
 (1937) 58 CLR 479 at 524 per McTiernan J. 
31
 Neyers, n 29 at p 125, citing Weinrib E, ‘The Passing of Palsgraf?’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 803. 
32
 It should be noted that Deakin and Randall did not flesh out in detail the considerations upon which their 
conception of interests was based. 
33
 The discussion in Part IV below is, in effect, a continuation of the literature review in Chapter Four above. 
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IV. PROTECTED INTERESTS TORT-BY-TORT 
 
A Inducing Breach of Contract 
 
The ‘interests’ protected by the Lumley v Gye tort are contractual. Deakin and Randall’s 
view, citing OBG, was that the interest protected is an “actionable contractual expectation” 
and the interference prohibited is a “knowing and intentional procurement of breach.”34 
 
Causes of action under the tort of inducing breach of contract have also been said to involve 
direct interference with pre-existing ‘rights’ of a plaintiff. The tort aims to protect a plaintiff’s 
contract rights against “a defendant’s direct interference through persuasion or inducement,” 
although “only those intentional breaches where the defendant has himself deliberately 
persuaded the contractual partner into breach are covered.” 35  Bagshaw described “the 
orthodox understanding of the tort … as offering special protection to the contractual 
relationship.”36 
 
In OBG Lord Hoffmann explained that the tort: 
 
… treats contractual rights as a species of property which deserve special protection, not only by 
giving a right of action against the party who breaks his contract but by imposing secondary 
liability on a person who procures him to do so. In this respect it is quite distinct from the 
unlawful means principle, which is concerned only with intention and wrongfulness and is 
indifferent as to the nature of the interest which is damaged.
37
 
 
Any discussion of interests and interferences as they relate to the tort of inducing breach of 
contract should recognise that a large body of commentators question whether there is a 
legitimate basis for the tort’s existence. Writing soon after the publication of the OBG 
decision, Lord Hoffmann described himself as part of a “school of opposition” to the 
outcome in Lumley, on the basis it was an unprincipled decision which “made the law 
irrational and sometimes incoherent.” He noted other opponents include “the law and 
economics people, who regard the case as an obstacle to efficient breach of contract.”38 Weir 
drew attention to: 
 
… a law and economics justification for sanctioning inducement of breaches of contract, that is, 
bribing or bullying someone into breaking his contract with someone else. To make the inducer 
pay gives him an incentive to go to the promise and bargain with him rather than seducing or 
browbeating the promisor. This saves transaction costs.
39
 
                                                                
34
 Deakin and Randall, n 16 at 552. 
35
 Carty H, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2
nd
 Edition, 2010) at pp 55-56. 
36
 Bagshaw R, ‘Can the Economic Torts be Unified?’ OJLS 18 4 (1998) 729 at 735. As Carty noted (n 35 at p 
55) Danforth also concluded that the focus of the tort is on promoting contract rights: Danforth J, ‘Tortious 
Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society’s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual 
Integrity’ 81 Col LR (1981) 1491. 
37
 OBG v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1. This case is referred to hereafter as “OBG”. 
38
 Hoffmann L, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Economic Torts’ in Degeling, Edelman and Goudkamp, n 1 at p 106. 
39
 Weir T, Economic Torts (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) at p 5. 
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Lord Hoffmann identified two theories which approve of Lumley: 
The first is that which emphasises the moral obligation to keep a promise and, correspondingly, 
the immorality of tempting or persuading someone to break it … The other theory is that a 
contract is a chose in action, a species of property, which the law should protect from interference 
or devaluation in the same way as any other property.
40
 
 
Carty’s scholarly analysis of the rationale for the torts in her book An Analysis of the 
Economic Torts, concluded that “those who support the tort” have offered three separate 
rationales for its existence: “the property theory, the social policy theory and the secondary 
civil liability theory.” In her analysis, “it may be possible to compare the protection given by 
this tort to at least some of the protection given by the law to property” but “the contract does 
not as such give rise to property rights.”41 Bagshaw, on the other hand, suggested that “rather 
than see the contract as property, the law ‘borrows’ well-tested arguments for protecting 
private property rights against the world and that this provides a secure foundation for the 
Lumley v Gye tort.”42 Lee argued that at times the focus “on ‘property’ or ‘quasi-property’ 
really reflects a moral justification for the tort.”43 
 
Carty saw that “the second policy justifying the tort … relies on the policy benefits of the 
tort, ‘establishing norms to encourage private order’.”44 She referenced Danforth’s view that 
the protection of the integrity of contract reflects “the important role of contractual relations 
as a reliable, structure-giving element in any market economy.”45 It is necessary to see the 
tort in its historical context: as Cane noted, this tort has frequently been used as between 
employers and trade unions “at the forefront of bitter arguments about the (ab)use and control 
of economic power in society.”46 
 
The third theory identified by Carty, which she regarded as the “true principle” underpinning 
the tort, was that it “provided special protection for contract rights by imposing ‘secondary 
liability’ on a person who procures a breach, that liability dependent on the contracting party 
having committed an actionable wrong.”47 For this position she cited the authority (in OBG) 
of Lord Hoffmann and Lord Nicholls, who said “this tort is an example of civil liability 
which is secondary in the sense that it is secondary, or supplemental, to that of a third party 
                                                                
40
 Hoffmann, n 38 at pp 105-6. 
41
 Carty, n 35 at p 57. 
42
 Bagshaw R, ‘Inducing Breach of Contract’ in Horder J (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th series 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), Ch 7 at pp 135-36, referenced by Carty, n 35 at p 58. 
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 These words are Carty’s (n 35 at p 59) referring to Lee Pey Woan, ‘Inducing Breach of Contract, Conversion 
and Contract as Property’ 29 OJLS (2009) 513 at 513. 
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 Carty, n 35 at p 59, referencing Partlett D, ‘From Victorian Operas to Rock and Rap’ 66 Tulane L Rev (1991-
2) 771 at 809. 
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 Danforth, n 36 at 1493. 
46
 Cane P, The Anatomy of Tort Law (2
nd
 Edition, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) at p 151.  
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 Carty, n 35 at pp 60 and 62. 
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who committed a breach of contract” and therefore provides a claimant with an “additional 
cause of action.”48 
 
Against this, Stevens doubted the existence of a general principle of secondary liability for 
wrongs committed by others as an explanation for the inducing breach of contract remedy, 
for six reasons:
49
 
 
First, one party who induces another to breach a contract is not held jointly liable with the party in 
breach of contract for the commission of the same wrong … Secondly, the modes of participation 
in another’s conduct which suffice for the attribution of action can be wider than is sufficient for 
the purposes of inducing breach of contract … Thirdly, and conversely, some forms of inducement 
of breach of contract are actionable which would not be sufficient for the purposes of the 
attribution of action … Fourthly, the remedies available against a party who induces a breach of 
contract differ from those available against the contracting party … Fifthly, the view that the claim 
in Lumley v Gye is a form of secondary liability is difficult to support in the light of the fact that 
the inducer may be laible when the contracting party is not … Sixthly, the attempt to generalize 
Lumley v Gye into a general principle of secondary participation was (rightly) rejected in Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credit Guarantee Department.
50
 
 
Stevens argued that “all contracts carry with them a right good against everyone else that they 
do not induce the infringement of the contractual right.” In his view “the essence of the tort 
[of inducing breach of contract] is that by inducing a voluntary breach the claimant 
undermines the bond of trust between persons.”51 
 
The earlier writings of Glasbeek maintained that “the ability to indulge in contract-making 
plays such an essential role in our society that it must be protected by the law” and that 
“public interest demands that such interference with contract-making be more positively 
discouraged and, therefore, an additional remedy is given to the promise.”52 He regarded 
Lord Macnaghten’s much-cited passage in Quinn v Leathem summarising the tort as “a 
violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law”53 as a variant 
of a general principle that “the law wishes the acknowledged right to be respected and to 
deter would-be violators by punishing actual violators. That is, inherent in the cause of action 
is the notion that certain modes of behaviour are not to be condoned and ought to be 
punished.”54 This is consistent with the courts’ interest in enforcing promises which are a 
product of the private autonomy of individuals.
55
 Glasbeek identified a range of important 
propositions emanating from Lumley: 
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… where the right violated was a contract, the nature of the behaviour of the stranger who 
procured or induced the breach of contract did not have to be evaluated: liability would follow if 
the breach was the result of the defendant’s conduct, whereas if the right interfered with was not a 
contract, the nature of the defendant’s conduct might make him liable although mere malice would 
not … The view that a contract is the kind of right which will justify the imposition of liability 
upon a stranger should it be breached as a result of that stranger’s conduct, is supported by respect 
that the common law has evinced over the centuries for private contract-making. The contract is 
seen as the cornerstone of our individualistic society. The making of contracts depends on the 
ability of free activity of individuals to voluntarily treat and to negotiate with each other and to 
agree to be bound to each other on such conditions as they choose. Accordingly, its status should 
be protected by the law wherever possible, thereby promoting these manifestations of individual 
freedom and enterprise.
56
  
 
In contrast, Carty’s view was that “simply to focus on the ‘protected interest’ misses the point 
of Lumley v Gye liability. The contract right is only protected against the defendant in certain 
circumstances. There have to be special reasons for making the defendant liable where the 
wrong concerned is the wrong of another.”57 As a sufficient reason, she nominated Weir’s 
“the defendant ‘got something unlawful done’.”58 Carty acknowledged that “contract rights 
are clearly important” but argued the focus on contract rights has led to unfounded extensions 
of liability in case law, with the unsuccessful attempt to assert a tort of interference with 
contractual relations in OBG being a prime example. She characterised Lord Macnaghten’s 
approach in Quinn v Leathem referencing “violation of legal right”59 as “misleading.”60 
 
 
B Conspiracy 
 
Goodman saw that the fundamental rationale of civil conspiracy was “the significance of 
plurality” and that its purpose, in both the lawful means and unlawful means forms, is 
“protection of the individual or the public vis-à-vis the activities of combinations.”61 This 
derived from comments of Bowen CJ in the Mogul case that “it is necessary to be very 
careful not to press the doctrine of illegal conspiracy beyond that which is necessary for the 
protection of individuals, or of the public.”62 Lee argued that regard must be had to the tort’s 
historical role as the civil analogue of criminal conspiracy, conceived to deter combinations 
that result in serious harm to social or economic order.
63
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The coercive potential of combination was demonstrated in Quinn v Leathem where one of 
the bases of the plaintiff’s action was the publication by the defendants “of ‘black lists’ 
containing and holding up to odium, not only his name, but the names of persons who dealt 
with him, as a warning to those persons that if they wished their names to be removed from 
the lists they must have no more dealings with him.” The black lists were termed “a real 
object of coercion.”64 
 
In Quinn v Leathem Lord Macnaghten explained the innate concern about parties acting in 
combination: 
 
That a conspiracy to injure – an oppressive combination – differs widely from an invasion of civil 
rights by a single individual cannot be doubted … A man may resist, without much difficulty, the 
wrongful act of an individual … but it is a very different thing … when one man has to defend 
himself against many combined to do him wrong.
65
  
 
Bowen LJ in the Mogul case said: “The distinction [i.e. between the infliction of harm by one 
compared with a combination] is based on sound reason, for a combination may make 
oppressive or dangerous that which if it proceeded only from a single person would be 
otherwise.”66 Goodman termed this the “strength in numbers” argument and contended this 
was no longer sustainable: 
 
It is not the mere fact of numbers that is potentially oppressive; oppression is the product of 
protean factors. Thus, for example, the relative power of the parties to a dispute vis-à-vis one 
another as well as the means at their disposal to bring about a result may outweigh the significance 
of plurality.
67
 
 
Elias and Ewing commented that “motive and purpose became relevant where a combination 
of persons was acting together,” especially where “a group of trade unionists were combining 
together” and the apparent justification for this was the belief that the coercive pressure of a 
group far outweighed that of an individual acting alone.”68 They thought “this was always a 
naïve assumption once the doctrine of separate legal personality for corporate bodies had 
been accepted into English law. And what was once simply naïve became positively 
grotesque with the development of very large and powerful corporate organisations.”69 
 
Lee balanced the debate, observing that “although it is true that a large corporation is often 
more powerful than several individual traders combined, it does not follow that the latter 
cannot constitute an unfair or intimidating force against a lone trader.”70 
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The validity of basing liability for lawful means conspiracy on “the mere fact … of a 
combination of persons” has been criticised by others.71 According to Carty the torts have 
been muddled by judicial “inability to appreciate the legitimacy of collective pressure.”72 
 
Goodman saw that the House of Lords in Lonrho Ltd and Ors v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd and 
Ors (No 2) made clear their belief that civil action in conspiracy was anomalous, referencing 
a dictum of Lord Diplock in that case: 
 
… [T]o suggest today that acts done by one street-corner grocer in concert with a second are more 
oppressive and dangerous to a competitor than the same acts done by a string of supermarkets 
under a single ownership or that a multi-national conglomerate … does not exercise greater 
economic power than any combination of small businesses is to shut one’s eyes to what has been 
happening in the business and industrial world since the turn of the [20
th
] century and, in 
particular, since the end of the 1939-45 war.
73
 
 
Writing in 1991, Goodman contended that “in contemporary Australia … it has become not 
uncommon for one person or a small group of persons to control, for example, virtually an 
entire industry and/or large numbers of employees” and that in that event the “dubious 
rationale upon which civil conspiracy is premised becomes totally eroded.”74 
 
A number of commentators have regarded lawful means conspiracy as anomalous. Stevens 
expressed concern at the liability being based on “the mere fact … of a combination of 
persons.”75 Lee said “the anomaly of lawful means conspiracy is too well recognised. It 
assumes that a combination has the magical power to transform a lawful act into an unlawful 
one although it is not clear why that is necessarily so.” 76  Carty thought “lawful means 
conspiracy could be seen as an anomaly, out of line with OBG’s reassertion of the 
abstentionist policy.”77  
 
Neyers considered the main arguments generally advanced by those who argue that lawful 
means conspiracy is anomalous, but he concluded that the tort is justified and the criticisms 
can be explained away. He noted that a common critique is that lawful means conspiracy is in 
violation of the well-accepted common law principle that “an act that is legal in itself will not 
be made illegal because the motive of the act may be bad.”78 Neyers’ view was that in order 
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to explain the rationale for lawful means conspiracy, “one must demonstrate that there exists 
a right to be free from gratuitous harm and that this right can consistently and coherently exist 
with the other rights recognised by law.” He persuasively argued that such a right exists.79 
 
In Deakin and Randall’s view the interest protected by unlawful means conspiracy is an 
economic interest in a trade.
80
 However, Lord Wright noted in the Crofter case that the 
doctrine of civil conspiracy to injure extends beyond trade competition and labour disputes 
and thus non-economic purposes may also be in scope. In Crofter Viscount Maughan said 
that amongst the types of combination that may be actionable are “combinations the object of 
which may be a dislike of the religious views, the politics, the race or the colour of the 
plaintiff provided that the plaintiff is harmed as a result of the combination.”81 
 
Deakin and Randall proposed a broadening of the interest protected by unlawful means 
conspiracy to “economic damage, not confined to trade interests.” This was in line with “the 
residual market-protecting role” they suggested for the economic torts in general.82  
 
Their proposal – in that it envisaged limitation of availability of the remedy to players in a 
marketplace – was at odds with the outcome of the Total Network case in which, by a bare 
majority, access to the tort was extended to a government agency, Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs. A dictum of Lord Walker, part of the majority in that case, asserted that it was 
“not necessary, in the context of the unlawful means conspiracy tort, for the claimant to be a 
trader who is injured in his trade.”83 
 
Another concise encapsulation offered by Deakin and Randall described the interference 
prohibited by the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means as “combination coupled with 
intention to harm.” They noted that for this tort the defendants’ activities need not be 
“independently actionable by the party interfered with.”84 
 
In a thought-provoking article published in 2016, Lee explored a further extension of the tort 
– to use it, as an alternative to ‘the piercing of the corporate veil’ to either “stretch a 
company’s liability to its controllers, or to enable a controller’s creditors to reach the assets of 
a company under his or her control.” She noted potential for the tort to be used “in disputes 
involving corporate defendants, as a means of circumventing the company’s veil of 
incorporation to reach directors, shareholders or related companies who might in one way or 
another have been involved in a company’s alleged wrongdoing.” This would leverage the 
characteristic of the general economic torts that they allow a plaintiff to “reach beyond the 
immediate perpetrator of a particular injury, and attach liability to those whose involvement 
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is either indirect or insufficiently causative of the claimant’s injury.” Lee noted that a liberal 
application of conspiracy liability to companies and their insiders could potentially encroach 
upon the limited liability principle and undermine the benefits of incorporation.
85
 
 
C Intimidation 
 
With the tort of intimidation, the ‘interest’ protected is an “economic interest in the relation 
being interfered with.”86 The need for courts to evaluate the nature of interests at stake, from 
the perspective of both plaintiff and defendant, is illustrated by Ansett Transport Industries 
(Operations) Pty Ltd & Ors v Australian Federation of Air Pilots & Ors
87
 in which four 
airline companies, who together employed about 1500 air pilots, took action against the 
Federation for interference with contractual relations, conspiracy and intimidation, following 
a dispute about pay increases for pilots. The defendants, union officials, issued a directive to 
pilots that they should only work between the hours of 9am and 5pm, causing the plaintiff 
airlines considerable loss of income. They also advised pilots to resign their employment, 
which they did en masse, and placed advertisements in various publications warning of 
adverse consequences for any pilots accepting employment from the plaintiffs. The defendant 
advertised in newspapers that any pilot seeking employment with airlines in Australia would 
be considered a strike breaker, and that the terms of settlement of the dispute would include a 
provision for immediate cancellation of the employment contracts of those pilots. The airlines 
alleged that the advertisement by the defendant prevented pilots from seeking employment 
with them.
88
 
 
The court said: 
 
The warning notice certainly had a tendency to deter pilots from seeking employment with the 
plaintiffs … It may be that some pilots were deterred from taking employment with the plaintiffs 
by the notice. The … factors operating to influence the minds of pilots … include (in the case of 
those who had resigned) self-interest and loyalty and (in the case of all pilots) the fear of 
unpleasant consequences of one kind or another if they took up employment and anxiety about 
what their position would be, in every respect, quite independently of the threat in the notice, if the 
dispute was settled and those who had resigned returned to work.
89
 
 
Deakin and Randall detailed various interferences, falling within the rubric of ‘threats of 
unlawful conduct’, that led to the development of the tort of intimidation – threats of serious 
violence;
90
 actual violence;
91
 and the need to address “the problem of the coercive power of 
threats.”92 
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D Causing Loss by Unlawful Means 
 
According to Deakin and Randall the tort of causing loss by unlawful means protects “an 
economic interest in the relation being interfered with” or alternatively “substantial interests 
in a trade, business or livelihood.”93 
 
Neyers suggested that claims for economic loss caused by unlawful means can potentially be 
justified “on the basis that the defendant’s actions violate a (specially constituted) primary 
right of the plaintiff” that is infringed “when the defendant injures the third party.”94 In 
Neyers’ treatment “the term ‘primary right’ refers to a right that: (1) is recognised by the 
substantive law (such as rights to bodily integrity, to property, to contractual performance, 
and to reputation …; and (2) exists prior to the wrongful interference with it. A primary right 
is contrasted with secondary rights which arise when a primary right has been infringed (that 
is, the right to damages).”95 
 
As “the unlawful means tort is a three-party tort involving a plaintiff, a defendant and an 
injured or threatened third party” it “expands the number of persons liable for a civil 
wrong.”96 Thus, the tort “allows a plaintiff to sue a defendant for a loss that is occasioned by 
an unlawful act committed by that defendant against a third party.”97 The tort is therefore 
sometimes referred to as “anomalous”98 or “a peculiar cause of action”99 because, as Pearson 
LJ commented in Rookes v Barnard, “the plaintiff is only a secondary and indirect victim of 
the wrongdoing.”100 
 
The unlawful means tort “necessarily has a multi-party structure and is conceptually distinct 
from two-party liability contingent upon the use of unlawful means.”101 Lord Hope warned in 
Total Network that “caution is needed where the unlawful act is directed against a third party 
at whose instance it is not actionable because he suffers no loss. In such circumstances the 
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plaintiff’s cause of action is, as Carty put it, ‘parasitic on the unlawful means used by the 
defendant against another party’.”102 
 
Carty also commented that “the debate as to the existence and scope of two-party economic 
torts has been set alight by the House of Lords decision in Total Network, a debate which 
may lead to the emergence of two frameworks for economic tort liability and possibly the 
distortion of established areas of tort liability.”103 Lee’s view was that “it is unclear if the 
legal principles enunciated in OBG v Allan apply only to indirect interferences, or extend also 
to those involving direct, two-party interferences.”104 Neyers said: 
 
For clarity’s sake it should be noted that acceptance of the ‘composite justification’
105
 of the 
unlawful means tort does not cast doubt upon the existence of two-party intimidation provided that 
unlawful means in that tort are understood to be limited to threatened violations of a plaintiff’s 
primary rights. On this analysis, a two-party version of the unlawful means tort is redundant since 
actual/direct violations of a plaintiff’s rights can be remedied by the respective torts which protect 
those rights.
106
 
 
Deakin and Randall identified the kinds of interferences restricted by the tort of causing loss 
by unlawful means as “intentional harm via independently actionable unlawful means, 
limiting freedom to trade” and “interventions which are direct and targeted.”107 
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V. THE VEXED NOTION OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Having considered the nature of the rights and interests that can potentially underpin a 
claimant’s cause of action, discussion can now turn to the kinds of countervailing rights and 
interests that may be argued to found justification defences. Justification is explored in detail 
in Chapter Seven, but it is appropriate to elaborate here on the proposition (advanced at the 
end of Chapter Five) that the notion of public interest needs to be considered in any analysis 
of the respective rights of the parties to a dispute. Considerations of public interest provide 
the most compelling explanation for denying a claimant recourse it would otherwise be 
entitled to. 
 
McBride argued that it would be a “wrong turn” or a “big mistake” to interpret the 
requirements of a rights-based theory of law to “abjure any reference to the public interest all 
the way down – not only in its account of why and when tort remedies will be available, but 
also in its account of what rights we have and what rights we don’t have.”108 His view was 
that: 
 
… rights-based theorists of tort law are right to be suspicious of those who claim that all tort cases will 
ultimately come down to questions of ‘public policy’ – but they throw the baby out with the bath water 
when they claim that considerations of what is in the public interest are never relevant to claims in tort. 
Plainly they are, and plainly they should be … the fact that the courts are ill-equipped in some difficult 
cases to decide what is, and what is not, in the public interest does not mean that they are always 
incapable of reaching accurate conclusions on such issues. In cases where it is very clear – even to a 
judge – that it would be contrary to the public interest, or that it would not be contrary to the public 
interest, to grant someone a particular right, why should the courts not take that into account in 
deciding whether or not to recognise that right?
109
 
 
Where a sufficient public interest exists it is legitimate for a court to grant a claimant only a 
measured or limited right against a defendant. However, a series of problems need to be 
overcome if this proposition is to be carried into effect. 
 
The first is the need to develop better mechanisms for assessing the public interest, in order to 
determine its sufficiency. Cheer noted that “considerable judicial and other ink has been 
spilled trying to define what the public interest means”110 but the meaning of the term is still 
debated, and unclear. Where statutory tests of public interest have been put in place, e.g. the 
test of ‘benefit to the public’ under s 90(8) of Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth), comprehensive methodologies of assessment based in economics have been 
developed.
111
 Comparable methods have not been developed to guide assessments under the 
common law. 
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Even in the Competition and Consumer Act example, there is undoubted potential to design 
and implement more rigorous assessment processes which take into account a wider range of 
considerations, including “broader social values.”112 
 
The second set of issues to be overcome are essentially political. According to Powell and 
Clemens, the idea of public good is “vexed and contested and one must ask questions like 
‘which public?’ and ‘for whose good?’” and assess “what is the yardstick that assesses how 
organizational actions best meet broad societal goals?”113 An illustration of how value-laden 
the process of assessment can be was provided by Cane when he observed that “furtherance 
of the self-interest of workers can be seen as in the public interest because it provides a 
counterweight to the ability of employers, by virtue of their economic strength, to protect 
their own interests within the law.” 114  Evaluations become especially challenging when 
courts are asked to determine matters of morality or fairness.
115
 The difficulty of deciding 
where the public good lies between competing views of a contentious political nature has 
been noted by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.
116
  
 
The final problem which needs to be addressed is judicial reluctance to engage in the process 
of weighing rights and interests. This reluctance has been overcome in some areas of law: 
Cane discussed the “balancing of factors” (often involving “difficult and controversial moral 
and social judgments”) required under the common law defence of necessity to actions for 
trespass.
117
 He also highlighted that “there are many areas of the law of tort in which the 
courts give effect, explicitly or implicitly, to ‘public policy’ arguments. The results may 
sometimes be controversial, but the courts are not always in a position to shirk the 
responsibility of deciding such matters; nor do they always wish to do so.”118  
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In an article which mapped the development of remedies for economic duress, Stewart 
concluded that: 
 
… every day courts are required to resolve commercial dilemmas, and frequently there is no clear-
cut precedent or obviously applicable rule to guide them. In these ‘hard cases’ it becomes 
necessary for judges to rely on their own acquired knowledge of commercial practices and 
standards: and it is these which … must be applied when the use of commercial pressure is alleged 
to be wrongful.
119
 
 
Uncertainty will arise if litigation is resolved by approaches which depend on a judicial 
value-judgment of the justifiability of certain conduct (for instance, commercial pressure) but 
this can be moderated if public interest considerations are part of the evaluation. 
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VI. THE WEIGHING OF COMPETING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 
 
Since it is being advocated in this thesis that the courts should be prepared to engage in the 
weighing of competing rights and interests, it is necessary to review the guidance that is 
available in the case law as to how this should be done. 
 
Before considering the cases it is useful to reflect upon the conceptual observations of Peter 
Cane in his 1991 text Tort Law and Economic Interests, in which he engaged in some 
“skirmishing about the proper role of general principles” in tort.120 Cane analysed the various 
ways in which defences to tortious actions, grounded in competing interests, may result in a 
refusal to impose liability. He saw two types of cases. The first was where a “competing 
interest nullifies a (prima face) liability in tort,” allowing the competing interest to be 
“recognized as affording a legal justification for conduct otherwise tortious.” This can arise 
where a defendant “acted to protect some stronger legal interest of his own,” and in this case 
“the onus of establishing nullifying factors will normally rest on the defendant.” The second 
case – where the competing interest “negatives tort liability” – can arise where a defendant 
pleads “that some public interest justified” the action. Here, “the plaintiff will normally be 
responsible for establishing that there are no negativing factors.”121 Cane elaborated: 
 
Reasoning in terms of nullification of liability most commonly occurs in cases where the tort on 
which the plaintiff’s cause of action is based is one which has the protection of a property interest 
(or some kindred type of interest), or of a contractual interest, as its juristic focus: trespass, for 
example, or defamation, or interference with contract … Thus we speak of justifying trespass or 
interference with contract, and of raising a defence to a prima-face case of defamation.
122
 
 
In Read v The Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons of England, Ireland and Wales,
123
 
an early inducing breach of contract case, it was held that sufficient justification for 
interference with a claimant’s right hinged on the existence of an equal or superior right. 
 
Important questions flow from this principle. Should certain economic interests receive a 
higher degree of protection than others, and is there a hierarchy of interests? Whilst the idea 
of a settled hierarchy has not been entertained by the courts, Deakin and Randall thought that 
a hierarchy of interests is implicit in the structure of the economic torts, with contractual 
rights enjoying a higher level of protection than general economic interests, and that some 
degree of prioritisation is inevitable.
124
 
 
Read was subsequently elaborated in the Glamorgan Coal case
125
 where it was said that “the 
circumstances which will constitute sufficient justification cannot be satisfactorily defined, 
and it must be left to the determination of the Court in each case whether there is sufficient 
                                                                
120
 Cane P, Tort Law and Economic Interests, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) at p 23. 
121
 Ibid at p 230. 
122
 Ibid at p 231. 
123
 [1902] 2 KB 732. 
124
 Deakin and Randall, n 16 at 535-56. 
125
 Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd v South Wales Miners’ Federation [1903] 2 KB 545. 
Chapter Six: The Contest of Rights and Interests 
142 
 
justification for the interference.”126 Romer LJ provided a list of relevant factors which could 
potentially be weighed, where the tort in play is inducing breach of contract: 
 
... in analyzing or considering the circumstances, I think that regard might be had to the nature of 
the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; the 
means employed to procure the breach; the relation of the person procuring the breach to the 
person who breaks the contract; and I think also to the object of the person in procuring the 
breach.
127
 
 
The Read and Glamorgan Coal precedents were reviewed in Independent Oil Industries Ltd v 
Shell Co of Australia Ltd,
128
 a decision of three judges of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales. There it was noted that no case had, as yet, authoritatively decided that “anything 
short of the protection of an actually existing superior legal right will justify the wilful 
procuring of a breach of contract.” 
 
Independent Oil involved a suit by a petrol wholesaler which was supplying to retail dealers 
on the condition they would sell petrol at a retail selling price fixed by the wholesaler. After a 
series of transgressions of the agreed pricing arrangements certain dealers broke their 
agreements with the plaintiff and increased the price of petrol beyond the selling price fixed 
by the plaintiff. While the outcome of the case turned on failure to prove the elements of the 
tort of inducing breach of contract, rather than justification arguments, the judgments in the 
case contained several important dicta bearing on the considerations to be taken into account 
when weighing competing interests. 
 
Jordan CJ said that justification rested on the principle that “an act which would in itself be 
wrongful as infringing some legal right of another person may be justified if shown to be no 
more than reasonably necessary for the protection of some actually existing superior legal 
right in the doer of the act.”129 In support of this he gave the example of an occupier of land 
who may, after notice, lawfully eject a trespasser by acts which would in other circumstances 
constitute the tort of assault. 
 
Zhu v Treasurer of the State of NSW
130
 concerned actions taken by the Sydney Organising 
Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) to instruct TOC Management Services Pty Ltd 
(TOC), the trustee of the Olympic Club Trust, to terminate an agency agreement between 
TOC and the plaintiff Zhu. The facts can be concisely summarised: 
 
In March 1999 Z entered into a contract with the trustee of an ‘Olympic Club’ which appointed 
him as an agent to sell memberships of the club to residents of China for use in conjunction with 
transport and accommodation for the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney. In November 1999, the 
Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) procured the termination of Z’s 
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contract. In proceedings brought by Z, SOCOG conceded that its acts interfered with Z’s contract 
and were intended to do so, but it pleaded that the interference was justified.
131
 
 
The defendant SOCOG made a number of key submissions: that as defendants they needed 
some insulation from the rigours of the widening tort of interference with contract and that 
the function of the justification defence was to achieve this end; that it had rights resulting 
from its responsibility to protect the intellectual property which it was custodian of; and “that 
there were two inconsistent sets of legal rights: the plaintiff’s contractual rights against TOC, 
and SOCOG’s rights.” However, “SOCOG accepted that it had no superior statutory right 
positively authorising the commission of the tort and no superior proprietary right.”132 
 
In Zhu, the High Court established a general principle that: “Ordinarily, to justify the wilful 
attempt of a stranger to procure a breach of contract, a superior legal right must be 
established” 133  and that the “approach to the defence of justification [which] should be 
accepted for Australia” was that “an ‘actually existing superior legal right’ is required.”134 An 
‘actually existing superior legal right’ could be taken to mean “a right in real or personal 
property, not merely a right to contractual performance.” The High Court observed that “two 
competing rights to contractual performance involving no proprietary interest would be equal 
rights” but, significantly, Jordan CJ in Independent Oil had not mentioned the protection of 
an equal right as a form of justification.”135 To reinforce the general principle, it was also said 
that “a right which is ‘superior’ to the plaintiff’s contractual right must be proprietary” and 
“statute apart, where reliance is placed on the defence of justification to protect a right which 
is equal or superior to the contractual right of the plaintiff … normally … a superior right will 
be proprietary.”136 
 
The High Court addressed an inconsistent English example of a superior right making out a 
defence of justification in Edwin Hill
137
 where “the defendants lent money to a property 
developer to enable him to develop a particular property and secured the loan by charges on 
the property.” They noted a dictum in that case that “justification for interference with the 
plaintiff’s contractual rights could be based upon an equal or superior right in the defendant 
derived from contractual rights.” However, this was discounted on the basis it found ‘no 
support” in the statements of Jordan CJ in Independent Oil and the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales in that case only supported “the existence of justification in 
superior, ie, proprietary rights.”138 
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It had been commonly understood that “the superiority of the defendant’s contract apparently 
rests on its temporal priority”139 but Zhu established that “in stating the law for Australia, it 
should now be accepted that, when the superiority of right rests in some characteristic of the 
general law then … temporal priority of other purely contractual rights will not suffice.”140 
The High Court held that: 
 
The assertion of justification by a stranger to interfere with [compliance with a contractual 
obligation] necessarily impinges on the law. It is for that reason that justification requires either 
the authority of statute … or some other superior right if the interference is to be lawful.
141
 
 
The combined effect of these reasons was that SOCOG’s conduct did not meet the criteria for 
a defence of justification. Its acts were more than was reasonably necessary to protect its 
rights.
142
 As a result of Zhu an ‘actually existing superior legal right’ has arguably become, in 
Australia, the only justification for inducing a breach of contract.
143
 
 
It should be noted that in Zhu the High Court downplayed the ‘balancing and weighing’ 
function of the judiciary (although the necessity for this task to be undertaken will still arise 
whenever two comparable sets of rights grounded in property and/or contract are in issue). 
SOCOG unsuccessfully submitted that the court should “engage in a flexible discretionary 
‘balancing exercise,’ weighing social and individual interests, to determine which set of 
rights should prevail.”144 The High Court said: 
 
The primary difficulty with the approach SOCOG would have this Court take is that in Australian 
law the defence of justification does not depend upon a discretionary ‘balancing’ of social and 
individual interests. The statement of Romer LJ in Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd v South Wales Miners 
Federation may be relevant, at a high level of generality, in the elucidation of the law, but appears 
never to have been decisive of the outcome in any particular case.
145
  
 
The weighing of countervailing rights and interests is a task that courts have traditionally 
disdained. Nevertheless, it is submitted, the weighing of rights is terrain that the courts will 
increasingly be called upon to traverse. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the idea that the general economic torts should be approached from 
the vantage point of rigorous rights analysis – that is, based on evaluation of the respective 
rights of the claimant and defendant. It has been concluded that causes of action in this field 
of law are essentially grounded (whether explicitly or implicitly) in interference with rights or 
interests and that diagnosis of the rights and interests at stake should be an essential early step 
in economic tort litigation. 
 
It was also found that the interference that ground the action will have greater consequence if 
it is capable of being substantiated as having the elevated status of a right (as opposed to a 
‘mere’ interest). However, the nuances of the differences between rights and interests and 
their respective weighting do not appear to have been judicially considered in a recent 
Australian economic tort case. Terminology relating to notions of rights and interests tends to 
be employed in a confused and inconsistent manner by advocates, judges and academics 
alike. 
 
It has been seen that there is potential for the development of new approaches, grounded in 
refinements of intermediate theories, under which the general economic torts could be 
developed with primary reference to correlative considerations of justice between the 
claimant and defendant, but also potentially taking account of public interest considerations. 
This will require courts to be involved in the balancing of competing rights and interests. 
 
Precisely articulating the rights at stake becomes vitally important if justification defences are 
to be asserted. The state of development of the justification defences applicable to the general 
economic torts is examined in detail in Chapter Seven which follows. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
JUSTIFICATION DEFENCES 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of justification has been central to the economic torts from their inception, but 
limited attention has been paid to delineating the justification defences. This position stands 
in contrast to other areas of tort law such as defamation where the common law developed a 
series of “formalised privileges”1 which ultimately were converted, in Australia, into 
statutory exceptions embedded in the Defamation Acts of the various States and Territories 
(including the “defence of justification”).2 
 
In part, this lack of attention may be attributable to the tendency courts have displayed to rely 
on definitions of unlawful means and/or intention, malice or purpose in preference to 
justification as control mechanisms for the torts.
3
 Another explanation may be that when 
statutes were introduced to confer immunity from economic tort liability on collectives 
involved in industrial action, this “in effect fulfilled the function of the defence of 
justification in the labour context … and made unnecessary further judicial consideration or 
development of the common law doctrine.”4 As a result, as Lord Hoffmann has said (extra-
judicially), after South Wales Miners Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd
5
 in 1905, 
“justification more or less disappeared from the calculation.”6 Whatever the reason, the state 
of development of the justification defences is surprisingly immature.
7
 
 
Deakin and Randall proposed a revised conceptual basis for the general economic torts 
which, in part, would give greater emphasis to “the nature of justifications which should be 
accepted as defences.”8 They saw the need for “a more nuanced account” of justification, 
noting that the defences have potential to delimit the outer limits of these torts. The 
conclusion of their article suggested a new basis for reformulating the torts, built on general 
principles which included “a broad range of justification defences based on collective 
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economic self-interest, pre-existing contracts, etc.”9 Deakin and Randall commented that “the 
justification defences … have not received the attention which they deserve” but went on to 
note that there are signs that this is changing with indications in decisions since the turn of 
the 21
st
 Century of the interplay between torts and immunities again becoming the focus of 
judicial activity.
 10 
 
Despite these insights, Deakin and Randall’s proposals have, to date, gained limited traction 
and received relatively little judicial support or analysis. In part, this is because they did not 
themselves undertake a detailed evaluation of potential ways justifications might be 
elaborated in the future, only offering a high-level sketch. They did not flesh out in any detail 
the considerations upon which their conception of interests might be based. The absence of 
exploration by other commentators (especially in Australia) of the potential identified by 
Deakin and Randall for expansion of the justification defences constitutes a gap in the 
economic torts literature. 
 
This chapter aims to address this gap by reviewing in some depth the relevant case law, 
identifying the judicial perspectives reflected in the English and Australian precedents and 
examining the role justification defences play within the architecture of the economic torts. It 
then explores the potential for future expansion of the defences. A number of obstacles to 
expanded justifications – some erected by the case law, others arising from theory – are 
considered, and a refocusing on notions of public interest in the future development of the 
defences is anticipated. The chapter considers the question: should a defendant who has 
engaged in illegal activity ever be able to claim the benefit of a justification defence? 
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II. JUSTIFICATION DEFENCES TORT-BY-TORT 
 
To understand the current status of justifications under the economic torts it is necessary to 
review the position tort-by-tort, as there are significant differences in the way the defences 
are applied (or not applied) to the underlying causes of action. Just as no underpinning 
unifying principle of liability has been arrived at for the various economic torts,
11
 it is 
difficult to discern a common thread of logic in the application of these defences. Deakin and 
Randall’s 2009 article set out a simple typology for justifications:12 
TORT JUSTIFICATIONS 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMIC TORT LIABILITY 
Broad range of justification defences 
based on collective economic self-
interest, pre-existing contracts, etc 
INDUCING BREACH OF 
CONTRACT 
Limited (eg. rights under pre-existing 
contract: Edwin Hill) 
LAWFUL MEANS CONSPIRACY Collective economic self-interest 
(Crofter) 
UNLAWFUL MEANS 
CONSPIRACY 
None 
INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE, 
ETC BY UNLAWFUL MEANS 
None 
 
Figure 1: Deakin and Randall’s Assessment of Justifications after OBG and Total Network 
  
According to this analysis, the position established by 2009 was that there is no place for 
justification in connection with two of the five torts with which this thesis is concerned: the 
category where the defendant has intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s trade, business 
or livelihood using unlawful means; and unlawful means conspiracy. 
 
However, there is potentially a significant role for justification in relation to both lawful 
means conspiracy and the tort of inducing breach of contract, as Heydon noted. These torts, 
he said, were “dependent on a notion of justification or privilege” and he concisely described 
the operation of this notion as follows: “if one party to a contract is induced to break it by the 
defendant, the latter is liable unless he justifies his conduct; two who conspire to injure 
another are liable unless they are advancing legitimate interests.”13 Heydon favoured a 
widening of justifications and regretted that they had simply not been worked out.
14
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Courts, especially in England, have specified a range of disparate circumstances in which 
defences of justification may be available. It is useful to review these cases with the objective 
of identifying principles that could potentially be generalised. The precedents also indicate a 
range of circumstances that will not amount to a justification defence.
15
 
 
A Inducing Breach of Contract 
 
Of all the general economic torts, justification defences have been most fully developed for 
inducing breach of contract. Hazel Carty commented that “as unlawful means are not part of 
the tort, it is likely that the defence will be different (and wider) in this tort than any defence 
of justification that might apply to the unlawful means tort.”16 
 
Deakin and Randall assessed the prospects of availability of a defence based on a pre-existing 
contractual obligation of the defendant
17
 which was successfully argued in Edwin Hill and 
Partners v First National Finance Corp.
18
 The complex facts of Edwin Hill involved a 
defendant finance company which had provided a substantial loan to a property developer to 
enable him to develop a property under a contract which contained an express power of sale 
and power to appoint a receiver, which upon default chose to finance the development itself 
rather than exercise its power of sale.
19
 Stilitz and Sales cited Edwin Hill as the basis for their 
view that, in the case of ‘the tort of knowing direct interference with contracts’, a defence of 
justification is established.
20
 
 
Edwin Hill has been taken as authority for the proposition that the absence of an intention to 
injure the person whose contract is broken does not amount to justification.
21
 As Slade J 
observed in Greig v Insole, “good faith and absence of malice on the part of a defendant do 
not as such provide any defence to an action based on inducement of breach of contract.”22 
 
The origin of the justification defence under inducing breach of contract can be traced to 
Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd v South Wales Miners’ Federation.23 In this case miners employed 
at a colliery, “without giving notice to their employers and in breach of their contracts with 
them, abstained from working on ‘stop-days’ … under the direction or order of a federation 
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of the miners.” The court’s view was that “the object of procuring this breach of contract was 
to keep up the price of coal, upon which the amount of the miners’ wages depended.”24 
 
At first instance the judge found that the federation and other defendants, as miners’ agents or 
leaders, “had lawful justification or excuse for what they did in this, that having been 
solicited by the men to advise and guide them on the question of stop-days, it was their duty 
and right to give them advice, and to do what might be necessary to secure that the advice 
should be followed.”25 
 
The Court of Appeal found that no sufficient justification was made out: 
 
To my mind the ground alleged affords no justification for the conduct of the federation towards 
the employers … it was said that the federation had a duty towards the men which justified them 
in doing what they did. For myself I cannot see that they had any duty which in any way 
compelled them to act, or justified them in acting, as they did towards the plaintiffs. And the fact 
that the men and the federation, as being interested in or acting for the benefit of the men, were 
both interested in keeping up prices, and so in breaking the contracts, affords in itself no sufficient 
justification for the action of the federation as against the plaintiffs.
26
 
 
However, in the course of his judgment Romer LJ, introduced the concept of the crossing of a 
difficult-to-determine “line” as the basis for justification: 
 
I respectfully agree with what Bowen LJ said in the Mogul Case, when considering the difficulty 
that might arise whether there was sufficient justification or not: ‘The good sense of the tribunal 
which had to decide would have to analyse the circumstances and to discover on which side of the 
line each case fell.’
27
 
 
Romer LJ also said “I think it would be extremely difficult, even if it were possible, to give a 
complete and satisfactory definition of what is ‘sufficient justification’, and most attempts to 
do so would probably be mischievous.
28
 
 
In James v The Commonwealth, which involved alleged breaches of “the duty of a common 
carrier to carry the dried fruit of Mr James,”29 Dixon J made a number of observations about 
‘the principle in Lumley v Gye’. He said: “What constitutes a lawful justification is a matter 
of some difficulty. The question which appears to me to arise in the present case under the 
head of justification or excuse is whether the bona-fide execution of a law for the time being 
upheld as valid by the competent judicial power amounts to just cause or excuse.”30 The High 
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Court found no breach of tort on the part of the Commonwealth (largely because it was under 
different obligations to private citizens). 
 
Camden Nominees v Forcey
31
 established the principle that a mere common interest does not 
provide justification in law. An association of tenants of a block of sixty flats had banded 
together with the intention of refusing to pay their rents in breach of their tenancy 
agreements. The defendants pleaded that they were justified and therefore should be excused 
from an otherwise actionable wrong on two grounds. The first was that they and those they 
sought to persuade to break their contracts had a common interest in making the landlords 
perform their obligations. The second was that there was “on the one side tenants who are 
weak and on the other landlords who are strong and take advantage of their strength.”32 It was 
argued that, because of this mismatch, it was justifiable for the defendants to use a weapon 
which would otherwise be wrongful. Simonds J held that there was no validity in either of 
these contentions and that the defendants interfered with the plaintiff’s contractual rights 
without justification: “The defendants owed no duty to their fellow tenants; they sought their 
cooperation for their own ends … There is neither reason nor authority for the suggestion that 
in such circumstances a common interest can justify the interference with contractual 
rights.”33 
 
The Possibility of Morality-Based Justifications 
 
There is a line of cases which suggest that an impersonal or disinterested motive may afford 
justification, particularly where the defendant, acting under a moral duty, seeks to protect a 
person to whom the defendant stands in a relationship of responsibility. Stott v Gamble
34
 was 
one such case. There, a licensing authority banned an objectionable film which the plaintiff 
had arranged to exhibit at another’s theatre. 
 
In Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed v Veitch
35
 an example was given of circumstances in 
which a party may be able to justify procuring a breach of contract (at that time). It was said 
that “a father may persuade his daughter to break her engagement to marry a scoundrel … 
The father’s justification arises from a moral duty to urge … that the contract should be 
repudiated.”36 This echoed the earlier case of Findlay v Blaylock37 where a father persuaded 
his daughter in good faith to break off an engagement to marry an undesirable suitor.
38
 
 
                                                          
31
 [1940] 1 Ch 352. 
32
 Ibid at 365. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 [1916] 2 KB 504. 
35
 [1942] AC 435. 
36
 Ibid at 442-3. The tort at stake was abolished in Australia by the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s 111A. 
37
 [1937] SC 21. 
38
 Stott v Gamble [1937] SC 21. See also Gunn v Barr [1926] 1 DLR 855, another case involving a father 
convincing his daughter to breach a contract of marriage to a “scoundrel.” 
Chapter Seven: Justification Defences 
152 
 
There was an expansion of this principle in Brimelow v Cassan,
39
 in which an “actors’ 
protection society” persuaded a theatre proprietor to break their contracts with the manager of 
a theatrical troupe who had paid female chorus members “such a low rate that they were 
‘forced’ into prostitution to survive.”40 Russell J decided that the defendants’ actions were 
justified, arguably creating a new category of ‘public morality’ defence. 
 
Read v The Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons of England, Ireland and Wales
41
 is a 
case which creates difficulties of precedent for those who would advocate a morality-based 
exemption for the economic torts, based on a dictum of a reasonably obscure County Court 
judge in England at the turn of the 20
th
 Century. The ‘salient facts’ of this case were 
summarised in Edwin Hill by Stuart-Smith LJ: 
 
The plaintiff was 25 years old and the son of a mason. He entered into a contract with Messrs 
Wigg & Wright under which he agreed to work for 3 years at 15 s. a week, which were ordinary 
labourer’s wages; in return Wigg & Wright were to instruct and teach him in the trade and 
business of a mason. Wigg & Wright were members of the defendant society. One of the rules of 
the society provided: ‘boys entering the trade shall not work more than three months without 
being a legally bound apprentice, and  in no case to be more than 16 years of age, except mason’s 
sons and stepsons. Employers to have an apprentice to every four masons on average.’ On 
learning of the plaintiff’s contract the defendants threatened that their members employed by 
Wigg & Wright would strike if the defendant started work on the terms of his contract. As a result 
Wigg & Wright terminated the plaintiff’s contract.
42
  
 
Read sued the society for “wrongfully and maliciously procuring to be broken an indenture of 
apprenticeship.” It was argued on behalf of the defendants that they had a “sufficient 
justification” for their interference because they had themselves entered into a contract with 
Wigg & Wright. Rose J said: 
 
… it is not a justification that they ‘acted bona fide in the best interests of the society of masons,’ 
i.e. in their own interests. Nor is it enough that that ‘they were not actuated by improper motives.’ 
I think their sufficient justification for interference with the plaintiff’s right must be an equal or 
superior right in themselves, and that no-one can excuse himself to a man of whose contract he has 
procured the breach, on the ground that he acted on a wrong understanding of his own rights, or 
without malice, or bona fide, or in the best interests of himself, nor even that he acted as an 
altruist, seeking only the good of another and careless of his own advantage.
43
 
 
The decision at first instance was affirmed by Lord Alverstone CJ and others in the 
Divisional Court, and then by the Court of Appeal, per Collins M.R. The Master of the Rolls 
observed: “how can they possibly justify taking the law into their own hands and compelling 
the opposing litigant by coercion to give effect to their view of a disputed obligation by 
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breaching his contract with the plaintiff?”44 It was said: “Belief, however honest, that in what 
they did they were acting in the best interest of the society of masons could be no excuse for 
conspiring to deprive the plaintiff of the advantages of his contract” and that “a strong belief 
on the part of the persuader that he is acting for his own interests does not seem to me to 
improve his position in any respect … Still less can it do so when he does not confine himself 
to persuasion, but joins with others to enforce their common interests at the plaintiff’s 
expense by coercion.”45 
 
The general position under this tort is, as Deakin observed, that the courts have not yet 
developed formalised privileges, although there are potential bases for examining whether a 
defendant’s ‘ultimate purpose’ has been “so meritorious as to require sacrifice of the 
plaintiff’s claim to freedom from interference.”46 Carty referred to an “uncertain” defence of 
justification under the tort of inducing breach of contract, and also noted that it is desirable 
that the defence should not be left vague.
47
 In OBG v Allan, Lord Nicholls was equivocal, 
saying “a defence of justification may be available to a defendant in inducement tort cases.”48 
B Lawful Means Conspiracy 
 
The potential for justification to be pleaded in response to the lawful means conspiracy tort is 
clearly established, as noted by Carty.
49
 Stilitz and Sales said that within the tort of 
conspiracy “the concept of intent to injure and justification have been assimilated.”50 Deakin 
and Randall observed that economic self-interest can be a justification under this tort, citing 
Crofter.
51
 According to Cane, “simple conspiracy, that is conspiracy to injure not involving 
the use of unlawful means, can be justified not only by assertion of some legal right, but also 
by the assertion of legitimate self-interest.”52 
 
Goodman’s view was that liability for lawful means conspiracy “depends upon what the court 
perceives to be the predominant purpose of the combiners [and] to ascertain that purpose the 
court embarks upon a dual exercise … First, it ascertains the intention of the combiners in 
order to make a finding as to the purpose or object of the combination. Second, the court 
ascertains whether the activity which resulted in harm occurring was justified.” She saw that 
justification will be established “if the predominant purpose of the combination is not the 
infliction of harm but rather the legitimate protection or furtherance of an interest by the 
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combiners such as the pursuit of business or employment advantages.”53 She argued “self-
interest of the combining parties as the overriding factor will dispose by implication of 
substantial desire to injure.”54 Goodman thought that: 
 
… According to Australian law, if the combination executes its object by lawful acts it is possible 
to avoid liability by showing that the ‘motive’, ‘intent’ or ‘purpose’ of the combination was 
predominantly the protection or advancement of legitimate interests. Thus, if parties to a 
combination are motivated by dislike of the religious or political views, or by the race or colour of 
the plaintiff, or their acts were a ‘mere demonstration of power by busybodies’, then a 
combination of such persons the acts of which cause damage to a plaintiff, cannot be justified.
55
 
 
In Sorrell v Smith, Viscount Cave said: “If the real purpose of the combination is, not to 
injure another, but to forward or defend the trade of those who enter into it, then no wrong is 
committed and no action will lie, although damage to another ensues.”56  This was reinforced 
by Evatt J of the High Court of Australia in McKernan v Fraser:
57
 “If the common purpose or 
object is the protection or advancement of trading, professional or economic interests 
common to the defendants there is no liability.”58 But His Honour also said that “if an alleged 
conspiracy has as its purpose the carrying out of some religious, social or political object, the 
law prefers to examine the motive or object in each case before pronouncing an opinion.”59 
 
Pratt v British Medical Association
60
 involved an association formed for the purpose of 
maintaining “the honour and interests of the medical profession.” The Association and other 
defendants who were its members “instituted and pursued a system of professional and social 
ostracism or boycott against the plaintiffs, who were medical men, by means of threats and 
widely extended coercive action” and they sought to justify the boycott on the basis the 
conduct of the plaintiffs “was detrimental to the honour and interests of the profession.”61 
McCardie J held that “no justification existed by reason of the fact that the defendants acted 
either for the advancement of their own trade interests or of the interests of those with whom 
they were associated”62 saying “how can mere self-interest be such a justification?”63 
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Cane noted that “the protection of the legitimate interests of workers has also been treated by 
the courts as providing justification for simple conspiracy.”64 However, an objective 
evaluation must be undertaken, involving “consideration of evidence which reveals the 
reasons which prompted the defendants to act as they did.” Thus, although the defendant 
union officials in Quinn v Leathem might well have been acting in what they perceived to be 
their own interests, their actions in compelling a customer of a butcher who had employed 
non-union labour to stop dealing with the butcher were not justifiable.
65
 
 
Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe
66
 suggested defendants who have engaged 
in a conspiracy, but acted in accordance with a moral imperative, may claim justification. The 
case concerned “a desire by coloured musicians to oppose their employer’s policy of all-
white audiences.”67 The plaintiffs, proprietors of a ballroom, had a policy of excluding from 
the dance floor people of colour, though they were prepared to employ coloured musicians in 
the orchestra. The Musicians Union had many members who were “coloured musicians” and 
“gave notice to the plaintiffs that its members would not be prepared to perform at the 
ballroom as long as the policy of racial discrimination continued.”68 
 
At first instance Diplock J held: “So long as the defendants had a predominant object which 
was not in itself unlawful, this was a legitimate interest which they were entitled to agree to 
forward by any means not in themselves unlawful. It was not unlawful to advocate the 
abolition of the colour bar and to use all methods not in themselves unlawful to achieve that 
object. It was the right of all citizens to advocate policies in which they bona fide believed. It 
did not become unlawful for them to agree together on such a course of action unless their 
predominate object was to injure a man in his trade.”69 Diplock J’s decision was affirmed by 
the Court of Appeal (Hodson LJ, with whom Sellers LJ agreed, and Morris LJ) and although 
as Heydon says “the exact reasoning of the courts which heard the case is not wholly clear” 
Morris LJ stated a wide test “based on honest belief by the defendant union officials that 
union members wanted discrimination to end.”70 
 
C Unlawful Means Conspiracy 
It is difficult to envisage circumstances under which a justification defence may be available 
for the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means. In Williams v Hursey
71
 the High Court said the 
fact that conspirators have been actuated by the desire to further their own interests will not 
absolve them from liability if they have in fact utilised unlawful means. Balkin and Davis 
were emphatic that “the fact that the defendants have acted in defence of their own business 
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or trade interests – a matter which is relevant to conspiracy by lawful means – cannot provide 
a defence by way of justification for this type of conspiracy.”72 Goodman explained: 
 
… a combination of persons who act in concert so as to intentionally injure the plaintiff in his/her 
trade or other legitimate interests by an act which is independently unlawful … [ie. they resort to 
unlawful means to attain their purpose] are liable in tort if actual injury is caused to the plaintiff, 
notwithstanding that their predominant purpose is to further their own legitimate interests.
73
 
 
De Jetley Marks v Greenwood
74
 involved an alleged unlawful means conspiracy to cause a 
breach of contract, where company directors were said to have conspired together “to secure 
the dismissal by the company of one of their number.”75 Here, a primary motivation was seen 
to be to promote the defendant’s own trade interest, to avoid insolvency. Porter J entertained 
an argument that the defendants had good cause to induce the company to break its contract 
with the plaintiff, but held: 
 
The good cause which excuses the procurement of a breach of contract must be something more 
than a belief by the servants or agents of a company that the company might become insolvent if 
the contract were not broken … the justification must, I think, involve an action taken as a duty, 
not the mere protection of the defendants’ own interests.
76
  
 
D Intimidation 
For intimidation, there has been little judicial guidance on “the metes and bounds of the 
defence”77 of justification. However, it was suggested in Latham v Singleton that the defence 
may be available under this tort in circumstances where trade union officials were acting for 
the protection of their members (although a defence on this basis would not be available in an 
action for interference with contractual relations). Nagle CJ said that, in causes of action 
founded on intimidation, if the tort is committed in the course of an industrial dispute the 
defendant may be able to demonstrate justification if able to “show a motivation primarily or 
predominantly to preserve and foster the purposes of the trade union of which the defendant 
was a member.”78  
 
Stickley’s view was that “it is unlikely that such a defence, one that involves unlawful acts 
and an intention to harm the plaintiff, would find favour.”79 It also seems clear that if the 
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defendant’s making of demands and threats was “actuated by spite or ill-will against the 
plaintiff” the defence will not be available.80 
 
The potential for justification defences to apply to intimidation also arose in Universe 
Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation and Others,
81
 
which concerned the application of commercial pressure between persons carrying on 
business through the threat of industrial action. In this case the plaintiffs owned a Liberian 
registered ship which docked at a UK port without a ‘blue certificate’. This was a document 
issued by the defendant union (the International Transport Federation, or ITF) exempting a 
ship from ITF ‘blacking’. The ITF had a “policy of improving wages and conditions for 
crews on ships flying flags of convenience.” This seemingly philanthropic aim was also 
“ultimately designed to prevent such crews undercutting ITF wage rates which tended to be a 
great deal higher and therefore less attractive” to many shipping companies. Port workers 
who were members of the ITF refused to service the ship with tugs, thus preventing it leaving 
the port, and made a range of demands.
82
 
 
The ITF demands included “payment to the ITF of US$80,000 by way of, inter alia, back pay 
for the crew of the ship and a contribution of $6,480 to the ITF’s Welfare Fund.”83 The 
plaintiffs eventually agreed to the demands, the ‘blacking’ was lifted and the ship left port. 
However, “twelve days later the plaintiffs commenced proceedings against the ITF … to 
recover the money paid to the Welfare Fund … the plaintiffs contending that it had been paid 
under economic duress.” There was "no doubt that the ITF officials, in procuring the blacking 
of the plaintiffs' ship, had threatened to induce breaches of the tugmen's contracts of 
employment and thus committed the tort of intimidation."
84
 It was argued that the officials 
were protected by the statutory immunity operating in the United Kingdom at that time but a 
majority of the House of Lords held that the ITF's actions fell outside the immunity and that 
the moneys paid to the Welfare Fund were recoverable by the shipowners. 
 
The application of commercial pressure between business rivals has been the setting for a 
number of recent Australian intimidation cases.
85
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E Causing Loss by Unlawful Means 
 
Despite their general enthusiasm for better delineating the justification defences, in view of 
the precedents Deakin and Randall saw no place for justification in connection with the tort 
of causing loss by unlawful means. They regarded the prospects of building a justification 
defence under this tort as “limited,” describing the position thus: “As the law currently 
stands, there seems to be no possibility of invoking a justification defence where unlawful 
means have been used.”86  
 
Carty thought the prospects for development of a justification defence “at best … very 
residual.”87 Sales and Stilitz rejected the possibility altogether, stating that in the case of the 
unlawful means tort “there is no defence of justification”88 – a view that was cited with 
approval by Lord Nicholls in OBG v Allan.
89
 Ong noted that “none of the House of Lords in 
OBG expressly referred to such a defence in relation to the unlawful means tort,” that 
“certainty … would be undermined by a justification defence” and that the courts would be 
reluctant to be drawn into the need to “openly assess the fairness or unfairness of the 
defendant’s conduct towards the claimant.”90 
 
The contrary view, that a defence of justification should be available, has been expressed by a 
number of commentators including Weir. Heydon also saw potential for the availability of 
justification under the tort of causing loss by unlawful means. He observed that in Rookes v 
Barnard: 
 
… there was a case for pleading justification, because the party threatened, B.O.A.C., was in 
breach of an agreement made with the union not to employ non-unionists such as the plaintiff, but 
that B.O.A.C. was not taking steps to rid itself of the employee and fulfil its agreement.
91
 
 
Deakin and Randall acknowledged potential arguments relating to rights under a pre-existing 
contract for this tort, referencing Edwin Hill.
92
 These sentiments were echoed in the 2011 
edition of Fleming on Torts where it was said “it is unclear what part justification plays in 
this tort;” however, “possible justifications may be as open-ended as in relation to the tort of 
interference with contract.” 93 
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III. POTENTIAL BASES FOR EXPANSION OF JUSTIFICATION 
 
Against this background, it is possible to discern five broad thematic bases for justification 
which serve as potential ‘beachheads’ for expansion of the justification defences. The first is 
“a defence based on a pre-existing contractual obligation of the defendant.”94 This is typified 
by Edwin Hill and Partners v First National Finance Corp
95
 and can be observed in 
operation in relation to the Lumley v Gye tort (inducing breach of contract). Deakin and 
Randall speculated that such a defence could potentially “apply in trade union cases where 
union rules, which constitute a contract, require members to take strike action to defend union 
rates of pay and protective practices”96 They noted, however, that such an argument “appears 
never to have succeeded” and “it is not even clear that it has been attempted” due to statutes 
occupying the field – the long-standing statutory immunities which apply in England and 
Wales “now contained in the Trade Unions and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, 
Part V”.97 
 
According to Carty’s analysis, the defence of justification, at least for inducing breach of 
contract covers the protection of both private rights and private interests. The former category 
was said to protect “a defendant who asserts a legally enforceable right” and “such right may 
derive from property, real or personal, or from contractual rights,” with the most common 
example being “a collision of contracts.” She cited examples of overriding property rights. To 
illustrate her second category, private interests, Carty speculated that English courts would 
support  a justification for inducing breach of contract based on the protection of health and 
safety. She referenced Cane’s observation that there is a public interest in the protection of 
persons from death and bodily injury or illness.”98 Cane had commented that “a competing 
interest may provide a defence to an action in respect of conduct which is prima face 
tortious.”99 
 
Second, there is potential for building on the idea that “on grounds of policy, a privilege is 
warranted wherever a servant or agent acts, not in capricious pursuit of self-advantage, but 
for the bona-fide protection of his employer”100 or, perhaps, members. To develop this thread, 
it would be necessary to overcome precedents that say “the mere fact … that an association 
has undertaken a duty to its members to protect their interests and acted in pursuance thereof, 
does not by itself provide a justification, for the courts take the view that otherwise a ready 
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excuse would be at hand for almost any actionable interference provided by collective action 
at the prompting of trade unions, trade associations and other protective societies.”101 
It would also be necessary to overcome the precedent in Ansett Transport Industries 
(Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots,
102
 a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria. The facts of this case were described in Chapter 6, Part IV C. The 
defendants, from the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, contended that they were morally 
obliged, and also bound by the rules of their federation, to act in accordance with the outcome 
of a secret ballot. Brooking J considered that the defendants failed to establish the defence of 
justification. Furthermore, it was held that a trade union and its officials “cannot set up as a 
defence of justification in an action for interference with contractual relations the suggestion 
that what they did was by way of performance of a duty to advise members of the union and 
to protect their interests in relation to an industrial dispute.”103 
 
In Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd, which concerned actions 
taken in opposition to labour outsourcing arrangements, the appellant trade union argued that 
the activities of its officials were justified because "they believed it was necessary in order to 
protect award wages and conditions and the operation of the Victorian building industry 
agreement."
104
 However, a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia held that the 
appellants' actions were not justified.
105
  
 
A third category is what Deakin and Randall termed “justification based on the economic 
self-interest of the group” or “collective economic self-interest”.106 This would be an 
extension of a general principle Cane described as follows: “The defendant may succeed in a 
plea of justification if he was acting in his own self-interest.”107 However, in De Jetley Marks 
v Greenwood,
108
 it was said that justification must “involve an action taken as a duty, not the 
mere protection of the defendants’ own interests.”109 Motivation to promote the defendant’s 
own trade interest, of itself, is unlikely to be sufficient. Cane suggested that “the true basis of 
self-interest, to the extent that it provides a legal justification, is that it also furthers some 
wider public interest.”110 
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In Zhu
 
v Treasurer of the State of NSW, a case which was discussed at length in Part VI of 
Chapter Six, the High Court of Australia referred to difficulties that confront a claimant 
arising from the authorities which have established that justification cannot be found in “mere 
self-interest.”111 The arguments of the defendant organisation in Zhu, the Sydney Organising 
Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG)
112
 hinged on the desire to protect its own 
interests as organiser of the Olympic Games. 
 
A fourth notion, advanced by Deakin and Randall, is that the common law could expand the 
range of collective actions that might be considered justified. Deakin and Randall saw that “a 
wide justification defence is essential if collective action is to be preserved” and noted that in 
the past the extension of principle occurred “somewhat exceptionally” in Universe Tankships 
of Monrovia v ITF.
113
 They thought the courts might, for example, be called upon in the 
future to take this approach in the context of the European Union law on free movement.
114
  
 
Stewart observed that “there are some signs in Universe Tankships that the House of Lords is 
moving away from the rigid ‘unlawful acts’ test and towards a broader inquiry as to the 
justifiability, in moral and commercial terms, of the pressure used.”115 He gave the example 
of The Siboen
116
 where “it was ‘legitimate’ for the charterers, on the assumption that was 
made, viz. that their representation of imminent bankruptcy was not fraudulent, to threaten 
breaches of contract to secure lower rates. Not only are renegotiations of charters apparently 
common, but it would seem reasonable to attempt to force renegotiation of an agreement with 
a major creditor in order to avoid liquidation, a course which would also benefit the other 
party, who would not become merely a general creditor in liquidation proceedings.” Although 
Stewart’s observations were made with reference to the doctrine of undue pressure in contract 
law, they have potential application to the deployment of justification defences under the 
economic torts. Stewart further commented that “it cannot be denied that any approach 
resting on a value-judgment of the justifiability of commercial pressure presents considerable 
problems” and that “questions such as whether there has been “an improper exercise of 
superior power for private advantage … can only be answered on a case-by-case basis: … it 
is impossible to do more than generalise about the sort of factors that will influence the 
resolution of situations of commercial pressure.”117 
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There is a fifth potential basis for expansion of the defences. Justification may be available 
where a moral imperative or public duty exists,
118
 or where there has been altruistic action 
designed to protect the interests of third parties. The case law discussed in this chapter 
indicates that “justification based on public interest”119 is likely to offer fertile ground for a 
general widening of the justification defences. An impersonal or disinterested motive may 
afford justification, particularly where the defendant, acting under a perceived moral duty, 
seeks to protect a person to whom the defendant stands in a relationship of responsibility. 
 
It can be argued that Brimelow v Cassan, which concerned the payment of low wages to 
chorus girls, gave rise to a ‘public morality’ defence.120 This case has been cited as authority 
for the proposition that interference in contract in circumstances that lead to improvement in 
the pay of workers may be justified as an assertion of the public interest.
121
 Carty cautioned 
that “no case has applied this [public morality] principle subsequently” but agreed that this 
precedent “shades into a justification based on a moral imperative or duty.”122 Cane saw 
Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe as an illustration of courts: 
 
… allowing altruistic action designed to protect the interests of third parties to be pleaded in 
justification of simple conspiracy. Such a defence would, in essence, be a defence of public 
interest, because the courts would be unlikely to allow the defence to succeed unless they 
considered that what had been done did further some interest of the public generally. The Scala 
case concerned the public interest in eliminating racial discrimination.
123
 
 
It should be noted however that in Camden Nominees v Forcey
124
 Simonds J reviewed 
Brimelow v Casson and said that neither that case “nor any other case supports the view that 
those who assume the duty of advising the withholding of rent or any other breach of contract 
can justify their action by protesting that they are performing a public service … and there is 
no reason to suppose that the giving of such advice is justifiable except by those persons to 
whom the law recognizes a moral duty to give it.”125 The moral duty, it seems, must have a 
basis in law, rather than mere protestation, and the courts will be reluctant to entertain those 
who are simply “busybodies.”126 
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It is plausible based on the authorities reviewed above that the notion of a ‘legitimate 
collective interest’ not grounded in economic interests could become the basis for justified 
actions. Environmental activism is an obvious likely test-bed for this concept.
127
 
 
Heydon and Deakin and Randall each saw that it was important and desirable that 
justifications should be more readily available, but for different reasons. For Heydon, there 
was a principle at stake – it was desirable as a matter of policy that the architecture of the 
torts should place heightened focus on motive; this would be assisted by embracing a wider 
view of unlawful means to ‘widen the net’ of conduct qualifying as prima-facie tortious, then 
ameliorating this by expanding justifications.
128
 Deakin and Randall viewed the broadening 
of justifications as a necessity, given the pattern of development of the economic torts since 
the 1960s, if collective conduct is to be preserved: “a necessary corrective to some of the 
expansionary tendencies” (especially under the Lumley v Gye tort).129 
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POTENTIAL DEFENCE APPLICATION CONSIDERATIONS 
DEFENCE BASED ON 
EXISTING CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION, PROPERTY 
RIGHT OR OTHER 
PRIVATE INTEREST 
 
Inducing breach of 
contract; potentially 
generalisable. 
Edwin Hill; Zhu. Contract 
should be pre-existing. 
Property rights can override 
other interests. An equal or 
superior right of the defendant. 
BONA FIDE PROTECTION 
OF EMPLOYER/MEMBERS 
 
Inducing breach of 
contract; potentially 
generalisable. 
 
B.W.I.U. v Odco; Ansett. No 
capricious pursuit of self-
advantage. Mere common 
interest does not suffice. 
Potentially available to trade 
unions, trade associations, 
other protective societies. 
Necessary to overcome 
objections to illegality. 
 
COLLECTIVE ECONOMIC 
SELF-INTEREST 
Inducing breach of 
contract; unlawful 
means conspiracy; 
potentially 
generalisable. 
De Jetley Marks v Greenwood. 
Actions taken as a duty. 
Something more than a belief. 
Argument assisted if a wider 
public interest furthered. 
 
EXPANDED COMMON LAW 
DEFENCES FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
 
Potentially 
generalisable. 
Universe Tankships; The 
Siboen. Consider moral and 
commercial justifiability of 
pressure used. 
 
MORAL IMPERATIVE OR 
PUBLIC DUTY 
Inducing breach of 
contract; lawful means 
conspiracy; potentially 
generalisable. 
Brimelow v Cassan; Scala 
Ballroom; James v 
Commonwealth. Altruistic 
action designed to protect the 
interests of third parties. Civil 
rights independent of contract 
may be taken into account. 
Moral duty. Hinges on 
arguments of public benefit. 
 
Figure 2: Summary of Potential Widened-Out Justification Defences 
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IV. CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXPANSION OF THE DEFENCES 
There are three main constraints on the potential expansion of the justification defences: the 
‘bipolarity constraint’ which flows from the application of corrective justice theory; the 
requirement of a ‘special reason’ for shifting loss; and the need to arrive at measures of 
‘public benefit’ around which there is community consensus. A fourth consideration is the 
impact of statute.  
 
A The Bipolarity Constraint  
 
The first constraint derives from the view that the general economic torts have their 
theoretical foundation in corrective justice theory. As was seen in Chapter Five, it can be 
argued that the general economic torts should be conceptualised as a manifestation of 
corrective justice
130
 and this would carry the consequence that claims must be assessed 
according to the “justificatory structure” of corrective justice theory, rather than “external 
policy considerations or social goals.”131 A corrective justice approach “restores the 
equilibrium, through an award of compensation, within the … [bipolar] relationship of the 
injured plaintiff and the defendant.”132  
 
If a conception of the torts based on corrective justice theory were to be adopted, this would 
place limits on the capacity of judges to have reference to social goals in determining cases, 
because relieving the defendant from liability on the basis of an extrinsic consideration 
“means denying the plaintiff.”133 Liability and entitlements should be determined 
“relationally” with reference to the interaction between parties to a dispute, rather than “the 
effect of the claim on third persons who are not parties to the claim.”134 
 
B The ‘Special Reason’ Requirement  
 
The second constraint is the need to find ‘special reason’ for shifting loss. As Deakin noted, 
the search is for circumstances in which “the defendant’s ultimate purpose may … be so 
meritorious as to require sacrifice of the plaintiff’s claim to freedom from interference.”135 
Fleming, in the preface to the fifth edition of his text Law of Torts, articulated some key 
evaluations required of courts undertaking the weighing of conflicting interests: 
 
… a shifting of loss is justified only where there exists special reason for requiring the defendant 
to bear it rather than the plaintiff on whom it happens to have fallen. The task confronting the law 
of torts is, therefore, how best to allocate these losses, in the interests of the public good. For the 
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solution of this problem, no simple and all-embracing formula can be offered, because the 
concrete fact problems which arise in tort litigation are manifold and often complex.
136 
Cane saw that, where a justification defence operates, “the defendant is able to point to some 
competing interest which outweighs that of the plaintiff and justifies the law of tort in 
refusing to come to the plaintiff’s aid.” He noted that “some … policy arguments may 
involve the assertion by a defendant of a countervailing interest.”137 
 
The need for judicial weighing of competing interests emanates from the dictum in Read that 
an equal or superior right is the basis of “sufficient justification for interference with a 
plaintiff’s right.”138 In the subsequent Glamorgan Coal case it was said that “the 
circumstances which will constitute sufficient justification cannot be satisfactorily defined, 
and it must be left to the determination of the Court in each case whether there is sufficient 
justification for the interference.”139 Romer LJ provided a list of relevant factors which may 
be weighed: 
 
... in analyzing or considering the circumstances, I think that regard might be had to the nature of 
the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; the 
means employed to procure the breach; the relation of the person procuring the breach to the 
person who breaks the contract; and I think also to the object of the person in procuring the 
breach.
140
 
 
If the third, fourth and fifth ‘beachheads’ for extension of the justification defences described 
in Part III above are to gain traction, questions of ‘public benefit’ will inevitably come into 
play. In applying tests of public benefit decisions must be made about what assessment 
mechanism should be deployed; and what actually constitutes public benefit.
141
 
 
 
C Measuring ‘Public Benefit’ 
The third constraint, then, is the need to ‘flesh out’ the meaning of ‘public benefit’. Stewart 
highlighted that “there are many areas of the law of tort in which the courts give effect, 
explicitly or implicitly, to ‘public policy’ arguments. The results may sometimes be 
controversial, but the courts are not always in a position to shirk the responsibility of deciding 
such matters; nor do they always wish to do so.”142 He further commented that: 
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… every day courts are required to resolve commercial dilemmas, and frequently there is no clear-
cut precedent or obviously applicable rule to guide them. In these ‘hard cases’ it becomes 
necessary for judges to rely on their own acquired knowledge of commercial practices and 
standards: and it is these which … must be applied when the use of commercial pressure is alleged 
to be wrongful.
143
 
Cane explored the category of ‘interest-based’ defences which assert some public interest 
which “competes with the interest the plaintiff is seeking to protect.”144 For example, 
“furtherance of the self-interest of workers can be seen as in the public interest because it 
provides a counterweight to the ability of employers, by virtue of their economic strength, to 
protect their own interests within the law.”145 According to Cane a key question to be asked is 
what should be considered “a matter of morality or fairness”?146 To illustrate the problematic 
nature of the assessment, he discussed the “balancing of factors” (often involving “difficult 
and controversial moral and social judgments”) required under the common law defence of 
necessity to actions for trespass.
147
 The difficulty of the assessment sometimes required is 
illustrated by the following hypothetical scenario proposed by Goodman, writing in 1991: 
 
Would a court find a combination to be ‘lawful’ if the parties to that combination were a group of 
medical practitioners who agreed to refuse to work with another medical practitioner who 
performed in vitro fertilisation or gave contraceptive advice with the result that the latter’s 
contract of employment is terminated? Arguably if the medical practitioners who agreed to 
enforce such policies ‘honestly believed’ that their legitimate interest in maintaining medical 
ethics was thereby furthered then their ‘object’ is lawful and therefore justified. If justification 
extends to protect such interests then the scope of civil liability would embrace any social, 
political or religious purpose provided that it furthered the interests of the parties to the agreement 
irrespective of the public utility of that purpose. 
148
 
 
The enlivening of common law justification defences will therefore depend upon the exercise 
of “judicial initiative.”149 This will require the courts to overcome their traditional reluctance 
to become involved in the weighing and measuring of competing interests. Cane noted, for 
example, that “the courts are unlikely to relish the prospect of being expressly asked which 
political or social causes justify conspiracies to injure.”150 In a given case, a ‘public interest’ 
might be able to be specified, but assessment also needs to be made of whether it is of such 
moment as to justify relieving the defendant of liability. Any defence of public interest “has 
to be weighty enough to persuade the court that it is a social interest ‘of greater public import 
than is the social interest involved in the protection of the plaintiff’s interest’.”151 
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D The Statutory Path 
 
There are statutory routes to a widening of justification. Fleming noted that in England “the 
statutory immunities for industrial action effectively provide a form of legislative 
justification.”152 This avenue is explored in Chapter Eight which follows, in the specific 
context of environmental activism. 
 
Lessons and parallels can be drawn from other areas of tort law, and related disciplines. 
Cheer examined legislated public interest exemptions available to media organisations from 
defamation laws, noting that by contrast to the very wide-ranging defence of public interest 
that applies in the United States, which can be equated to ‘newsworthy’ (probably reflecting 
the supremacy of freedom of expression within the American constitution) in Australia and 
New Zealand “a balancing approach is favoured where many elements are weighed.”153 
 
An economics-driven frame of analysis is evident under the authorisation provisions of 
Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the CCA). They provide for an 
assessment of whether proposed conduct “would result, or be likely to result, in such a 
benefit to the public that … [it] should be allowed to take place” centring around “the 
economic goals of efficiency and progress … allocative efficiency, production efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency.” The applicable tests require a weighing of public benefits and 
detriments. The CCA also provides for an exemption from its secondary boycott prohibitions 
for conduct if “the dominant purpose for which the conduct is engaged in is substantially 
related to environmental protection or consumer protection.”154 
 
Whether the enactment of legislation to provide exemptions for conduct offers the best 
solution to a given problem can depend on the perspective from which they are viewed. As 
the discussion in Part V of Chapter Six demonstrated, it is often difficult to determine where 
the public good lies between competing views of a contentious political nature. Because 
statutory solutions are subject to politics, a special interest group receiving the benefit of an 
exemption may find that status reversed following a subsequent election. Ongoing certainty 
depends upon a broad-based community and political consensus around the need to 
‘privilege’ certain conduct. 
 
Statutory exemptions tend by their nature to be piecemeal – they focus in on specific 
contexts, often in response to an ‘issue of the day.’ The risk of a patchwork of exemptions 
lacking a basis in coherent principle is real. As Edelman, Goudkamp and Degeling observed, 
although torts have long been ‘promiscuously entangled’ with statutes, “in the present ‘age of 
statutes’, the coherence that the law of torts has achieved is under threat.”155 
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V.               JUSTIFICATIONS AND ILLEGALITY 
A final constraint on expansion of justification defences is judicial disdain for the presence of 
illegality. The employment of unlawful means has generally been considered fatal to the 
pleading of a justification defence. Deakin referenced an immutable principle that “fraud or 
physical violence cannot be justified in any circumstance.”156 Cane highlighted that: 
 
When it comes to justifying the use of unlawful means in torts such as intimidation or unlawful 
means conspiracy or several forms of interference with contract, the general question is whether 
the use of unlawful means can ever be (legally) justified.
157
 
 
Until recently, the courts have said ‘no’ to this question. Cane suggested three reasons 
underpinning this position.
158
 The first was that “as a matter of public policy, courts are 
unwilling to give legal remedies to a party who founds his cause of action on his own illegal 
act. The judges do not wish to be seen as giving aid or encouragement to law breakers.”159 
Second, if an “illegal act was a cause of, or was closely associated with … loss … it would be 
an ‘affront to the public conscience’160 to afford him relief.” Third, courts will not “promote 
or countenance a nefarious object or bargain which it is bound to condemn.”161 
 
As former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia Robert French said in 2017, the rule of 
law, well-established in Australia, is fundamental to “the long term protection of rights and 
freedoms” and “an essential element for a free society.”162 In line with this sentiment the Full 
Court of the Federal Court of Australia said in Building Workers’ Industrial Union of 
Australia v Odco Pty Ltd: “There is good reason for the rarity of cases where justification has 
been shown. In a society which values the rule of law, occasions when a legal right may be 
violated with impunity ought not to be frequent.”163 In Pratt v British Medical Association, 
McCardie J confessed his “inability to discover any head of justification which will sanction 
the employment of violence or of threats.”164 
 
A common thread running through the torts of unlawful means conspiracy, intimidation and 
causing loss by unlawful means has been that the element of illegality required under these 
torts has been fatal to the pleading of a justification defence. The tort of inducing breach of 
contract does not, however, have unlawful means as an element. This is an important 
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differentiator and gives scope for defences associated with this tort to be “different (and 
certainly wider)”165 than for some of the other torts, although illegal conduct may defeat 
justification under this tort as well.  
 
In the Ansett case,
166
 Brooking J expressed the view, based on authorities including Read,
167
 
Posluns v Toronto Stock Exchange
168
 and the Australian case Latham v Singleton
169
 that 
justification is no defence where a plaintiff “complains of interference with contractual 
relations by unlawful means or interference with his business by unlawful means.”170 In Read 
(a case decided on the basis of an illegal act carried out by illegal means) Collins M.R. said: 
 
The defendants did knowingly and for their own ends induce the commission of an actionable 
wrong, and they employed illegal means to bring it about. Such conduct would be actionable in an 
individual and incapable of justification, a fortiori where the defendants acted in concert. These 
considerations seem to me to exclude from discussion in this case the illustrations given in 
argument of what might in given circumstances be ‘just cause’.
171
 
 
Later, in Glamorgan Coal Company v South Wales Miners Federation, there was a judicial 
comment on the Read case. Vaughan Williams J asked: “can there be a ‘just cause or excuse’ 
for the use of illegal means to procure a breach of a legal right?” and then “What was the end 
in Read?” He referenced approvingly the answer given by the counsel for one of the parties: 
“It was to defeat the plaintiff’s purpose of becoming a stonemason. The end was illegal, the 
object illegal, and the means illegal. If the means taken are illegal, it is unnecessary to inquire 
whether what was done was done with just cause or excuse.”172 
 
However, in an important series of English cases, courts have been prepared to contemplate 
justification defences despite the occurrence of illegality. Assessing the position as at the mid 
1970s, Heydon noted “There was a dogma that illegality could not be justified; but Lord 
Denning M.R. has often asserted the contrary and has allowed for the defence.” Heydon 
identified Lord Denning as the modern originator of the movement towards specifying and 
widening justification mechanisms, noting that as Master of the Rolls he often asserted a 
contrary view which allowed for a justification defence.
173
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Lord Denning’s sentiments were initially expressed in Morgan v Fry, in which an action 
against trade union officials was unsuccessful on the basis they “did not use any unlawful 
means to achieve their aim …; they were not guilty of intimidation; and they were not guilty 
of conspiracy to injure since they acted honestly and sincerely in what they believed to be the 
true interests of their union.”174 Russell LJ in the same case “queried whether every breach of 
contract constituted sufficient unlawful means to found the tort” (of intimidation). (Stilitz and 
Sales opposed this approach, arguing that there should be no defence of justification for 
intimidation, as this would spare the courts “the task of trying to classify the gravity of 
different forms of unlawful conduct” and that justification cannot apply where “the 
defendant’s actions are unlawful in themselves, in the intentional harm tort.”)175 
Initial Services v Putterill concerned a defendant who resigned from the plaintiff’s 
employment as a sales manager but took with him a number of documents which he handed 
to a national newspaper, leading to publication of articles alleging a liaison system between 
laundries to keep up prices. This was alleged to be in breach of an implied term of his 
contract of service to not disclose to strangers confidential information obtained by him in the 
course of his employment. Lord Denning entertained arguments that it may have been in the 
public interest that misconduct was disclosed to the press, saying that there were exceptions 
to the obligations of employment that “extends to any misconduct of such a nature that it 
ought in the public interest to be disclosed to others” although disclosure should “be to one 
who has a proper interest to receive the information.”176 
 
In Hubbard v Vosper Lord Denning considered an action for breach of copyright and 
confidence by representatives of the Scientology cult against the author and publishers of a 
book which was very critical of the cult. The author had been a member of the Church of 
Scientology for 14 years and it was argued that the book contained information obtained in 
confidence. It was held that as “the defendants had reasonable defences of fair dealing and 
public interest they should not be restrained from publication.”177  
 
Corey Lighterage Ltd v TGWU involved a dispute about union membership where the 
majority of workers refused to work with non-union workers. Lord Denning MR found that 
“the other men and the union may have sufficient justification or excuse for what they 
did.”178 Heydon highlighted the peculiarity of Lord Denning “saying that to cause loss by 
unlawful means to an employer of a non-unionist could be justified if he ‘abused … beyond 
measure’ his rights not to join a union and not to work, and simply acted ‘maliciously’, a fact 
shown by such remarks as ‘I will not rest until I have Mr Lindley’s head on a platter’.179 
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Subsequently, in Universe Tankships,
180
 a question for the Court was whether the economic 
pressure applied by the International Transport Federation was ‘illegitimate’ pressure. In this 
case the court had no doubt that the ITF officials, in procuring the blacking of the tugmen’s 
contracts of employment, had committed the tort of intimidation, but it said: 
 
The question naturally arises as to how the law is to distinguish ‘legitimate’ from ‘illegitimate’ 
pressure. Perhaps the obvious answer is to ask whether the act (or omission) threatened, or the 
actual threat itself, is independently unlawful. Presumably an ‘unlawful act’ would include at least 
commission of a crime or a tort or, of course, a breach of contract.
181
 
 
Neither Lord Diplock nor the other Law Lords found it “necessary to articulate the criteria 
which courts should utilise in making the necessary value-judgment as to the use of 
commercial pressure. It is difficult therefore to predict how far, if at all, their Lordships might 
really wish to see the concept of illegitimate pressure divorced from that of independent 
illegality.”182 However, the Universe Tankships decision needs to be viewed “against the 
background of the statutory immunities system which operated under the labour law of the 
United Kingdom. Briefly, the system seeks to prevent unions, their officials and their 
members from becoming liable for certain types of industrial action.”183 There was immunity 
from economic tort liability under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (UK) 1974, s 
13 of which provided that an act done ‘in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute’ 
would not be actionable in tort on the ground only that it amounted to an economic tort. 
 
Lord Diplock acknowledged that there may be circumstances [although he did not enter into 
the question of what kinds] in which “commercial pressure, even though it amounts to 
coercion of the will of a party in the weaker bargaining position, may be treated as legitimate 
and, accordingly, as not giving rise to any legal right of redress”184 but he also spoke of 
“pressure ‘which the law does not regard as legitimate’ without identifying the issue as one of 
ascertaining illegality.”185 
 
Deakin and Randall described the limited possibility of invoking a justification defence 
where unlawful means have been used as an “unsatisfactorily rigid position” and advocated a 
more flexible approach which “would be to allow the courts to weigh the nature of the 
illegality involved against the strength of the potential justifying factors.”186  
 
Heydon’s position, expressed in 1970, was that if the basis of the law were to change from 
illegal means to unjustifiable motives, the dogma that illegal means cannot be justified might 
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change too.
187
 Although the English and Australian common law has not developed in the 
way Heydon was possibly anticipating in making these comments (that is, towards a greater 
focus on analysis of motive) his comments illustrate the greater flexibility that can be created 
if a wider view of unlawful means is adopted. 
 
Cane answered his own question as to whether use of unlawful means can ever be justified:
188
 
 
… there seems a good argument for saying that there is no reason why illegal acts should never be 
justifiable in a civil action for intentionally inflicted loss. If the illegality is no more than 
incidental to the purpose which the defendant was pursuing, and if the interest he was seeking to 
protect by his actions was sufficiently important to outweigh the negative impact of the illegal 
conduct involved (because, for example, the illegality consisted of breach of a merely regulatory 
provision), then it may be that a defence of justification should succeed.
189
 
 
  
                                                          
187
 Heydon, n 13 at 178. 
188
 This question was noted at n 155 above. 
189
 Cane, n 40 at p 279. 
Chapter Seven: Justification Defences 
174 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The development of justification defences for the economic torts appears to have stalled. 
Apart from Zhu,
190
 which firmly established the importance under Australian law of 
establishing a ‘superior legal right’ as a basis for justification, it is difficult to identify any 
cases this century that have meaningfully grappled with the potential for expansion of the 
justification defences. Even in the leading recent cases of OBG, Revenue and Customs 
Commissioner v Total Network
191
 and A.I. Enterprises
192
 the possibilities of justification were 
only lightly entertained, typified by Lord Nicholls’ statement in OBG: “I mention, but 
without elaboration, that a defence of justification may be available to a defendant in 
inducement tort cases.”193 
 
There are a number of constraints on the expansion of justification. These arise from both the 
case law and from theory, in particular the principle in corrective justice theory that holds that 
“judges should be focused only on the relationship between the parties as doer and sufferer of 
the same harm, and should not impose on the relationship an independent policy of their own 
choice.”194 
 
However, there is potential for these constraints to be overcome. As the discussion above 
shows, there are sufficient wellsprings of authority in the common law (both in England and 
Australia) to enable an enlivening of justification. The defence of justification has the 
capacity to be highly flexible. There is a school of thought, reflected in the words of Slade J 
in Greig v Insole, that the defence “should not be confined to narrow straightjackets.”195 For 
Australia, an enlivening of justification is a clear option. Expanded and better delineated 
justification defences can play an important role in cataloguing the forms of pressure or 
interference with the rights of others that are legitimate. 
 
The thread of authority established in Zhu showing a preparedness to take into account the 
civil rights of litigants has considerable potential for development, when read together with 
the dictum of Dixon J in James v The Commonwealth that ‘the principle in Lumley v Gye’ is 
wide enough “to include within its protection civil rights which exist independently of 
contract.”196 It can be anticipated that an opportunity will arise in the not-too-distant future, in 
a case where collective action is undertaken in pursuit of a ‘moral principle,’ for the 
‘beachheads’ for expansion of justification canvassed in this chapter to be put to the test. 
 
Some advocate statutory solutions, but it is desirable that legislative interventions be 
buttressed by consistent common law principles. As Stewart observed, “legal doctrine … will 
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fall into disrepute if it is not fleshed out with coherent and consistent principles to regulate its 
application.”197 It is desirable that the further development of justification defences should be 
underpinned by thought-through, coherently formulated common law rules. 
 
Finally, as Cane envisaged, despite the well-established principle that illegality cannot be 
countenanced, it can be anticipated that courts may be prepared to make justification 
available in instances where illegal conduct has been incidental and has occurred in pursuit of 
an interest judged to be of high importance.
198
 There is scope for courts to weigh the nature of 
illegality involved against the strength of potential justifying factors. The following Chapter 
Eight explores the potential for the development of justification arguments, despite the 
presence of illegality, in the specific context of environmental activism. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CAMPAIGNS AND THE GENERAL ECONOMIC TORTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Context has affected development of the general economic torts to a significant degree. This 
chapter considers the application of the general economic torts in an important contemporary 
arena of collective conduct: environmental activism directed against business interests. 
 
Development of the economic torts has been spurred along by the advent of a series of social 
movements. Aggressive nineteenth century competition,
1
 freemasonry
2
 and the growth of 
trade unionism,
3
 in turn, became focal points. As each of these phenomena gathered 
momentum and gave rise to new patterns of collective conduct it was necessary for the 
common law to redefine established principles, taking account of the exigencies of novel 
social behaviour. 
 
As was mentioned in the Introduction to Chapter Three, recent discussion of the torts has 
most often occurred in the context of labour law, the primary battleground for their 
development in the twentieth century, or commercial rivalry. Commercial dealings have 
provided the setting for many of the important cases of the past decade. It will be recalled that 
OBG concerned the actions of defendants who took control of the claimant company’s assets 
as receivers appointed under a floating charge which proved to be invalid and A.I. Enterprises 
involved machinations amongst family members over the sale of a valuable investment 
property.
4
 
 
To date, environmental activism has been under-explored as a context for the application of 
the torts. However, in view of the increasing sophistication of environmental campaigning 
and its disruptive impact on business activities, this is likely to be a domain in which 
established legal principles pertaining to collective conduct will be tested and re-shaped over 
the next decade or so. Carty predicted that “claimants will attempt to rely on the torts beyond 
their traditional setting in areas where other civil liability is problematic … such as the 
consumer picket.”5 
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5
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An extensive body of literature describes the benefits of collective environmental activism
6
 
and its contribution to “public good.”7 Mathews highlighted the ways campaigning groups 
“breed new ideas, advocate, protest and mobilize public support,” “shape, implement, 
monitor and enforce national and international commitments”, “disrupt hierarchies,” spread 
“power among more people and groups” and have promoted an unprecedented “power shift” 
from states to liberal private organizations.
8
 Keck and Sikkink suggested that world politics 
have been fundamentally transformed by liberal transnational networks that “multiply the 
channels of access to the international system,” most notably in the environmental field.9 
NGOs are seen as enhancing the legitimacy of international law
10
 and playing important roles 
as “guardians of the environment” in processes of international regulation and supervision.11 
Binder and Neumayer found empirical evidence that the presence of environmental non-
government organisations (NGOs) leads firms to reduce their emissions of toxic chemicals.
12
 
It follows that, in certain circumstances, it may be legitimate for campaign actions to interfere 
with property and business interests. 
 
However, the question of where the boundaries of the arena of legitimate conduct should be 
set is contestable.
13
 In defining the limits of permissible conduct courts and lawmakers need 
to deliberate on conflicts between competing rights and priorities – between the interests 
asserted by those taking collective action and the private or civil rights of individuals and 
corporate interests. The areas of law which regulate collective economic coercion seek to 
resolve a conflict between rights of reputation and personal freedom (to be free from attacks 
on assets, property and businesses and to have redress for infringement of those rights) and 
rights of the public (for awareness and freedom of expression). 
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To date in Australia, there have been few reported cases involving economic tort actions 
against environmental campaigners, with the Gunns litigation series the leading example.
14
 
The Gunns cases, discussed in Part II of this chapter, have been described as “a legal and 
public relations disaster for the company.”15 They illustrate practical difficulties involved in 
litigating the economic torts. 
 
The economic torts are politically contentious, a legacy of their intermittent deployment 
against trade unions
16
 and environmental lobbies object to the potential use of these causes of 
action against community groups, seeing them as avenues for “suppressing adverse public 
debate and participation.”17 As Gunns showed, any party utilising the torts against 
environmental groups needs to be prepared to face a fierce public relations backlash. 
Maxwell suggested that firms facing an NGO campaign “must decide to either embrace the 
NGO’s demands … or invest in a reputation of intransigence; the middle ground is hard to 
sustain.”18 Two recent decisions in international jurisdictions, Resolute Forest Products19 and 
Sea Shepherd v Fish & Fish,
20
 demonstrate the willingness of some firms, if they have 
sufficiently strong cases, to pursue the litigation path. 
 
This chapter aims to deepen understanding of ways in which the general economic torts may 
evolve in the future by evaluating the potential application of the range of “control 
mechanisms”21 that can be deployed to inhibit the scope of the torts: the common law 
justification defences, definitions of intentionality and unlawful means, and statutory 
exemptions. As Chapter Seven showed, for Australia, an enlivening of the justification 
defences is a clear option and this might be associated with a widened conception of unlawful 
means under the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means. It is argued in this 
chapter, with reference to the specific context of environmental activism, that there is a need 
to clarify the optimum blend of control mechanisms. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Part II outlines some developments which suggest 
increasing potential for environmental activism to be an arena for future economic tort 
litigation and canvasses concluded cases where the underlying principles of the torts have 
been applied to the context of environmental campaigns. Part III then considers the potential 
application of control mechanisms. The chapter concludes with some observations about the 
important disciplining role private law solutions play in the overall accountability framework 
for groups acting collectively. 
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL CAMPAIGNS AS AN ARENA FOR LITIGATION 
 
A Application of the Economic Torts to Environmental Activism 
 
The benefits that have resulted from collective environmental activism have been widely 
celebrated.
22
 Scholarship of the sociology of social change identifies institutions based in 
civil society as catalysts for an ecologically sustainable society.
23
 Within the broad spectrum 
of the environmental movement some argue, with a sense of urgency, that “the reason why 
we are not fixing up the planet, even though it is to the advantage of all that we work together 
in our common interest, is that specific class interests [of business, of transnational 
companies, of corporations] intrude upon the process.”24 This view would see that it is 
legitimate to interfere with property rights and other economic interests in pursuit of 
environmental causes. Environmental NGOs are a “diverse and heterogeneous group” that 
differ markedly in how they operationalise activities:  
 
Some NGOs use completely non-confrontational means to achieve their goals of protecting 
ecosystems for conservation purposes. Some … work closely with existing institutions to bring 
about corporate and social change. Others choose to remain outside those institutions … working 
in a more confrontational style. Still others prefer to engage in acts of sabotage and deliberate 
violation of the law.
25
 
 
However, those involved in environmental campaigns are susceptible to the economic torts. 
This susceptibility is demonstrated by the frequently deployed pattern of conduct which 
involves well-resourced non-government organisations (NGOs), operating on a network 
basis, setting out to coerce customers of a company to stop doing business with a target 
company (unless the company accedes to the NGOs’ demands).26 Business lobbies contend 
that campaign methods are increasingly calculated to impose costs upon and cause financial 
damage to “targets.”27 Each of the five torts under study in this thesis can potentially be 
applied against activists. 
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Campaign actions may constitute inducing breach of contract if steps are taken to deprive the 
plaintiff of legal rights arising under a contract and if it can be shown that the defendants 
intended to interfere with the plaintiff’s legal rights. 
 
Conduct occurring in the course of an environmental campaign could potentially be “a 
combination or conspiracy aimed at harming the plaintiff in his trade or business” (the classic 
Quinn v Leathem test) if the conduct is found to have been motivated by malice. Lawful 
means conspiracy could arise if there was unjustified combination leading to economic 
pressure or harm (even if no unlawful means had been used). If a conspiracy or combination 
involved the use of unlawful means (most obviously, trespass or acts of defamation) it could 
be tortious without the need to show malice. 
 
It should be noted, however, that conspiracy actions face real practical difficulties. In Gunns 
Ltd v Marr (No 2), Bongiorno J was concerned by the plaintiffs’ attempt “to characterise 
virtually all of the defendants’ activities as being in furtherance of one extensive conspiracy,” 
noting that “conspiracy trials tend to be of inordinate length.” His Honour referred to a 
general reluctance of the Victorian Supreme Court to entertain civil conspiracy trials, 
observing that in the criminal jurisdiction, “such trials are now a rarity and are strictly 
controlled by statute.”28 
 
As was explained in Chapter Three above, the tort of intimidation arises where a defendant 
has, “by a threat to commit an unlawful act, coerced another person into acting in a way in 
which the latter did not wish to act, the defendant having thereby intended and caused 
economic damage to the plaintiff.”29 In Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU, the 
Supreme Court of Victoria affirmed the tort of intimidation as part of the law of Australia, 
consisting of three elements: that the defendant makes a demand coupled with a threat; that 
the threat is a threat to commit an unlawful act; and that the person threatened complies with 
the demand, thereby causing loss to the plaintiff.
30
 
 
The discussion in Chapter Three also established that the unlawful means tort has two 
essential ingredients: unlawful means, and an intention to thereby cause loss to the claimant. 
 
Increasingly, scenarios are arising in which environmental NGOs are adopting the latter two 
of the operating styles identified by Hoffmann and Bertels (involving confrontation and/or 
deliberate violation of the law). In such situations, it can be anticipated that campaigning 
groups will find themselves exposed to actions under the torts of intimidation and causing 
loss by unlawful means.
31
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B The International Experience 
 
Some of the most prominent examples of litigation against environmental activists emanate 
from Canada. In the action in Resolute Forest Products v 2471256 Canada Inc, before the 
Superior Court of Justice of Ontario, a statement of claim was filed alleging “defamation, 
malicious falsehood and intentional interference with economic relations.” The defendant 
activists were said to have targeted the plaintiff’s stakeholders, disseminated an 
“Unsustainability Report” for the purpose of damaging the company’s reputation and took 
steps to “harass, intimidate and otherwise exert pressure on Resolute’s customers” in a 
manner “designed to have customers refrain or alter their business relations with Resolute.”32 
 
By contrast, in Daishowa Inc. v Friends of the Lubicon,33 which involved a boycott campaign 
aimed at customers and consumers of the plaintiff’s paper products by supporters of an 
indigenous group, it was held that: 
 
The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants under the tort of interference with economic interests 
cannot succeed because the means used by the Friends was not unlawful. The claim that breach of 
contract was induced cannot succeed because the evidence failed to establish contractual relations 
between the plaintiff and its distributors and customers. One of the crucial elements of the 
economic tort of intimidation, an unlawful threat, is absent. The lack of a common intent to act 
unlawfully means that the tort of conspiracy to injure has not been established.
34
 
 
A scan of developments on the international scene offers more recent illustrations of conduct 
containing the key triggers of use of unlawful means and intentional conduct targeting the 
economic interests of another, which could form the basis for economic tort actions.
35
 Sea 
Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd 
36
 concerned an incident in the Mediterranean Sea where an 
operation was mounted to disrupt blue fin tuna fishing activities and a protest vessel rammed 
and tore open fishing cages. 
 
There is a new trend in activist thinking towards the direct targeting of individuals, possibly 
extending to extra-judicial orchestrated ‘naming and shaming’. This is evident from a 
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detailed “Practitioner Handbook” on “Motivating Business to Counter Corruption”37 
produced by Germany’s Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance (“HVSG”) in 2013. 
HVSG reviewed potential “sanctions and incentives for companies and their representatives” 
in legal, commercial and reputational areas and concluded that “all 3 categories are of near-
equal importance in motivating business.” Activists were encouraged to consider “making the 
application of sanctions public, as this may not only raise financial costs, but also social costs 
and (potentially) even psychological costs”.38 The Handbook detailed social costs individuals 
targeted may experience – “exclusion/ostracism within the community/neighbourhood, etc.; 
social rejection from colleagues, friends and family; public association with behaviour that 
damages society”39 and noted the practical application of these methods in the context of 
environmental protection. A related survey of “223 international anti-corruption experts,” 
published in 2012, showed that “80% of ‘civil society’ respondents agreed with the 
proposition that “public campaigns and press articles should target business representatives 
rather than businesses.”40 The HVSG research suggested that measures should: 
 
… not only influence the targeted individual or company, but also the opinion of key stakeholders 
or the general public ... The internet and in particular social media have given new momentum to 
reputational sanctions and incentives, widening their scope and enabling high-speed information 
distribution … the internet means external scrutiny can potentially be globalized.
41
 
 
As Waddell demonstrated, the true power of modern activism resides in “global, multi-
stakeholder, inter-organizational change networks,” comprising people numbering in the 
many millions, which work to assert new rules, laws and values and set up circumstances in 
which “organizations will no longer be considered ‘legitimate’ and will be denied 
opportunities if they don’t follow the new rules and integrate the values.”42 He named these 
“Global Action Networks.”43 Campaign-oriented NGOs now have a real capability to effect 
damage to businesses and individuals they target. Maxwell observed that the proliferation of 
the internet and social media has enabled citizens hungry for change to achieve “a dramatic 
reduction in the costs of mobilizing individuals and communicating concerns to the broader 
public and that this has allowed NGOs to be much more effective in dealing with the general 
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public, raising their private political power.
44
 In 2013 the German newspaper Handelsblatt 
reported that: 
 
Greenpeace and the Food Guardian Foodwatch group have, in Germany alone, each well over 
80,000 Facebook fans, with which they can quickly start mass protests. The campaign website 
‘campact.de_democracy in action’ represents more than 825,000 deferred activists and for almost 
any topic – from rents to waterworks nationalization – can mobilise many supporters fast.
45
 
In the course of setting boundaries for permissible conduct, account should be taken of 
factors such as the relative power (including political influence) of groups applying coercion 
and those targeted. At some point, past assumptions about the relative strength of opposed 
parties may need to be revisited. 
 
It is one thing for highly organised and well-resourced environmental groups to target large 
corporations; quite another if the targeting is of particular individuals unaided by large-scale 
corporate backing, or of small-scale business interests. There is potential for the common law 
rules to take account of disequilibrium in power and influence between those applying 
economic coercion and the party targeted.  
 
C The Australian Experience 
 
The highest profile Australian litigation against environmental activists was brought by 
Gunns Ltd, a Tasmanian forestry company, in the Supreme Court of Victoria over the 2005-
2009 period. Proceedings were launched against seventeen individual and three corporate 
entities (the Wilderness Society, the Huon Valley Environment Centre and Doctors for 
Native Forests) over their efforts to protect Tasmanian forests. The initiating writ (which was 
accompanied by a 216 page Statement of Claim) described four separate “logging operations 
disruption campaigns” and a “corporate vilification campaign” tied together with a broad 
allegation of a “campaign against Gunns”46 and sought damages of more than A$6 million. 
The causes of action were initially pleaded as “interference with trade or business by 
unlawful means, wrongful interference with contractual relations, conspiracy to injure and 
defamation.”47 Eventually, after grants of leave to amend Statements of Claim, the actions 
were re-focused around intentional interference with contractual relations, “intentional injury 
to the plaintiffs in their trade and business” and trespass.48 
 
Six judgments were handed down in the Gunns litigation series but the matter never 
proceeded to a trial on the merits and was eventually settled on terms unfavourable to the 
plaintiffs.
49
 Most of the post-litigation analysis has focused on the reputation effects on the 
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plaintiffs, with Beresford commenting that “the attempt by Gunns to sue some of its main 
critics came to rival the notorious McLibel case in the United Kingdom as an example of 
corporate abuse of free speech.”50 Commentators have viewed the Gunns litigation as an 
overt strategy by the plaintiffs to distract and occupy their opponents in the courts, noting that 
the company’s actions were bolstered by political relationships.51 
 
The pleadings offer a cloudy and contested picture of the activists’ conduct, but Beresford’s 
2015 book on the Gunns saga, based largely on insider interviews with campaigners, left little 
doubt as to the extent to which the campaigners were intent on disrupting and undermining 
the business of the plaintiffs. He details “blockades and tree-sits in addition to public-
education campaigns about the forests … Those found chained to harvesting machines or 
making other attempts to halt logging were arrested, charged with trespass and ordered not to 
re-enter the prohibited zone.”52 Beresford also detailed the way in which, in late 2007, “the 
focus widened from electoral politics to the corporate backers of the project,” in particular 
“targeting the principal funder” (the ANZ Bank) as well as other institutional investors and 
financial institutions, with the objective of “creating a domino effect if ANZ could be 
pressured to drop the project.”53 An important aim was “putting pressure on major 
international banks and finance groups to declare publicly their opposition to funding the 
mill.”54 Key campaigners disclosed that “in these sorts of disputes, delay and uncertainty are 
your friends, because they can frighten off investors.”55 
 
It would be a mistake to interpret the outcome of the Gunns cases as suggesting the futility of 
future economic tort litigation against activist groups in Australia. What Gunns demonstrated, 
above all, is the need for claimants to plead economic tort causes of actions effectively. The 
task in this series of cases was rendered complex by the continuing ambiguity of the torts 
under Australian law and international case law developments occurring during the period in 
question, but it is clear that the lack of success of the plaintiffs was due largely to tactical and 
procedural errors in the conduct of the litigation. Bongiorno J initially criticised various parts 
of the Statement of Claim for “extreme prolixity,” and found they were “confusing and resort 
to formulas” and did not “adequately expose the case.” He also took issue with the inclusion 
of “quotations from newspapers, websites and correspondence which are inappropriate in 
form” and “formulaic uninformative particulars”.56 His Honour’s criticisms of the pleadings 
in a later 2006 decision included that “too much has been sought to be alleged against too 
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many defendants in the one proceeding,” that there were obstacles in the way of justice 
deriving from “the sheer magnitude of the case and its effect on interlocutory processes,” 
concerns about “processes of discovery and interrogation … of enormous proportions” and 
the perceived likely burdensome cost to individual defendants.
57
 
 
Animal rights activism and environmental activism are discrete movements based on 
different philosophies but two actions brought against animal rights activists should be noted. 
In Australian Wool Innovations Ltd v Newkirk,
58
 the torts of conspiracy and intimidation were 
alleged against People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Animal Liberation and a number 
of individuals associated with those organisations. In Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v 
Hahnheuser
59
 animal rights activists entered a sheep feed paddock where sheep were being 
held prior to shipment to the Middle East and placed pig meat into food troughs, rendering 
the animals unsuitable for export and causing hundreds of thousands of dollars of loss to the 
sheepowners. These circumstances gave rise to an ultimately successful anti-boycott action 
under s 45DB(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) but they could equally 
have been the basis for a tort suit. Ogle viewed the actions as “arguably … on the margins of 
legitimate public participation.”60 
 
Another conspicuous example of conduct which could potentially lead to an economic tort 
suit occurred in January 2013 when a campaigner sitting in a protest camp in the Leard State 
Forest in New South Wales sent out a fake ANZ Bank press release from his laptop, saying 
that the bank had withdrawn a $1.2 billion loan to Whitehaven Coal, the target of a protest 
over a mine expansion. This cited “volatility in the global coal market, expected cost 
blowouts and ANZ’s corporate responsibility policy.”61 The hoax release was picked up by 
media and wiped 9% (a few hundred million dollars) off the market capitalisation of the 
company for a period of time, resulting in a trading halt. This incident demonstrates the 
potential for campaign conduct to move markets. 
 
For all their possibility in tort law, potential claimants contemplating deployment of the 
economic torts are likely to be deterred by four factors: the lack of clarity around many 
aspects of the operation of the torts under Australian law, difficulties in adducing evidence, 
reputational risks and the observed negative experiences of litigants such as Boral and Gunns. 
Cases may not be initiated because of social or political reasons or, as Gunns showed, depend 
on the implicit endorsement of the government of the day. 
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III. CONTROL MECHANISMS 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Part II (C) above, a range of judges
62
 and commentators
63
 
have been concerned about the need for ‘control mechanisms’ to inhibit the scope of the 
general economic torts and prevent them from being “unmanageably broad. Environmental 
activism will present new varieties of cases in which the application of control mechanisms 
can be tested. The uncertainties that exist under Australian law have arguably acted as a 
disincentive to business interests initiating proceedings; equally, activists need to be wary 
that the state of flux and the immaturity of defence arguments may advantage plaintiffs.
64
 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that there are four potential avenues for inhibiting the scope of 
the general economic torts: the expansion of justification defences; adjusting the tests of 
intention and targeting; clarification and “tweaking” of notions of unlawful means; and 
statutory exemptions. The current state of development of the law in Australia is such that 
each alternative is “in play.” The discussion below considers each of these options in turn, 
with reference to the context of environmental campaigning.
65
 
 
A Justification Defences 
 
Expanded and better delineated justification defences can play an important role in 
cataloguing the forms of pressure or interference with the rights of others that are legitimate. 
Deakin and Randall viewed justifications as a vital dimension of the overall architecture of 
the economic torts and noted potential for it to be “the justification defences which determine 
their outer limits.”66 
 
Chapter Seven identified five broad thematic ‘beachheads’ which could serve as potential 
starting points for expansion of justification defences. The first – a defence based on a pre-
existing contractual obligation of the defendant - is typified by Edwin Hill and Partners v 
First National Finance Corp.
67
 Second, Deakin saw potential for building on the idea that “on 
grounds of policy, a privilege is warranted wherever a servant or agent acts, not in capricious 
pursuit of self-advantage, but for the bona-fide protection of his employer.”68 A third 
category is what Deakin and Randall termed “justification based on the economic self-interest 
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of the group” or “collective economic self-interest”.69 Fourth, the common law could expand 
the range of collective actions that might be considered justified, as contemplated in Universe 
Tankships of Monrovia v ITF.
70
 
 
The fifth potential starting-point for expansion of justification defences has obvious relevance 
to the context of environmental campaigning. Circumstances may arise where a moral 
imperative or public duty exists,
71
 or where there has been altruistic action designed to 
protect the interests of third parties. There is a category of cases in which an impersonal or 
disinterested motive may afford justification, particularly where the defendant, acting under a 
moral duty, seeks to protect a person to whom the defendant stands in a relationship of 
responsibility.
72
 
 
Brimelow v Cassan arguably created a new category of “public morality” defence.73 This was 
the case in which an actors’ protection society was held to be justified in inducing theatre 
operators to breach their contracts with a theatrical manager who paid female chorus 
members such a low rate that they took to prostitution to survive.
74
 The additional moral 
component provided a novel edge to this case. Carty highlighted that “the notion of moral 
duty raises two problems for a court: how to weigh economic loss against moral concern; 
conversely, how to ensure that support for that moral concern will be effective.”75  
 
In Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe,
76
 after a musicians union objected to the 
plaintiffs’ policy of excluding “coloured people” from the dance floor and “gave notice to the 
plaintiffs that its members would not be prepared to perform at the ballroom as long as the 
policy of racial discrimination continued”77 the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to injure them 
in their trade. Cane noted that “even in 1958 it was possible to say that eliminating racial 
discrimination was a matter of public interest and not just a matter of interest to groups who 
were discriminated against” and saw that this case gave rise to potential for general 
arguments about moral imperatives to morph into a defence of public interest.
78
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The category of “moral imperative” raises the complication that courts would be called upon 
to decide which conduct should be considered matters of “morality or fairness?”79 There may 
be concern that this could lead to uncertainty but, as Heydon commented, “the current law of 
economic torts is also uncertain. The gains in rationality and predictability of development 
that would follow from generalisation and a greater concentration on justification might 
outweigh any uncertainty.”80 Some lack of judicial appetite for the task of weighing interests 
can be anticipated, but judges are already regularly called upon to adjudicate upon political 
and social issues. It is inevitable that, over the years ahead, the courts will be challenged to 
overcome their traditional reticence to become involved in the measurement and weighing of 
competing interests. 
 
Cane considered the circumstances in which this type of weighing may occur, examining the 
example of the application of the defence of necessity to actions for trespass: 
 
What acts the defence will justify depends … on the nature and source of the evil avoided, the 
identity of the beneficiaries of the defendant’s action, and the seriousness of the interference with 
the plaintiff’s rights. Such balancing of factors may involve difficult and controversial moral and 
social judgments.
81
 
 
B Intention and Targeting 
  
The legal settings for tests of intention can be fine-tuned so as to enhance, or alternatively 
dampen, the prospects of claimants. As Chapters Two, Three and Four of this thesis showed, 
it is necessary to inquire into the defendant’s intention or purpose (according to various tests) 
in order to make out each of the general economic torts. 
 
The debates around intention and targeting which were canvassed in Chapters Two, Three 
and Four are highly relevant to the context of environmental activism, where claimants 
seeking to prove mental states or discover documents containing evidence of intention can 
face particular challenges. Gunns demonstrated that the deliberation processes of campaign 
oriented NGOs may be arranged so it is difficult for plaintiffs to access information about 
groups’ underlying motivations and the nature of strategies and actions taken in support of 
their strategic objectives.
82
 In the 2008 proceedings,
83
 Gunns applied for discovery of key 
documents needed to substantiate the torts pleaded in their revised Statement of Claim, but 
this was successfully resisted on the basis that these documents contained very sensitive 
internal information regarding the policies, finances and administration of the defendant 
Wilderness Society. The Supreme Court of Victoria declined to order disclosure of a series of 
the defendants’ documents which directly concerned campaigns, tactics, strategies and 
operations, including meeting, travel and telephone records, “constituent profiles” and a 
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document titled Draft Strategy for Gunns Market Campaign – Background, on the basis the 
plaintiffs and defendants were “in competition” with each other and that their disclosure 
might give Gunns a significant collateral advantage in its conduct of adversarial dealings with 
the Wilderness Society over the logging and management of Tasmanian forests.
84
 The Court 
adopted an interpretation of confidentiality pertaining to these key documents which was 
highly sympathetic to the defendants. 
 
It will be recalled (from Chapter Four, Part VIII of this thesis) that Deakin and Randall 
advanced a revised conceptual basis for the general economic torts in which more attention 
would be paid to “their essential ingredients from the perspective of market regulation,” 
namely “to the interests which they protect, to the types of conduct which amount to 
illegitimate interference with those interests and to the justification arguments which 
determine their outer limits.”85 Deakin and Randall envisaged significant difficulties for 
plaintiffs if the requirement promoted by the House of Lords in OBG – that the defendant 
“actually realised the factual and legal effect of his actions, in addition to proving that he 
acted intentionally”86 – were adopted. They commented that the “requirement of ‘actual 
realisation’, coupled with the removal of the presumption of knowledge of the reasonable 
consequences of acts, leaves potential claimants facing an extremely high evidential burden” 
with the outcome of claims turning on “the attribution of ‘mental states’ many months or 
even years after the relevant events.”87 
 
It is open to Australian courts to act on the suggestions made by Deakin and Randall, and also 
by Neyers, advocating reiteration of the orthodox “aimed, directed or targeted” view of 
intention which acknowledges “the plaintiff’s right not to have others act with the 
predominant purpose of causing them injury.”88 There is merit in more explicitly taking 
‘targeting’ into account in deciding if a defendant has transgressed the torts, and conduct 
should be critically examined where parties acting collectively have banded together with a 
provable intention of causing economic injury to a targeted party. When prima facie liability 
arises, it can then be subject to justification arguments.  
 
C The Unlawful Means Lever 
 
An alternative avenue for limiting the extent of application of the general economic torts is to 
employ a narrow definition of ‘unlawful means.’ It will be recalled from earlier chapters of 
this thesis that, in broad terms, two alternate conceptions of unlawful means have been 
developed by the common law – a ‘narrower view’ and a ‘wider view’89 – and that there are 
significant variations in the meaning of the notion of unlawful means across the various torts. 
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Writing in 1970, Heydon usefully catalogued some of the variations in judicial approach from 
tort to tort, based on analysis of then-prevailing precedents. A considerable body of case law 
has ensued since 1970, but Heydon’s concise encapsulation remains informative. He saw that 
under inducing breach of contract “the means may be physical restraint, taking away essential 
tools, trespass to goods, persuading a third person to do an unlawful act, fraud and breach of 
the rules of natural justice;”90 unlawful means under conspiracy “includes crimes; torts (e.g. 
violence, actual or threatened, restrictions on liberty of movement even though not amounting 
to false imprisonment, intimidation, defamation, trespass to the plaintiff’s goods); fraudulent 
misrepresentation to the plaintiff or presumably third parties”91 and could also include “non-
disclosure by company directors to an investigator of the reasons for the managing director’s 
absence,”92 probably also breach of contract, and “to strike in breach of statute and to 
threaten such a strike;”93 under the tort of intimidation “an unlawful act is probably any 
crime, tort … or breach of contract; a strike in breach of statute is probably an unlawful act 
for this purpose.”94 As was noted in Chapter Three, illegal means under the innominate 
unlawful means tort “may be common law crimes like murder of a third party, or breaches of 
criminal statutes; torts, for example nuisance as against third parties, nuisance as against the 
plaintiff, trespass against the plaintiff, violence against third parties, defamation of the 
plaintiff, injurious falsehood … and breaches of contract.”95  
 
The problem with the narrow view is that it is at odds with the common law’s traditional 
intolerance, as a matter of policy, of illegality. Chapter Seven, Part V above described the 
ways in which, in his treatise analysing tort law and economic interests, Cane stated three key 
propositions regarding tort law’s discouragement of illegal conduct. The first was that “as a 
matter of public policy, courts are unwilling to give legal remedies to a party who founds his 
cause of action on his own illegal act. The judges do not wish to be seen as giving aid or 
encouragement to law breakers.”96 A second proposition was that if an “illegal act was a 
cause of, or was closely associated with … loss … it would be an ‘affront to the public 
conscience’ to afford relief.”97 Thirdly, a court will not “promote or countenance a nefarious 
object or bargain which it is bound to condemn.”98 
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Turning to the context of environmental campaigning, it is apparent that campaign actions on 
occasions veer into illegality, sometimes by design.
99
 Exclusion of criminal offences and 
breaches of statute from the ambit of the economic torts undermines the objective of 
inhibiting, in Lord Nicholls’ terms, “clearly excessive and unacceptable intentional 
conduct.”100 For the law to develop in a balanced manner, it should align with the “very 
simple” and common-sense observations of Lord Walker in the Total Network case, which 
suggested that, to determine “what an unlawful act was” reference should be made to what 
“the man in the street” would say, if asked.101 
 
When the High Court of Australia has the opportunity to conduct a first principles review and 
to determine for itself the appropriate settings for the unlawful means tort for Australia the 
precedents from England and Canada will be influential but they will not be binding upon the 
court. As Neyers observed, referring to comments by Queensland’s Justice Dutney,102 they 
will represent the starting point (not the finish line) for a reconsideration of the position in 
Australia.
103
 (Neyers built a case for the wider conception of unlawful means based on a 
‘predominant purpose’ justification – “the plaintiff’s right not to have others act with the 
predominant purpose of causing them injury.”)104 
 
D Statutory Exemptions 
 
Legislatures can become involved in defining the circumstances under which collective 
actions are regarded as unacceptable, modifying common law rules. As Heydon noted, 
“Parliament, if it thinks the public interest requires it, can create any special exemptions of 
references needed for particular groups, as happens in England to a large extent with trade 
unions.”105 Carty viewed statutory exemptions as the preferred way forward, referencing the 
protections created in the labour law sphere and seeing the economic torts as “lacking the fine 
tuning or finesse of statutory law.”106 Cromwell J in A.I. Enterprises echoed these sentiments, 
with his concern that the economic torts might “undermine legislated schemes favouring 
collective action in, for example, labour relations and interfere with fundamental rights of 
expression and association.”107 The Victorian Court of Appeal took a different view in 
CFMEU, pointing out that “the existence of a tort was not affected by legislation, 
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‘[o]therwise, the life of such a cause of action would wax or wane according to the state of 
the legislation’ and for legislation to abrogate the right of plaintiff for redress against a 
wrongdoer for intimidation would need ‘a clear and unambiguous statement of legislative 
intention’.”108 
 
Attempts to advocate special exemptions for activist groups have achieved only limited 
traction in Australia. Momentum built in the immediate aftermath of the Gunns litigation, 
which had become a cause celebre in activist circles.
109
 Exemption proposals made to date
110
 
have sought to protect activists from “strategic litigation against public participation” 
(characterised as ‘anti-SLAPP’ suits). The term ‘SLAPP’ was conceived by Pring and 
Canan.
111
 According to Pring, SLAPP suits satisfy four criteria: a civil complaint or 
counterclaim for monetary damages and/or an injunction; filed against non-governmental 
individuals or groups; because of their communication to a government body, official, or the 
electorate; on an issue of some public interest or concern.
112
 Merriam suggested a fifth 
criterion: “the suits are without merit and contain an ulterior political or economic motive.”113 
The advocates of statutory exemptions contended the Gunns litigation met these criteria, 
although this is debateable, as the plaintiffs in that case clearly acted in defence of a 
significant economic interest. Ogle defined SLAPP suits more broadly as “any lawsuit in 
relation to a political issue where the case has had, or could be assumed to have had, the 
effect of constraining the community’s right and ability to participate in public debate and 
political protest.”114 
 
The Australian anti-SLAPP proposals have asserted “the right to freedom of expression, the 
right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association, and the right to take part in public 
life.”115 They are illustrative of an emerging approach which seeks to apply principles of 
public law to private law contexts, via the invocation of fundamental rights.
116
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Four main arguments are advanced for the passage of legislation exempting environmental 
campaigners from the economic torts. The first is that environmental groups are a ‘special 
case’ in moral and social terms, warranting differentiated treatment. This view objects to the 
ability of opponents to litigate against campaigning groups as “a clear deterrent to even basic 
forms of community organizing.”117 The second argument emphasises that net community 
and public benefit is created by liberating the energy of activist groups, and points to the 
considerable achievements of environmental activism over the past two to three decades in 
transforming world politics, gaining public trust and positively contributing to societal 
welfare.
118
 A third proposition is that there is a need to inhibit “an emerging practice in 
Australia of large corporations using litigation as a strategic means of suppressing adverse 
public debate, commentary and protest on issues of public importance.”119 Ogle referred to a 
trend towards “increasing use of claims brought under commercial and industrial laws.”120 
However, this does not appear to be supported by a pattern of recent court activity
121
 and a 
counter-argument is that access to sympathetic media and the proliferation of social media 
ensures groups are able to make their voices heard, and loudly, in Australia today. The fourth 
set of arguments concern financial resources: the “threat of adverse costs orders in legal 
proceedings”122 is seen as unduly onerous for environmental groups and it is argued “there is 
invariably a significant resource imbalance”123 with “poorly resourced community groups … 
pitted against major corporations and/or government authorities.”124 
 
The 2009 proposal for a ‘Bill for an Act to Protect Public Participation’ in Victoria sought to 
establish legislative recognition of a “right to engage in public participation.” It provided for 
dismissal of proceedings, including economic tort actions, and the awarding of damages and 
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costs against plaintiffs instituting such proceedings, for underlying conduct assessed to 
constitute “public participation.” It sought to establish legislative recognition of a “right to 
engage in public participation” and defined public participation very broadly as 
encompassing “communication or conduct aimed, in whole or in part, at: (a) influencing 
public opinion; or (b) promoting or furthering action by the public, a corporation or by any 
government body, in relation to an issue of public interest.”125 The draft Bill also provided 
that “public participation does not include communication or conduct to the extent that such 
communication or conduct: 
 
(i) constitutes unlawful discrimination under the Equal Opportunity Act 1995; 
(ii) constitutes vilification under the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001; 
(iii) constitutes a deprivation of liberty; 
(iv) constitutes a trespass to premises used primarily as a private residence; 
(v) is by a party to an industrial dispute between a major employer and employee, former 
employee, contractor or agent and relates to the subject matter of the dispute; 
(vi) intentionally or recklessly causes appreciable injury to tangible property that lowers its value; 
(vii) intentionally or recklessly causes physical or mental injury to natural persons; 
(viii) incites others or attempts to incite others to commit an act referred to in sub-section a(vi) or 
a(vii); or 
(ix) is made in trade or commerce.”126 
 
Thus, the likely effect of this proposal would be that groups would be able to obtain 
protection from suits relating to trespass to premises (other than those used primarily as 
primary residences) and for damage to property which is less than ‘appreciable’. 
 
A series of objections may be made to the proposed anti-SLAPP laws and the first is that they 
pay insufficient regard to the importance of inhibiting illegality. Legislatures need to be 
careful that restriction of the economic torts does not give too-broad licence for unlawful 
acts, and to collective conduct that unjustifiably damages individual and business interests. 
 
The anti-SLAPP proposals blur the distinction between public wrongs and private wrongs: 
the former concern the relationship between the individual and the state and breaches and 
violations of public rights and duties, affecting the whole community
127
 while private wrongs 
involve “an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, 
considered as individuals.”128 Collins acknowledged that “insertion of fundamental rights into 
litigation over ordinary contractual, tortious and property disputes is perceived to present 
worrying challenges to basic structures of the legal order and the nature of private law”129 
and, although two parties involved in a private law dispute enjoy rights, they will also be 
duty-bearers: 
                                                                
125
 Submission to the Victorian Attorney General by the Public Interest Law Clearing House (PILCH) dated 22 
April 2009 proposing “A Draft Bill for an Act to Protect Public Participation.” 
126
 Ibid at 19-10. See section 3 of the proposed Bill. 
127
 Burrows A, ‘Challenges for Private Law in the 21st Century’ Chapter 2 in  Barker et al, n 116 at p 29; 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1768, volume 3, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, reprinted, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1979 at p 2. 
128
 Mendelson D, The New Law of Torts, 3
rd
 Edition, Oxford University Press, Sydney, 2014, at p 36.  
129
 Collins H, ‘The Challenges Presented by Fundamental Rights to Private Law’ Chapter 11 in Barker et al, n 
116, p 213 at p 216. 
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Unlike the orientation in public law that typically treats fundamental rights as trumping arguments 
in order to control abuse of state power, the role of rights in private law is much more likely to be 
one of questioning the existing delicate balance struck by private law between rights, interests and 
public policy.
130
 
 
Caution should be exercised when proposals seek to take away existing legal recourse for 
parties damaged by intentional actions targeting their economic interests, because this is at 
odds with an idea that underpins the economic torts, that “the law should not legitimize the 
infliction on another of gratuitous harm.”131 
 
Other arguments against statutory exemptions in favour of environmental groups emphasise 
the growing sophistication and power of activist networks,
132
 and the new trend towards 
direct targeting of individuals.
133
 Environmental campaigns are generally portrayed as “David 
vs Goliath” contests, but there is potential for conduct to damage small-scale property and 
business interests, as in Rural Export.
134
 
 
For these reasons the proposals that have been made in Australia to date for statutory 
immunities for environmental groups should be rejected. However, the anti-SLAPP model is 
just one example of an effort to create statutory exemptions.
135
 New proposals are sure to be 
advanced for the economic torts to be delimited by legislative initiatives, built upon 
fundamental rights arguments, and referencing freedom of expression and political 
communication. But the achievement of a political consensus as to the ‘right’ approach can 
be expected to take some time.
136
 
 
  
                                                                
130
 Ibid at p 221. 
131
 Weinrib E, ‘Two Conceptions of Remedies’ in Rickett CEF (ed), Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 3 at p 44. 
132
 See Submission to the Australian Competition Law Review, 2014 by ITS Global, June 2014. 
133
 See Part III of this chapter. 
134
 Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser (2008) 169 FCR 583. 
135
 An alternative formulation is the approach taken in 45DD(3) of Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth) which exempts secondary boycott conduct from liability if “the dominant purpose for which the 
conduct is engaged in is substantially related to environmental protection” although this test gives rise to a range 
of difficulties in discerning the purposes motivating the conduct of defendants. See Chapter Nine below. 
136
 In late 2016 a controversy about “foreign funding” of anti-coal campaigns and the use of “eco-litigation” by 
activist groups re-ignited political debates about the role legislation should play in impeding, or facilitating, the 
disruptive impact of environmental campaigning on business activities, leading Australia’s Prime Minister to 
express concern about the existence of “very systematic, well-funded campaigns against major projects” - 
‘Turnbull government moves to shut court doors on anti-coal activists,’ The Australian, 25 October 2016. There 
have also been contentious recent proposals to criminalise protest activities in the States of Tasmania and 
Western Australia – see https://forcechange.com/152971/dont-criminalize-peaceful-forms-of-protest/ (accessed 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
When groups act in concert to apply economic coercion they have the capacity to cause 
significant economic injury to those they target. The availability of robust private law 
solutions plays an important disciplining role in the overall accountability framework for 
groups acting collectively – if they overstep permissible boundaries of conduct, they can be 
brought to account by aggrieved parties commencing litigation. Abandonment of common 
law protections for individual interests in property or personal reputation should be 
approached cautiously. 
 
There is a considerable diversity of views amongst commentators as to the appropriate 
settings for the context of environmental activism. Some favour a restrictive approach; others 
advocate permissive settings with very few constraints – almost an ‘anything goes’ approach. 
The political debates are still immature and the new dynamics of activism are as yet little 
understood, as Maxwell has shown.
137
 The spectrum of opinions resembles the debates that 
raged over trade union activities in the 20
th
 Century, until a settled consensus began to 
emerge about the appropriate outer limits of unions’ liberties when operating collectively. 
This was associated with the creation of disciplines to make union activities more transparent. 
Equivalent transparency mechanisms have not at this point been developed for the 
environmental movement – in fact accountability lines are blurred by the global trans-
jurisdictional nature of networks and the conscious design of operating methods which make 
actions difficult to trace and evidence hard to obtain.
138
 
 
Chapter Three of this thesis argued against use of a narrow view of unlawful means as the 
preferred control mechanism for the economic torts. As was contended in Chapter Three, 
exclusion of criminal offences and breaches of statute from judicial definitions of unlawful 
means has potential to undermine the aspiration, inherent in the torts, to inhibit excessive and 
unacceptable intentional acts. Courts, like legislatures, need to ensure settings are designed so 
as not to encourage or condone illegality. 
 
Chapter Seven demonstrated that, for Australia, a clear option is to evolve common law rules 
to enliven notions of justification. This could allow courts to weigh the nature of illegality 
involved against the strength of potential justifying factors, and would necessarily be 
associated with a wide conception of unlawful means under the tort of causing loss by 
unlawful means.  
 
Environmental campaigns directed against business interests present a new context for the 
application of the economic torts. The history of labour law suggests that the achievement of 
a political consensus which strikes the right balance in designing statutory exemptions in 
such a contentious area is the work of decades. Eventually, a middle ground will be attained 
but the shape of this cannot be discerned at this stage. It is by no means clear that the 
compromises reached in labour law will, or should, be exactly emulated. The existing 
Australian ‘anti-SLAPP’ proposals, which seek to apply public law principles to private law 
disputes and tolerate illegality by activists, are unlikely to quickly achieve broad community 
acceptance. Statutory exemptions grounded in notions of public interest, involving a 
balancing approach, are more likely to be accepted. 
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 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
EXEMPTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BOYCOTTS FROM 
COMPETITION LAWS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter considers competition laws which regulate secondary boycott activities, an 
important dimension of the legal rules which inhibit economic coercion by persons in groups 
and by groups acting in concert. The legislative interventions which proscribe secondary 
boycotts were developed as extensions of the common law principles developed via the 
economic torts.  
 
Should competition law allow groups to arrange boycotts of some other person or entity 
because that person or entity does business with a third person to whom the boycotters object 
on environmental or consumer grounds? This question was under review as part of the Harper 
Committee’s ‘root and branch’ review of Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth).
1
 In its Draft Report, released on 22 September 2014, the Committee noted that: 
 
… where an environmental or consumer group takes action that directly impedes the lawful 
commercial activity of others (as distinct from merely exercising free speech) a question arises 
whether that activity should be encompassed by the secondary boycott prohibition.
2
 
 
Secondary boycotts and boycotts affecting international trade are generally illegal in 
Australia
3
 and attract significant sanctions,
4
 but for the past two decades conduct has been 
exempted from these laws if “the dominant purpose for which the conduct is engaged in is 
substantially related to environmental protection or consumer protection”. The exemption, 
contained in s 45DD(3) of the CCA, was enacted in 1996 as the result of a political 
accommodation between the Howard Liberal/National Coalition Government and the 
Australian Democrats, which at that time held the balance of power in Australia’s Senate. 
The Democrats, a party with a strong environmental constituency, insisted on enactment of 
an exemption from secondary boycott laws in favour of activist groups as a condition for 
support of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 which, inter 
alia, provided for transfer of modified secondary boycott and related laws from the industrial 
relations statute to the then Trade Practices Act. During the accompanying legislative debates 
in the Senate, the chief proponent of the exemption, Senator Murray said: 
                                                                
1
 From this point the Competition and Consumer Act is referred to as the “CCA”.   
2
 Harper I et al, Competition Policy Review, Draft Report (22 September, 2014) at 242. 
3
 The prohibitions, found in ss 45D, 45DA and 45DB of the CCA, are detailed in Part II of this paper. 
4
 Under s.76(1) of the CCA ‘pecuniary penalties’ may be imposed of up to $750,000 on any ‘body corporate’ 
involved in a contravention of section 45D or 45DB, and up to $500,000 on individuals. For s.45DA in the case 
of a corporation the consequence of a breach can be the imposition of pecuniary penalties of up to $10 million, 
the value of the benefit attributable to the breach or 10% of annual turnover (whichever is the greatest) with 
$500,000 the maximum penalty for individuals. Section 82(1) allows anyone who suffers a quantifiable loss as a 
result of a secondary boycott a right of action for damages against the perpetrators. Injunctions may be issued 
under s.80(1). 
Chapter Nine: Exempting Environmental Protection Boycotts from Competition Laws 
199 
 
The Australian Democrats are very proud that our negotiations with the Government have 
delivered an improved legal position for those people who are often involved in the front line of 
fundamental change – activists and protesters.5 
 
The Final Report of the Harper Committee recommended the maintenance of the general 
prohibitions on secondary boycotts contained in the CCA, and also made the following 
comment regarding the exemption: 
 
The Panel did not receive compelling evidence of actual secondary boycott activity falling within 
the environmental and consumer protection exemption in the CCA. In the absence of such 
evidence, the Panel does not see an immediate case for amending the exception. However, if such 
evidence arises from future boycott activity, the exceptions should be reassessed.
6
 
 
This inconclusive assessment means the desirability of continuation of the s 45DD(3) 
exemption is likely to remain under scrutiny from legislators. Perspectives on the issue tend 
to divide along political and ideological fault lines. The Harper Review elicited strong 
differences of view on the question, with opposing arguments expressed by pro-activist 
organisations and pro-business lobbies, reflecting fundamentally different viewpoints on 
approaches to accountability. For example, in its 2014 submission to the Harper Committee, 
the Australian Conservation Foundation urged that “environmental campaigns should not be 
held to the same level of scrutiny as claims made in the market,”7 while the Australian Forest 
Products Association advocated that the CCA “should subject activist groups to the same 
level of social standards and accountability expected of companies with regard to boycotts 
and the use of false and misleading information.”8 
 
A number of technical legal and practical difficulties in the application of s 45DD(3) were 
exposed by the Full Federal Court of Australia in Rural Export and Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v 
Hahnheuser,
9
 the leading case examining the provision. There, the Court saw potential for the 
language of the section to be subjected to “strained and uncontrolled construction supported 
only by Humpty Dumpty’s example of being able to choose a meaning for itself.”10 In view 
of the ongoing policy debate, it is timely to revisit the Rural Export case and the insights that 
can be discerned from it. 
 
This chapter begins by detailing ss 45D(1), 45DA(1), 45DB(1) and 45DD(3) of the CCA. It 
then briefly summarises the history of Australian regulation of collective boycotts, clarifies 
some terminology and analyses the key operative phrases in the legislation. The rationales for 
prohibitions on boycott conduct and for the s 45DD(3) exemption, and associated normative 
                                                                
5
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 November 1996, PP5676 (Andrew Murray). 
6
 Harper I et al, Competition Policy Review, Final Report (31 March, 2015) at 68 and 389. 
7
 Australian Conservation Foundation (“ACF”), Submission in response to Issues Paper, Competition Policy 
Review, June 2014 at 2. 
8
 Australian Forest Products Association (“AFPA”), Submission in response to Issues Paper, Competition Policy 
Review, 10 June 2014 at 2. 
9
 (2008) 169 FCR 583. The case was also reported at (2008) 249 ALR 445. Hereafter in this chapter the case 
will be referred to as Rural Export. 
10
 Ibid at para [31], quoting Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 244-245. 
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and policy debates, are traced. The chapter outlines difficulties which can arise in the 
practical application of s 45DD(3) and examines the quirks identified in Rural Export. There 
is discussion of the alternative of basing exemption on case-by-case assessment of public 
benefit (instead of a generalised test based on dominant purpose), which would place the 
focus on conduct and its effects, rather than purpose. The mechanism by which existing 
authorization provisions in the CCA could be applied to secondary boycott conduct is 
described. The chapter also addresses the opportunity to refine approaches applied to 
determination of public benefit, to take better account of environmental and social 
considerations. 
 
 
II. OUTLINE OF THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME 
 
The provisions which regulate secondary boycotts and boycotts affecting international trade 
are contained in ss 45D, 45DA and 45DB of the CCA. Section 45D(1), headed “Secondary 
boycotts for the purpose of causing substantial loss or damage” says: 
 
… a person must not, in concert with a second person, engage in conduct: 
(a) that hinders or prevents 
i. a third person supplying goods or services to a fourth person (who is 
not an employer of the first person or the second person); or 
ii. a third person acquiring goods or services from a fourth person (who 
is not an employer of the first person or the second person); and 
(b) that is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the effect, of 
causing substantial loss or damage to the business of the fourth person. 
 
Section 45DA(1) is headed “Secondary boycotts for the purpose of causing substantial 
lessening of competition.” It is in identical terms to s 45D(1) except that in subparagraph (b) 
the words “substantial loss or damage to the business of the fourth person” are replaced by 
the words “a substantial lessening of competition in any market in which the fourth person 
supplies or acquires goods or services”. It provides: 
 
… a person must not, in concert with a second person, engage in conduct: 
(a) that hinders or prevents 
i. a third person supplying goods or services to a fourth person (who is 
not an employer of the first person or the second person); or 
ii. a third person acquiring goods or services from a fourth person (who 
is not an employer of the first person or the second person); and 
(b) that is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the effect, of a 
substantial lessening of competition in any market in which the fourth person 
supplies or acquires goods or services. 
 
In s 45DB(1), headed “Boycotts affecting trade or commerce” the particular concern of 
hindrance of international trade is addressed, as follows: 
A person must not, in concert with another person, engage in conduct for the purpose, and having 
or likely to have the effect, of preventing or substantially hindering a third person from engaging 
in trade or commerce involving the movement of goods between Australia and places outside 
Australia. 
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The exemption to these general rules is contained in s 45DD(3). The full text of this provision 
is as follows: 
 
A person does not contravene, and is not involved in a contravention of, subsection 45D(1), 
45DA(1) or 45DB(1) by engaging in conduct if: 
(a) the dominant purpose for which the conduct is engaged in is substantially related to 
environmental protection or consumer protection; and 
(b) engaging in the conduct is not industrial action. 
 
 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY 
The regulation of secondary boycotts has a long and fractious history in Australia and the 
current formulation of the anti-boycott provisions and the s 45DD(3) exemption cannot be 
understood without referring to that history.
11
 For two decades from the mid 1970s to the mid 
1990s, secondary boycotts were a controversial aspect of Australian industrial relations and 
the justifications for limitations on boycott conduct were the subject of significant public 
debates, mainstream media coverage and academic interest.
12
 Accordingly, most of the cases 
on the subject that have come before the nation’s courts concern disputes between targeted 
companies and trade unions, acting in pursuit of industrial relations objectives. 
 
The effective use of secondary boycotts can be traced to the 19
th
 century,
13
 but the first 
critical stage in the development of Australia’s regulation of this area occurred when s 45D of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was formulated, following the work of the Swanson 
Committee established by the Fraser Government in 1976.
14
 One of the terms of reference of 
this Committee was to give attention to the Act’s application to anti-competitive conduct by 
employer or employee organisations. When s 45D was enacted in 1977, it prohibited conduct 
which had the effect of causing “substantial loss or damage to a targeted person or; a 
substantial lessening of competition in a market.”15 This rendered acts done by employees in 
the course of secondary boycott activities unlawful. At the introduction of the provision, the 
then Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (Mr Howard) said: 
 
                                                                
11
 The early history is mapped in Creighton WB, Ford WJ and Mitchell RJ, Labour Law: Text and Materials 
(2
nd
 ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1993). See also Sykes EI and H J Glasbeek HJ, Labour Law in Australia 
(Butterworths, Sydney, 1972) at 550-552 and Sorrell GH, Law in Labour Relations (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 
1979) at 17-19. 
12
 See Boulton A, ‘The Conciliation and Arbitration Act and the Common Law’ in Evans G (ed), Law, Politics 
and the Labour Movement (Legal Service Bulletin, Melbourne, 1980), Chapter 4. 
13
 Temperton v Russell [1893] 1 QB 715; Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495. 
14
 The Liberal/National Coalition had become concerned at the use of secondary boycotts by a number of trade 
unions to try to prevent price-cutting in relation to bread and petrol. 
15
 See Creighton, Ford & Mitchell, n 11 at Chapter 37 for a discussion of the background to s 45D and for 
extracts from many relevant cases. 
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… boycotts have been used by some trade unions in this country to dictate the business 
arrangements of independent businessmen. In some instances these boycotts have resulted in 
higher prices to the consumer. The most common instance of a secondary boycott occurs where a 
group of employees collectively acts for the purpose of interfering with supply of goods and/or 
services by their employer to a company.
16
 
 
The secondary boycott provisions were transferred into the Industrial Relations Act in 1993 
by the Keating Labor Government, reflecting the then-prevalent paradigm which saw them 
exclusively as an aspect of employer/employee dynamics. In 1996, following the election of 
the Howard Liberal/National Coalition Government, the provisions were transferred back to 
the Trade Practices Act by the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
1996. 
 
Australian industrial relations history has seen periodic upsurges in the use of tort liabilities 
by employers against employees. In the late 1960s, and again in the late 1980s, employers 
regularly succeeded in obtaining injunctions against trade unions, utilising contempt of court 
and sequestration proceedings.
17
 By the mid 1990’s a settled consensus developed regarding 
the boundaries it was appropriate to establish around secondary boycott conduct in the 
employer/employee context, reflected in the current text of s 45E of the CCA which prohibits 
various forms of conduct which indirectly lead to such boycotts and s 45DD(1) which permits 
boycott conduct where the dominant purpose of the conduct relates to employment matters. 
 
IV. THE VARIOUS FORMS OF BOYCOTT 
Some key terminology requires clarification. A secondary boycott arises when two or more 
people decide to boycott some other person or entity because that person or entity does 
business with a third person to whom the boycotters object. The aim is to indirectly punish a 
company designated as a key target by punishing those whom the company relies upon or is 
connected with. Essentially, the effect of a secondary boycott is to harm a ‘third party’ (not 
the subject of a dispute) economically, so that party will bring pressure to bear on the subject 
of the dispute. Corporations may be targeted via action directed against their suppliers, or 
customers of their suppliers, or customers (through what might be termed ‘tertiary action’). A 
secondary boycott might consist of a refusal to handle or use goods or services which 
emanate from, or are destined for, the target. Equally, it might take the form of threats or 
pressure against a financial institution if it maintains funding to a company deemed 
objectionable. Baron and Diermeier deem this the “upstream” market campaign, citing the 
example of Rainforest Action Network targeting banks that finance environmentally 
damaging projects in the developing world.
18
 In the debates preceding the passage of the new 
package of provisions in 1996, Senator Murray said: 
 
                                                                
16
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1976, PP3533 (John Howard 
MHR). 
17
 See Creighton WB, ‘Secondary Boycotts Under Attack – The Australian Experience’ (1981) 44 Modern Law 
Review 489.   
18
 Baron D and Diermeier D, ‘Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy’ (2007) 16 Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy 599 at 603.    
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The provisions we will vote for today … target expressly the cases of boycott activity which 
Labor, the Coalition and the Democrats have consistently regarded as undesirable – that is, 
boycotts where an innocent third party is involved in a dispute between two other parties. The law 
in this country and the law in many other countries have always precluded such boycotts as … 
undesirable and unsanctioned.
19
 
 
Primary boycott activity is, by contrast, generally permissible under the CCA, unless conduct 
adversely affects international trade. A primary boycott is a decision not to do business with a 
person because of a direct dispute. It could take the form of a boycott directly aimed at a 
company considered to have done something offensive by its consumers or potential 
consumers: you “don’t like how a biscuit manufacturer operates, so you and your friends stop 
buying their biscuits”20 or you make “a decision not to patronise a business that discriminates 
on the basis of race.”21 
 
As a matter of policy the CCA renders illegal primary boycotts which hinder international 
trade and commerce. It has been judicially observed that “Parliament sought, in s 45DB(1), to 
protect the nation’s overseas trade from concerted interference with the movement of goods 
in or out of Australia”.22 The policy rationale underlying this section was explained to the 
Senate by Senator Murray in 1996: 
 
The new 45D will be much narrower in scope than the old…It will not apply to primary boycotts, 
with the narrow exception of the movement of goods in and out of Australia ... The reason for [the 
provision] is that primary boycotts on the wharves affect many other people. The effect is not 
limited to the immediate parties involved. If the waterside workers refuse to load perishable 
goods, the supplying factory might be forced to suspend operations and stand down workers, 
resulting in innocent employers and employees being hurt.
23
 
 
The category of primary boycott in which consumers of goods or services take collective 
action against their suppliers could also be illegal, falling within the ambit of the prohibition 
in s 45 of the CCA on contracts, arrangements or understandings that restrict dealings or 
affect competition.
24
 
                                                                
19
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, n 5 PP5608. It should be noted that in these debates Senator 
Bob Brown of the Australian Greens advocated that the scope of the s 45DD(3) exemption be expanded to 
activities “related to” or which “draw public attention to” the areas of “human rights, social justice, peace, 
Aboriginal land rights, environmental protection or consumer protection” and moved an amendment to the 
legislation to this effect. However this was defeated in the Senate. 
20
 Berg C, Freedom of speech means freedom to boycott (The Drum, 24 September 2013; accessed 16 February 
2015) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-24/berg-freedom-of-speech-means-freedom-to-boycott/4977410  
21
 Smith B, The Problematic Nature of Secondary Boycotts on Political Speech (20 April 2012; accessed 16 
February 2015) http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2012/04/20/the-problematic-nature-of-secondary-boycotts-
on-political-speech/  
22
 Rural Export and Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser (2008) 169 FCR 583 at [34]. 
23
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 November 1996, PP5676 (Andrew Murray). 
24
 However, s 51(2A) says that in determining contraventions in Part IV of the Act, “regard shall not be had to 
any acts done, otherwise than in the course of trade and commerce, in concert by ultimate users or consumers of 
goods or services against the suppliers of goods or services”. This grants protection to groups of consumers and 
others who take collective action against suppliers, which extends to parties boycotting particular products or 
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V. KEY OPERATIVE PHRASES IN THE LEGISLATION 
To determine whether conduct is in breach of any of ss 45D(1), 45DA(1) or 45DB(1), it is 
necessary to focus on the meaning of key operative phrases such as ‘in concert,’ ‘engaging in 
conduct’ and ‘purpose.’25 
  
The requirement that parties engaged in boycott conduct must have acted ‘in concert,’ which 
is common to each of ss 45D(1), 45DA(1) and 45DB(1), has existed in the vocabulary of the 
CCA since the original anti-boycott provisions were enacted in 1977.
26
 The phrase ‘in 
concert’ whilst general in nature is drawn from the common law.27 It resonates with the 
definitions used in assessing the tort of conspiracy, involving mutual consent by persons to a 
common design.
28
 
 
Acting in concert generally involves a degree of closeness in timing, as illustrated in Flower 
Davies Wemco Pty Ltd v BLF WA Branch.
29
 J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers 
Federation Union of Workers, WA Branch
30
 suggested the necessity for evidence of 
communication between participants and that the parties must have demonstrated 
“contemporaneity and community of purpose”. It is not uncommon for defendants to argue 
that there were merely simultaneous actions occurring spontaneously.
31
 
 
AMIEU v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd,
32
 in which conduct was engaged in at separate 
locations and at separate times, shows how this requirement of contemporaneity can give rise 
to evidentiary difficulty. Gray J held that “while there may have been arrangements or 
understandings between employees of each of the respective employers who were targeted 
and their union, there was no evidence that the individual employees in the various 
workplaces had acted in concert with each other.”33 Whilst the AMIEU “was at the centre of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
suppliers for reasons unrelated to commercial gain by the consumers involved. See Miller R, Australian 
Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (36
th
 ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2014) at [1.51.70]. 
25
 The mechanics of ss 45D, 45DA and 45DB were outlined in depth in McClelland R, ‘Sections 45D and 45E 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Re-Born or Misconceived?’ (1997) 16 Australian Bar Review 118. An update 
of this paper was published in a Thomson Reuters weekly report: McClelland R, ‘Secondary boycott actions 
under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010’ (2014) 5 WR 46. 
26
 McClelland (1997), n 25 at 120. 
27
 Creighton, n 17 at 508. This may be considered a form of statutory re-enactment of pre-existing tort liabilities, 
reflecting the indirect form of the tort of interference with contractual relations. 
28
 McClelland (1997), n 25 at 120. 
29
 (1987) ATPR 40-757 90. 
30
 (1992) 111 ALR 502. 
31
 Epitoma Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1984) ATPR 40-469; Tillmanns Butcheries 
Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1979) 27 ALR 367, per Bowen CJ. 
32
 (1985) AILR 393. 
33
 McClelland (2014), n 25 at 47. This demonstrates the importance in s 45D actions of the applicant 
discharging its evidentiary burden. 
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a coordinated campaign of stoppages” this “did not mean that employees who were its 
members acted in concert with it in any way in relation to employees other than their own”.34 
Weight was given to evidence that the question of whether a stoppage would occur depended 
on the outcome of separate meetings of employees at individual workplaces. 
 
In Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd v Electrical Trades Union
35
 the Building Trades Association 
of Unions had imposed a picket-line around a construction site. It was alleged the union had, 
in concert with one of its members, engaged in boycott conduct. The applicant was unable to 
establish any communication between the union and its member. The employee indicated the 
reason he did not perform work on the construction site was because it was a long-standing 
policy of his union to not cross a picket line. There was no evidence that an officer of the 
union had addressed the meeting where it was decided to impose bans. 
 
However, in Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of 
Australia
36
 bans against independent contractors imposed by a union contemporaneously but 
at separate industrial sites were held to establish workers had “acted in concert” with their 
union. There had been close temporal connection between bans at separate sites. The 
imposition of bans had been communicated to members in the union’s official magazine and 
other publications. 
 
In practice, for liability to arise, s 45D requires both “communication” between the actors and 
an “engaging in conduct” which “hinders or prevents” the acquisition or supply of goods or 
services.
37
 In Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish,
38
 Deane J said “the conduct of 
hindering or preventing supply or acquisition to which the section refers can be engaged in by 
threat and verbal intimidation as well as physical interference with the actual activities.”39 
Mason CJ in Devonish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd
40
 said “’hinder’ should be construed ‘in 
the general sense’ of in any way affecting to an appreciable extent the ease of the usual way 
of supplying the articles.” 
 
Section 45D(1) requires ‘substantial’ loss or damage to be caused to a target corporation.41 
However, given that much protest action, in order to be effective, is designed to have the 
                                                                
34
 McClelland (1997), n 25 at 122. 
35
 (1986) ATPR 40-694. 
36
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potential to hurt the target by inflicting loss, it is difficult to envisage as a practical matter 
matters giving rise to litigation that would be defeated on the basis of being “insubstantial.”42 
French J (as he then was) summarised the case law on the concept of ‘purpose’ as used in s 
45D in J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federation Union of Workers, WA 
Branch:
43
 
 
The purpose which attracts the application of s 45D(1) is the ‘operative subjective purpose of 
those engaging in the relevant conduct in concert’. It is identified ‘by reference to the real reason 
or reasons for, or the real purpose or purposes of the conduct and to what was in truth the object in 
the minds of the relevant persons when they engaged in the conduct in concert’.
44
 
 
A problem that can arise in taking action against a group affiliated to a corporate entity or 
like organisation is whether a corporation can have ‘a mind’. It has been generally held, in 
relation to the requirement of purpose in s 45 of the CCA, that a corporation (having no mind) 
can have no purpose.
45
 It follows that the purpose of a corporation is a legal conclusion 
expressed as an attributed state of mind.
46
 Nevertheless, if an environmental or consumer 
organisation is a body corporate, it is a ‘person’47 capable of being subject to the prohibitions 
in subsections 45D(1), 45DA(1) and 45DB(1). Furthermore, each of its members may be a 
‘person’ subject to the prohibitions in those subsections. If the organisation is not a body 
corporate it is not a ‘person’ and therefore not subject to the prohibitions in ss 45D(1), 
45DA(1) and 45DB(1). Even so, each of its members will be considered a ‘person’ who may 
be subject to the prohibitions. 
 
  
                                                                
42
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43
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VI. RATIONALES 
A The Rationale for Prohibitions 
 
Secondary boycotts and trade-affecting boycotts are generally prohibited in Australia because 
they are perceived to have pernicious economic effects,
48
 distorting competition by seeking to 
force preferences for one supplier, or category of supplier, over another. As noted by 
Creighton, “very considerable pressure can be brought to bear upon [a] target … through 
action directed against their suppliers or customers” and boycotts by their very nature imply 
disruption and the infliction of economic harm or inconvenience.
49
 A pro-market view sees 
any secondary boycott – or boycott affecting international trade – as an arbitrary market 
distortion and an interference with free and open competition, antithetical to attainment of the 
objective of “cheaper prices, more growth and more jobs”. 50  (The counter-view regards 
corporate interests as legitimate and impersonal targets for boycotts.
51
) 
 
The rationale for prohibitions on secondary boycotts was re-affirmed by the Harper 
Committee in 2015: 
 
Secondary boycotts are harmful to trading freedom and therefore harmful to competition. Where 
accompanied by effective enforcement, secondary boycott prohibitions have been shown to have a 
significant deterrent effect on behaviour that would otherwise compromise consumers’ ability to 
access goods and services in a competitive market.
52
 
 
The impact on consumers can be significant. Baron and Diermeier traced the various forms of 
harm that can be inflicted by boycotts. These include strategic effects such as higher marginal 
costs and compounding competitive disadvantage for targets,
53
 generating regulatory risk and 
creating uncertainty that could increase the cost of raising capital,
54
 reducing the profits of 
targets and discouraging investment in an industry.
55
  Lyon and Maxwell showed that activist 
campaigns can create such an opportunity cost associated with the commitment of resources 
to an industry that some companies may exit a targeted industry altogether.
56
 As Friedman 
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observed in analysing the history of boycotts, campaigns are essentially confrontational and 
rely on threats and negative tactics.
57
 Konrad and Skaperdas suggested that, in their economic 
effects, activist campaigns can be similar to extortion.
58
  
 
Protection of individual and corporate rights has traditionally been the domain of the 
common law, including the economic torts. A considerable body of literature explains the 
rationale for these torts.
59
 The case for legal interventions to halt coercion and resulting 
economic dislocations derives from a utilitarian perspective, which seeks contractual freedom 
whenever loss of utility to third parties exceeds gains to parties to a transaction, but justifies 
antitrust laws in a carved out set of cases in which systematic losses to society at large
60
 
justify some restraint on freedom of contract.
61
 There is also a libertarian rationale for the 
economic torts. This assumes that the state has a legitimate role to play in preserving property 
rights, upholds the private autonomy of individuals and hesitates to give effect to “(physical) 
duress, deceit or misrepresentation.”62 
 
The areas of law which regulate collective economic coercion seek to resolve a conflict 
between rights of personal freedom and reputation (to be free from attacks on assets, property 
and businesses and to have redress for infringement of those rights) and rights of the public 
for awareness. 
 
B The Rationale for the s 45DD(3) Exemption 
 
The enactment of the s 45DD(3) exemption in 1996 was a function of politics. The Australian 
Democrats held the balance of power in the Senate at a time when the Liberal/National 
Coalition was seeking to make significant changes to workplace relations legislation, and 
were able to successfully leverage this position to achieve a positive result for key 
constituencies. The provision itself appears to have been negotiated and drafted hurriedly and 
does not seem to have been based upon a deliberative review or consultative process.
63
 The 
parliamentary debates of the time were robust, but no cohesive rationale for the exemption 
was articulated. 
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In 2014 however, the opportunity arose for a well-coordinated series of submissions to the 
Harper Review inquiry by non-government organisations (NGOs) and associated lobby 
groups advancing a rationale for s 45DD(3). Four main sets of arguments for retention of the 
exemption were advanced. 
 
The first group of arguments were concerned with rights of free speech and political 
communication. Australian Lawyers for Human Rights (ALHR), for example, submitted that 
“the anti-boycott provisions of the CC Act place unjustifiable limits on free expression.”64 
The submission of the Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices (ANEDO) 
contended that removal or dilution of the exemption would support “the important public 
right of free speech and access to information that might otherwise be suppressed,” 
referencing an implied freedom of political communication in Australia’s federal 
Constitution
65
 and citing Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills
66
 and Unions NSW v State of 
NSW.
67
 
 
In a judgement handed down subsequent to the Harper Review submissions, Tajjour v New 
South Wales; Hawthorne v New South Wales; Foster v New South Wales,
68
 the High Court of 
Australia considered freedom of communication and association arguments. The Court 
affirmed the principle emanating from Unions NSW that where a law has the legal or practical 
effect of burdening political communication, it is necessary to decide whether the provision is 
reasonably appropriate and adapted, or proportionate, to serve a legitimate end in a manner 
which is compatible with the maintenance of the prescribed system of representative 
government. Hayne J said: 
 
… application of the established principles must proceed in accordance with the two steps 
identified in Lange. Does the law have the legal or practical effect of burdening political 
communication? If it does, is the law proportionate to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is 
compatible with the maintenance of the prescribed system of representative government?
69
  
 
Rights-based justifications for the exemption give rise to a need to assess the extent to which 
one set of rights (such as free speech) “can consistently and coherently exist with the other 
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rights recognised by law,”70 including property and trading rights. According to Weinrib, 
“rights provide the space within which all right holders may pursue ends of their own. Such 
ends are consistent with the self-determining freedom of others only if the point of pursuing 
them is independent of the adverse effect on someone else… if the freedom to perform an act 
merely to frustrate the purposes of another were legitimate, rights would be transformed from 
markers of mutual freedom to instruments of subordination.”71 As Neyers noted, “if one 
accepts that implicit in the very nature of rights and liberties is a limitation on their use in 
certain circumstances, the only remaining question is how the legal system gives effect to 
such a limitation”.72 
 
ALHR also invoked the right to free expression “contained in international human rights 
instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 
19(2).”73 In Tajjour, the High Court unanimously determined that the statutory provision in 
question was not invalid because of inconsistency with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. The Court affirmed that “the provisions of an international treaty to 
which Australia is a party do not form part of Australian law unless those provisions have 
been validly incorporated into Australian municipal law.”74 
 
A second theme in submissions to the Harper Review concerned the information effects of 
secondary boycotts and boycotts affecting international trade. This is, essentially, a utilitarian 
argument. A coalition of seven prominent NGO’s stated an objection of principle to “any 
attempt to narrow the capacity of organisations and individuals to provide the public with 
information about harmful corporate practices” and contended that “markets-based 
campaigns … serve the important public function of free provision of information”.75 The 
animal protection group Voiceless argued secondary boycotts “provide valuable information 
to consumers, allowing them to consciously make a decision to purchase products that are 
consistent with their ethical stance,” that the exemption “ensures transparency and 
accountability within the consumer market” and that “consumers rely on third party 
assessments and commentaries to make their consumer decisions”.76 ANEDO cautioned that 
“without s 45DD … s 45D has the potential to prevent … the free flow of information, 
political or otherwise, that promotes the transparency and accountability of organisations 
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trading in Australia.
77
 ALHR conceded that “the dissemination of particular information by 
activists may have the effect of reducing consumer demand for certain goods and services” 
but argued “by constraining the capacity of individuals and organisations to inform other 
consumers about the environmental and social implications of their purchases, the anti-
boycott provisions work against the efficient functioning of the market”.78  
 
None of these submissions saw a distinction between the application of primary and 
secondary boycotts. Though it appears from their submissions that NGOs would consider any 
limitation on methods within the arsenal of campaign tactics as retrograde, it was unclear 
why the feared loss of desired information effects would occur under circumstances where 
primary boycotts are permissible, and in view of the continuing ability of activist groups to 
disseminate information on issues via other measures. If Parliament were to abolish s 
45DD(3), NGO boycott campaigns would still be run, social media would still be actively 
utilised and information on environmental and other social issues would continue to be freely 
exchanged. Rather than bringing an end to political discourse, the probable consequence of 
any dilution of the s 45DD(3) exemption would be an imperative upon campaigning groups 
to proceed with greater caution in designing actions. This could potentially serve to 
encourage less confrontational dynamics and inhibit the “shoot first, ask questions later” 
instinct. 
 
A third set of submissions argued a lack of necessity for regulation of boycott conduct under 
competition law, in view of the adequacy of tort law.
79
 According to ALHR “in Australia the 
law of defamation already provides sufficient protection to businesses that consider they have 
been the subject of inaccurate criticism”.80 This viewpoint must reflect a conviction that 
defamation protection should not be available to business interests: Australia’s uniform 
defamation laws by means of their definition of the concept of an “excluded corporation”81 
prevent for-profit corporations suing in defamation unless they employ less than ten persons. 
The modern Australian law in this area stands in contrast with the pre-existing common law 
position
82
 which recognised “an entrenched right of all corporations to sue for damage done 
to their trading reputations, regardless of size.”83 
 
Another group of arguments for the retention of s 45DD(3) ventured that “removal or dilution 
of the exemption … would go against the intention of the legislature when it originally 
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enacted the exemption,”84 that immunity from secondary boycott laws had been effectively 
settled in 1996 and that “it was a Coalition Government that reintroduced secondary boycott 
provisions into the Trade Practices Act including the s 45DD exception.” 85  However, 
Australian legislators today are unlikely to feel constrained by the outcome of decades-old 
debates. In determining the permissible boundaries of economic coercion, Parliament acts 
based upon political balances at a given point in time, reflecting then-prevalent community 
attitudes.
86
 
 
In weighing the arguments raised in favour of s 45DD(3), it is important to bear in mind the 
benefits that have resulted from proliferation of the transnational NGO sector, which – as was 
noted in Chapter Eight above – have been widely celebrated in the academic literature.87 
Activism involves deliberate disturbance of the status quo in order to achieve certain ends, 
especially social and political ends. Activist conduct often collides with established political 
and economic interests and legally enshrined protections. 
 
 
C Pro-Business Arguments and the Case for “Case-by-Case” 
 
The regulatory settings for the non-profit sector have been characterised by an assumption of 
virtue, with groups perceived to be “invested with an ethical quality that places them beyond 
mere utilitarian concerns”88 and having “a general willingness to play by the rules of the 
game even when the umpire is not watching”. 89  Goodin characterises non-profits as 
“voluntary organizations lacking any coercive powers”90 while Jepson sees the special nature 
of the sector as based around “public trust … built on the cumulative evidence of 
legitimacy.”91 In recognition of their perceived moral character and positive contribution to 
societal welfare and the “non-distribution constraint” which distinguishes them from for-
profit corporations,
92
 non-profits have benefited from public fiscal subsidies and been subject 
to relatively light-handed regulation, with an emphasis on self-governance mechanisms. 
‘Campaign-oriented’ NGOs have benefited from these settings. 
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However, there is an increasing body of information which gives cause to question whether, 
in the case of activist groups committed to the achievement of societal change, ‘virtue’ 
should be automatically presumed.
93
 Several submissions made to the Harper Review by pro-
business lobbies urging repeal of the s 45DD(3) exemption were in this vein. 
 
The Australian Forest Products Association submission made reference to “direct market 
interference activities by increasingly sophisticated environmental activist groups and 
individuals” and asserted that the s 45DD(3) “loophole” is open to abuse and unethical 
behaviour by some groups and individuals.
94
 Other submissions gave emphasis to the 
significant advances that have occurred since 1996 in the impact of activist campaigns, noting 
that the capabilities of campaign-oriented NGOs have increased considerably as a result of 
access to private and public funding, advances in information technology and realisation of 
the power of coordinated transnational campaigning. A submission to the Harper Review by 
the consultancy ITS Global referred to specific examples of market distortions resulting from 
the actions of campaign-oriented NGOs and “advocacy campaigns that are aimed not merely 
at encouraging consumer-level protest and political advocacy against specific businesses or 
industries that it considers objectionable, but also protests against businesses that supply or 
purchase from these industries, from financiers to wholesale customers.”95 
 
ITS Global noted that some NGOs “are now large and sophisticated organisations that have 
offices in numerous countries, staff numbering in the thousands, and can draw on significant 
resources and funding from both private and public funds.”96 
 
The extent of the ambition and transformational potential of contemporary environmental and 
social movements is conveyed by the work of Waddell, who detailed aspirations for “Global 
Action Networks” of activists extending to such themes as “changing the logic of finance” 
and “transforming forestry:”97 
 
Global Action Networks build visions of how things can be different and create the necessary 
capacity to go about making them different. This usually means changing rules, procedures, laws, 
and values … a GAN aims to reach the ‘tipping point’ where organizations will no longer be 
considered ‘legitimate’ and will be denied opportunities if they don’t follow the new rules and 
integrate the values.
98
 
 
For Australia as a trading nation, the potential economic significance of the development of 
sophisticated transnational campaign networks (if they are successfully executed) is 
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considerable. The sophisticated nature of modern-day campaigns is illustrated by a 2012 
document developed by a coalition of NGOs and donors titled “Stopping the Australian Coal 
Export Boom – Funding proposal for the Australian anti-coal movement.”99 This detailed a 
strategy for “gradually eroding public and political support for the industry”100 built around 
six elements: disrupt and delay key infrastructure; constrain the space for mining; increase 
investor risk; increase costs (for the coal sector); withdraw the social license of the coal 
industry; and build a powerful movement.
101
 Under the heading “Campaign outcome – what 
does ‘winning’ look like?” the proposal says “by disrupting and delaying key projects we are 
likely to make at least some of them unviable … we can delay most if not all of the port 
developments by at least a year, if not considerably longer”.102 
 
Examples such as these raise questions about the suitability of a generalised test of ‘dominant 
purpose’ as the basis for an exemption for boycott conduct, and suggest that case-by-case 
assessment of public benefit may be a more appropriate mechanism. Implicit in the logic that 
has underpinned s 45DD(3) has been the notion that the actions of activist groups which have 
a dominant purpose of environmental or consumer protection will lead inexorably (or at least, 
usually) to improved societal welfare. However, as Maxwell stated, the extent to which 
benefits, in economic terms, are delivered by activist campaigns is contentious: 
 
The most important question for policy economists is, do NGOs seek changes that on balance 
benefit society as a whole, or do they pursue narrowly defined environmental and social goals that 
may bring a level of harm to some sections of society (eg industry, consumers who care about 
low-cost products) that may outweigh the benefits brought about by their actions? If an NGO 
pursues the former objective, then economists would say that the NGO seeks to raise social 
welfare. If the latter, economists would tend to label it as perhaps one of many special interest 
groups.
103
 
 
Such sentiments evoke the rationale for prohibitions of secondary boycotts articulated by the 
Swanson Committee nearly 40 years ago: 
 
… no section of the community should be entitled to be the judge in its own cause on matters 
directly aimed at interfering with the competitive process between firms … If an organisation or 
group of persons for its own reasons deliberately interferes with the competitive process, then the 
community is entitled to have those reasons scrutinised by a body independent of the persons 
engaged in the dispute.
104
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VII. RURAL EXPORT: THE DIFFICULTIES WITH A DOMINANT 
PURPOSE TEST 
The application of s 45DD(3) presents a combination of technical legal and practical 
difficulties. The first is the absence of definition of key terms upon which the exemption 
depends. A second is the peculiarity of requiring Courts to apply a two-step analytical 
process to discern the purposes motivating the conduct of parties to a boycott. A third 
practical difficulty is the challenge faced by an applicant for relief in adducing evidence of 
the purpose of boycotters, coupled with a lack of clarity as to who bears the onus of proof 
when the exemption is claimed. Fourth, there is a need to address an important question of 
policy: should illegality be condoned or tolerated? The conclusion of the analysis below is 
that the provision is flawed and there is work to be done if the Harper Review objective of 
rendering the law as “clear, simple and predictable as it could be”105 is to be delivered upon. 
 
A The Rural Export Case 
 
The leading case on s 45DD(3), Rural Export, concerned the actions of a group of animal 
rights activists, members of Animal Liberation SA Inc., who entered into a sheep feed 
paddock in Portland, Victoria where some 1,700 sheep were being held prior to export to the 
Middle East. The activists placed pig meat into feed troughs, adding it to feed pellets which 
had been provided for the sheep. The respondent, Hahnheuser, made a video of the 
contamination of the feed and, the next day, issued a press release and participated in a series 
of media interviews about the actions taken. He explained that the contamination of the feed, 
by adding ham, was designed to prevent any exported animals meeting Halal requirements, 
rendering them unsuitable for Muslim consumers in the Middle East. Australian Government 
officials refused a permit for the export of the animals, and the owners of the sheep suffered 
losses estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
106
 
 
At first instance in the Federal Court,
107
 Hahnheuser was found to have engaged “in conduct 
for the purpose … of preventing or substantially hindering [the applicant] from engaging in 
trade or commerce involving the movement of goods between Australia and places outside 
Australia,” contravening s 45DB(1). However, Gray J ruled that the s 45DD(3) defence was 
established because the activist’s purpose of preventing cruelty to animals came within the 
exemption and therefore the dominant purpose of the conduct was environmental protection. 
It was reasoned that the protection of sheep from suffering (which Hahnheuser perceived they 
would undergo if shipped to the Middle East) was within the meaning of the term 
“environmental protection” as used in ss 45DD(3). In disallowing the sheep owner’s 
application for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, His Honour said: “All that a 
subjective dominant purpose requires is that the person holding it have a belief that such 
protection is necessary. Plainly, on the evidence in this case, Mr Hahnheuser had such a 
belief.”108 
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This decision was reversed on appeal. The Full Federal Court
109
 concluded that the concept 
of “environmental protection” did not extend as far as had been found at first instance.110 
Submissions made on behalf of the appellants to the effect that the primary judge’s reasoning 
on dominant purpose involved “a syllogism” were acknowledged. The syllogism was said to 
be: “First, sheep were part of the environment. Secondly, sheep needed protection from the 
cruelty and suffering of being transported by ship. Thirdly, it followed that the protection of 
sheep from such treatment was environmental protection.”111 
 
 
B Lack of Definition of Key Terms 
 
The first key difficulty faced in applying s 45DD(3) is the Parliament’s omission, when the 
provision was enacted in 1996, to provide definitions of key terms. The Full Court noted in 
Rural Export that “environmental protection” as an expression was not defined in any 
available dictionary,
112
 so the Court found itself in the position of needing to discern meaning 
from a conjoining of the independent words “environmental” and “protection”. Accordingly, 
it was open to the Court at first instance to adopt an interpretation of the scope of the defence 
which was highly sympathetic to the respondent animal rights activists, and which in all 
probability exceeded the intentions of Parliament. The position ultimately adopted by the Full 
Court accords more closely with Creighton’s view: ss 45D and 45DA were “introduced for 
the express purpose of outlawing secondary boycott activity, and it would be inconsistent 
with that objective to provide a defence in other than an exceedingly narrow range of 
cases.”113 
 
In Rural Export, the Full Federal Court identified the risk of uncontrolled construction that 
can arise if the test in the section is applied with reference to a subjective dominant purpose: 
 
‘Environmental protection’ cannot be simply what the person seeking to invoke s 45DD(3) 
believes to be the dominant purpose for which he or she engages in the conduct. That would 
permit the person’s subjective belief to define conclusively the scope of the statutory provision.
114
 
 
The Full Court preferred the following approach to determination of the scope of the defence: 
 
There must be an objective element in a dominant purpose substantially related to environmental 
protection which characterises what is relied upon by the person, in fact, as ‘environmental 
protection’.
115
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Another area of ambiguity is the precise meaning of “dominant purpose” in the s 45DD(3) 
context, although guidance can be obtained from areas of law outside competition law. For 
example, as a result of the changes to the law of legal professional privilege occasioned by 
O’Reilly v Commissioner of the State Bank of Victoria116  and Esso Australia Resources Ltd v 
Commissioner of Taxation
117
 courts in Australia apply a dominant purpose test when 
determining whether solicitor communications have been made for the dominant purpose of 
seeking legal advice or for the purpose of existing or reasonably anticipated litigation. In 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless Services Ltd, the High Court defined the term 
“dominant purpose” in the context of legal professional privilege as “the ruling or prevailing, 
or most influential purpose”.118 Holmes J elaborated upon the notion of “dominant” in GSA 
Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable: 
 
Satisfying the court that advice or litigation was one of the purposes of the communication is 
insufficient; it must be shown that, as a matter of objective fact, that purpose ‘dominated’ the 
decision to make the relevant communication.
119
 
 
 
C Characterising Dominant Purpose as Substantially Related to Environmental or 
Consumer Protection 
 
A conceptual peculiarity of s 45DD(3) is the way it requires a kind of analytical two-step to 
isolate whether the dominant purpose underlying the conduct of boycotting parties relates to 
environmental protection or consumer protection. In a first stage of analysis, to establish 
contravention of one of the anti-boycott sections (45D, 45DA or 45DB), it is necessary to 
identify the presence of a purpose proscribed under those sections (of causing either 
substantial loss or damage or substantial lessening of competition, or hindering trade or 
commerce). But because the terminology then employed in the s 45DD(3) exemption places 
focus on the overlapping operative phrase “dominant purpose,” a further sharpening of the 
analysis is needed to determine whether the conduct should be excused on the basis of a 
relevant purpose determined to be “dominant.” 
 
The inquiries required to be made therefore necessitate the making of fine judgements: 
exactly how ‘dominant’ does the particular environmental or consumer protection purpose 
claimed as the basis for the s 45DD(3) exemption need to be; and does there need to be a 
single dominant purpose? 
 
Sophisticated modern-day NGO campaigns generally exhibit multiple purposes. 
Environmental and consumer advocacy groups may simultaneously pursue a range of 
activities involving complex, intertwined objectives, including the pragmatic functions of 
fundraising, organisational development, recruitment and reputation management together 
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with overt political objectives.
120
 Secondary boycott action may be intended to further some 
organisational, social or political objective of the boycotters themselves and boycotters rarely 
act independently of their own motivations.
121
 
 
While the ultimate or even the primary purpose of boycotters might be to achieve their own 
demands, it is clearly established that they can at the same time have the prohibited 
immediate purpose, which may be (for example) to cause substantial loss or damage. J-Corp 
Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federation Union of Workers, WA Branch
122
 
affirmed that “the relevant purpose may not be the ultimate purpose for which the participants 
acted in concert … the party applying the pressure may have the purpose proscribed … 
notwithstanding that this purpose is a means to a greater end.”123 
 
The substantive anti-boycott provisions acknowledge the likelihood of multiplicity of 
purposes. The operative provisions of both ss 45D(1) and 45DA(1) are buttressed by a 
following subsection (2), identically worded in both cases: “A person is taken to engage in 
conduct for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1) if the person engaged in the conduct for 
purposes that include that purpose.” To constitute a breach of those sections, the proscribed 
purpose need not be the only purpose of the conduct, nor even a substantial purpose. 
 
In Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v ABCE and BLF
124
 the plaintiff company sought 
orders against the Builders Labourers Federation following repeated entries by union 
representatives onto its building sites seeking to distribute pamphlets. Morling J determined 
that, while there was an industrial purpose behind the union officials’ actions, there was also 
a second purpose – to cause loss and damage to the plaintiff’s business. He held it was 
possible to infer from the evidence that the purposes behind the conduct included the purpose 
of causing substantial loss or damage to the applicant’s business”.125 
 
Similarly, in Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd v Amalgamated Milk Vendors Association Inc, a 
“primary purpose” of milk vendors who had enacted a supply ban on the appellant “was to 
protect their own businesses” but “another purpose which they had was to damage or injure” 
the appellant’s business: “that was the means by which they intended to achieve their primary 
purpose … that is enough.”126 
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D Establishing the Purpose 
 
A third and practical difficulty in the application of s 45DD(3) is the challenge faced by 
plaintiff companies of locating and adducing sufficient evidence to establish that boycotters 
have a prohibited purpose.
127
 The evidence necessary to be disclosed in order to ascertain 
purpose is invariably in the possession of the party seeking to rely on the exemption. Whilst 
the person whose conduct is complained of might be considered to be in the best position to 
give evidence as to his or her dominant purpose, the nature of that person’s evidence may be 
affected by the fact it might exculpate him or her from liability. 
 
J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federation Union of Workers, WA Branch
128
 
shows the importance of fully probing individual representatives of boycotting groups as to 
their individual and organisational objectives, with the benefit of discovered material. In that 
case the court stated “where purpose or other state of mind of an individual in relation to a 
given transaction is an issue, the statements of that person in the witness box, in a sense, 
provide the best evidence.”129 Nevertheless, statements made must be tested and treated with 
appropriate scepticism.
130
 
 
Inquiry into the purposes of an environmental activist group in conducting a boycott-based 
campaign would be expected to involve detailed review of available strategy documents and 
correspondence relating to the activities of the boycotters. However, this can prove 
problematic if Courts are reluctant to permit discovery of key documents deemed confidential 
to defendants. It was mentioned in Chapter Eight of this thesis that in Gunns Limited & Ors v 
Marr & Ors
131
 a case involving tortious actions for intentional interference with contractual 
relations, intentional injury to trade and business and trespass, the defendant Wilderness 
Society successfully resisted disclosure of parts of documents which concerned its 
campaigns, tactics, strategies and operations. Kaye J declined to order disclosure of a 
document titled “Draft Strategy for Gunns Market Campaign – Background” and various 
travel records, reasoning that the breadth of orders sought by the plaintiff was excessively 
broad. Reliance was placed on an affidavit sworn by an activist involved in the campaign to 
the effect that significant damage and irreparable harm would be caused to the Wilderness 
Society if it was required to disclose the documents sought. 
 
Organisations which arrange boycotts take active steps to minimise the risk of suit. If 
globally coordinated boycotts involve multiple parties located internationally, the search for 
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key documents can be complicated by the wide geographical dispersal of networks. Quite 
rationally, the coordinators of environmentally-based boycotts are at pains to manage, and 
minimise, their paper trails, in order to make themselves the smallest possible targets. The 
nature of the current statutory exemption invites a calculated approach to documentation 
management.
132
 
 
A further ambiguity attaching to s 45DD(3) is lack of certainty about the way in which the 
onus of proof should operate when applying the exemption. At first instance in Rural Export, 
it was concluded that an applicant for relief under s 45DB(1) – in this case, the sheep owner – 
had to negate the existence of the dominant purpose referred to in s 45DD(3).
133
 This 
interpretation would have the quite challenging consequence for a party affected by a boycott 
action that if plausible arguments were made that the boycott action was motivated by a 
dominant purpose of environmental or consumer protection, the ability to claim relief under s 
45DB(1) – or s 45D(1) or 45DA(1) – would be lost. 
 
In its judgement in Rural Export the Full Court stated a tentative view that it would be 
necessary for the respondent to an application to discharge the burden of proving that he or 
she fell within the exemption provided by s 45DD(3).
134
 However, their Honours emphasised 
that, based on their other findings to the effect that the respondent Hahnheuser did not have 
the dominant purpose required by s 45DD(3), it was not necessary for them to determine 
whether the primary judge erred in his construction of the burden of proof. Consequently, the 
precise nature of the onus of proof in s 45DD(3) matters remains unresolved. 
 
 
E Condoning Illegal Acts? 
 
A final difficulty in the application of s 45DD(3) is that it fails to address a key question of 
policy: should illegality be condoned or tolerated? Whilst it is important not to overstate their 
prevalence, activities associated with protest campaigns may include trespass, the breaking of 
locks and fences to gain access to property, graffiti and other property destruction, 
‘hacktivism’, interference with police actions and pressure for economic disruptions such as 
blockades and embargoes. Assertive forms of ‘direct action’ (including violent tactics which 
utilise physical injurious force against persons or property) are sometimes employed.
135
 In its 
                                                                
132
 See the “hints for record keeping” contained in the ‘Bush Lawyers’ Guide to Avoiding Being Sued’ viewable 
at http://users.senet.com.au/~gregogle/ (Accessed 8 June 2014). See also Campaigning and the Law in NSW: A 
Guide to Your Rights and Responsibilities published by the Environmental Defender’s Office (NSW) in January 
2010 - 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/edonsw/pages/794/attachments/original/1382659533/Campaigning_and
_the_Law_in_NSW_2010.pdf?1382659533 (Accessed 16 February 2015). 
133
 Rural Export and Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser (2007) 243 ALR 356 at [65] – [68], per Gray J. 
134
 Rural Export and Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser (2008) 249 ALR 445 at [38] – [42]. Their Honours 
referenced the general rule of statutory construction stated by Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto 
JJ in Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 at 519-20 to the effect that a party seeking to rely on an 
exemption carries the onus of demonstrating, on the balance of probabilities, the additional or special matter 
relied upon (in this case, the dominance of purpose). 
135
 Commentary often draws a distinction between ‘non-violent direct action’ and ‘violent direct action.’ In a 
2010 publication, the British Ministry of Justice expressed concern at potential for the latter conduct, using the 
term “environmental extremists” to describe groups and individuals committing “criminal activity motivated by 
the broad philosophy and social movement centred on a concern for conservation and improvement of the 
Chapter Nine: Exempting Environmental Protection Boycotts from Competition Laws 
221 
 
submission to the Harper Review, Australia’s National Farmers Federation expressed alarm 
at the potential for “agri-terrorism.”136 
 
In placing emphasis on ‘purpose’ rather than the nature of actual conduct, s 45DD(3) has the 
characteristic that it can provide a shelter for illegal activities. This was, in effect, the 
outcome of the Rural Export decision at first instance. It is as true today as it was in the 
1980s to state that “not only is the lawfulness or otherwise of the means employed irrelevant 
for purposes of establishing the existence of a contravention of s 45D, it is also irrelevant for 
the purposes of establishing the existence of a defence.”137 
 
A different approach, involving the ‘carving out’ of illegality, was in place in the regulation 
of Australian secondary boycotts from 1996 to 1998 by virtue of s 166A of the Workplace 
Relations Act (Cth). This set out a limitation on the bringing of actions in tort against trade 
unions, with a rider that the protection did not apply to conduct that resulted in personal 
injury or wilful or reckless damage to property. Modification of the current statute to include 
a similar rider could be considered. 
 
More stringent approaches to questions of illegality can be identified under the CCA’s 
Authorisation processes and at common law, within the economic torts and in the regulation 
of charities. In each of these areas of law, safeguards against illegality have been embedded. 
For instance, in conducting Authorisation applications, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) is specifically required to take into account whether conduct 
which is proposed to be authorised exhibits illegality.
138
 
 
The occurrence of unlawful conduct is also a key consideration under charities laws which 
govern the eligibility of activist NGOs for taxation and other fiscal benefits. The 
consequences of registered environmental groups being associated with illegality were placed 
in focus in Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated
139
, in which the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand considered whether an organisation’s involvement in illegal activities should affect 
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its entitlement to registration as a charitable entity. The Court affirmed the earlier decision of 
the Court of Appeal of New Zealand that “a society that pursues illegal or unlawful purposes 
or activities is not entitled to registration as a charitable entity under the [Charities] Act and 
that a registered society with lawful charitable purposes which pursues them through illegal 
or unlawful activities should lose its registration.”140 An appeal against the determination that 
activities that are illegal or unlawful preclude charitable status was dismissed. The reasoning 
was that illegal activity cannot be considered to be for the public benefit, nor charitable. 
 
The Court of Appeal had been referred to examples from Greenpeace’s website of “direct 
action” approaches, which included: 
 
… boarding coal ships; occupying power stations and mines; preventing the delivery of coal to a 
factory by blocking it with wood fuel; boarding fishing vessels; protesting against whaling ships; 
disrupting whaling operations; boarding ships carrying genetically engineered food; boarding 
ships carrying palm kernel; placing signs on sites believed to be contaminated with dioxin; and 
planting trees on land thought to have been cleared for dairy farming.
141
 
 
Similar forms of direct action have been employed in Australia: 
We have blocked train lines, occupied Lucas Heights, trespassed at the Lodge, and illegally raised 
banners at Parliament house… this history of civil disobedience is part of a much bigger history of 
individuals and organisations prepared to violate the law.
142
 
 
A review of reportage in Australian media suggests no lack of recent examples of unlawful 
activities undertaken in connection with environmentally motivated boycott campaigns.
143
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VIII. AUTHORIZATION AND PUBLIC BENEFIT 
If s 45DD(3) were to be repealed and not replaced by an alternative exemption, the “safety 
valve”  for conduct that would otherwise breach the secondary boycott provisions would be 
the existing (but largely dormant) authorization process under s 88(7) of the CCA. This 
provides: 
 
The Commission may … grant an authorization … to engage in conduct to which s.45D, 45DA or 
45DB would or might apply and, while such an authorization remains in force, that section does 
not apply in relation to the engaging in that conduct by the applicant and by any person acting in 
concert with the applicant. 
 
The basis for authorization is elaborated by s 90(8): 
 
The Commission shall not (a) make a determination granting … (ii) an authorization under 
subsection 88(7) … in respect of proposed conduct … unless it is satisfied in all the circumstances 
that the proposed … conduct would result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to the public that 
… the proposed conduct should be allowed to take place. 
 
The CCA does not define what constitutes ‘benefit to the public’. It is a seemingly nebulous 
concept,
144
 but in seeking to discern it the ACCC has developed comprehensive 
methodologies. A ‘future-with-and-without’ test is generally applied.145 Usually, a “consumer 
welfare standard” has been upheld146 though Fallon has argued for the more general adoption 
of a “total welfare standard” approach,147 where all efficiencies can be treated as public 
benefits, with prominence given to overall economic efficiency. 
 
Application of these tests requires a weighing of public benefits and detriments: authorization 
cannot be granted unless the ACCC determines that conduct has public benefits which 
outweigh its detriments.
148
 In Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, a case concerning authorization of 
a merger, it was said: 
 
Public benefit has been, and is, given a wide ambit by the Tribunal as … ‘anything of value to the 
community generally, any contribution to the aims pursued by the society including as one of its 
principal elements (in the context of trade practices legislation) the achievement of the economic 
goals of efficiency and progress’. Plainly, the assessment of efficiency and progress must be from 
the perspective of society as a whole; the best use of society’s resources. We bear in mind that (in 
the language of economics today) efficiency is a concept that is usually taken to encompass 
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‘progress’; and that commonly efficiency is said to encompass allocative efficiency, production 
efficiency and dynamic efficiency.
149
 
 
Activist groups are significant players in arranging boycotts and yet, as Maxwell highlighted, 
there is a relative paucity of economics literature on NGO behaviour. The function of 
understanding the objectives of NGOs (and actions they take to advance them) is 
undeveloped by the standards of economic theory.
150
 
 
There is a school of thought that the way in which public benefit tests have been applied in 
Australia over time, with a focus on “efficiency above all else”151 reflects a general failing of 
the economics discipline.
152
  Under this view there has been a failure to appreciate “that other 
considerations such as efficacy or equality may be equally or more important than efficiency” 
and that social constructivist approaches which “capture the cultural and cognitive realities of 
a society better” are to be preferred.153 
 
Fels and Grimwade suggested that the continuing relevance of the authorization process 
depends upon application by the Commission of a “net public benefit test that is broad 
enough to accommodate new public benefit arguments and economic and social changes”.154 
Brunt also recognised the potential for authorization to be granted “to address broader social 
values”.155 Although critics would argue that it has adapted too slowly and conservatively to 
changes in community standards, the ACCC has shown itself to be somewhat adaptive in the 
way it applies tests of public benefit, and cognisant of changes in community standards. As 
long ago as 1991, the Commission listed “steps to protect the environment” as items which 
could be considered to constitute public benefit.
156
 
 
Over the past two decades it has been unnecessary to exercise the s 88(7) authorization 
process in connection with matters covered by s 45DD(3), so the extent to which the ACCC 
would be likely to receive favourably applications based on environmental or social grounds 
is an unknown. However, clearly one obstacle activist groups seeking to mount public benefit 
arguments would face is that it is not enough for a benefit to be speculative or a theoretical 
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possibility.
157
 There must be a real chance that claimed public benefits will eventuate
158
 and 
they should not be merely “ephemeral or illusory”.159 
 
A recurring issue is whether a private benefit that accrues to an applicant can also be seen as 
a benefit to the public.
160
 Fels and Grimwade described this as the private/public benefit 
debate.
161
 Viewed from the perspective of activists undertaking it, or the environmental 
movement generally, there may well be “benefit” to be derived from boycott conduct. Baron 
and Diermeier observe that the objectives of NGO campaigns include the funds raised and the 
career enhancement for individual activists resulting from the campaign and that “a campaign 
may be viewed as a local public good for those citizens sympathetic to the activist’s 
cause.”162 Based on its past approach it is unlikely the ACCC would recognise such benefits 
as a sufficient basis for an exemption. It can be assumed that “benefit to the public” would be 
interpreted as referring to the public as a whole, rather than just a section of it likely to 
benefit from a particular campaign. 
 
In the past, a complication of use of s 88(7) in relation to secondary boycotts brought by trade 
unions was seen to be “the spontaneous character of most industrial action,” with 
authorization therefore viewed as “too unresponsive to short-term needs”.163 This concern can 
be argued to be not applicable to boycotts in pursuit of environmental and social objects, 
which by their nature are rarely spontaneous but planned over an extended period. 
 
A consequence of the repeal of s.45DD(3) would be the need for the ACCC to refine its 
approach to determination of public benefit to take better account of environmental and social 
considerations in the context of s 88(7). The ACCC has begun to develop competency in 
areas of sustainability.
164
 Potential exists for development of a guideline to inform market 
players about factors which would be taken into account in the evaluation of applications for 
an authorization under this provision. 
 
Considerable ground-breaking work has been undertaken internationally exploring how best 
to assess sustainability initiatives in terms of competition law. Such work could inform 
development of a distinctive Australian approach. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers 
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and Markets (ACM) sees as relevant “what interest is served with the arrangement, how this 
interest can be defined in terms of economic and technological process and to what extent it 
relates to the associated restriction to competition”. The ACM view is that “solving a 
sustainability problem may result in welfare increases”165 but “not everything that is arranged 
collectively under the banner of sustainability actually benefits, on balance, consumer 
welfare”.166 
 
For groups engaged in the organisation of secondary boycotts, working through the process 
of obtaining an authorization would be considerably more time-consuming and arduous than 
simply relying on the s 45DD(3) exemption. Submissions to the Harper Review contended 
that the environmental and consumer exemption should be maintained “because it serves the 
public interest,”167 but an authorization process would require demonstration of the necessary 
benefits to substantiate this contention based on rigorous assessment processes. In view of the 
potential wide-ranging economic effects of modern-day boycott campaigns,
168
 legislators 
may consider this to be appropriate. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The contrasting perspectives presented above reflect an interplay between underlying 
rationales and changes in situational reality, principally the significant advances in the 
sophistication of environmental and social activism since 1996. On both sides of the debate, 
proponents and opponents refer to principles (of property rights, of utility, of freedom of 
expression and of human rights) to make their case. Crucial are the observations of Weinrib 
and Neyers
169
 that as right holders pursue their own ends there are limitations on their use in 
certain circumstances. 
 
This chapter has concluded that the exemption in s 45DD(3) of the CCA is flawed. It has 
found that the undefined and hard-to-interpret language of the section is susceptible to 
obfuscation and the precise purposes underlying activist conduct are difficult to ascertain. 
There are difficulties in the practical application of the provision, including in locating and 
adducing evidence and exercising the onus of proof. Overall, contrary to the objectives of the 
Harper Review of the CCA, the law is not as clear, simple and predictable as it could be. 
Furthermore, s.45DD(3) can provide a shelter for illegal activities. 
 
The chapter also reveals a strong case for basing any exemption on case-by-case assessment 
of public benefit, rather than a generalised test of dominant purpose. This can be achieved by 
a simple repeal of s 45DD(3), which would then bring into play the existing mechanisms of 
ss 88(7) and 90(8). Such an approach would place focus on conduct and its effects, not 
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purpose, in determining whether to exempt proscribed boycott actions from the general 
provisions of the CCA. 
 
The conduct under scrutiny would be secondary and trade-affecting boycotts, not primary 
boycotts. The need for scrutiny would arise in the circumstances defined in ss 45D(1), 
45DA(1) and 45DB(1) – for instance, where boycotters act in concert against a targeted party, 
cause actual damage to that party and can be shown to have the purpose and effect of causing 
substantial loss or damage to the business of that party. 
 
The central conclusion of this chapter was encapsulated by Fels and Grimwade in 2003: 
 
A process through which exemptions are sought on a case-by-case basis, which is responsive to 
economic and social developments, that is independently administered, transparent and subject to 
merits review, and where the onus rests on those seeking to act anti-competitively to show that 
such behaviour is in the public interest remains the most appropriate means to exempt conduct.
170
 
 
If analysis of boycotts were to be focused on their public benefit effects, refinement of the 
ACCC’s existing approaches to determination of public benefit would be desirable, to give 
greater emphasis to environmental and social considerations and broaden the past 
predominant emphasis on economic factors. 
 
Policy deliberations on the issues canvassed in this chapter will influence the design and 
shape of future activist campaigns affecting Australian markets and consumers. As Weisbrod 
noted, any organisation’s decisions reflect the interplay of its goals and the constraints upon 
it
171
 and the regulatory environment can materially affect the conduct of groups engaged in 
the organisation of secondary boycotts. 
The anti-secondary boycott provisions of the CCA supplement the general economic torts as a 
set of remedies that are potentially available to those targeted by collective economic 
coercion. Consideration of these remedies is therefore a central aspect of this thesis. 
This concludes the substantive aspects of this study. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I.          INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter summarises the key research findings of this thesis. It highlights the significance 
of this research and its implications for legal practitioners, and for legal theory and the 
economic torts body of knowledge. These findings may prove to be useful for policy-makers. 
Some areas for further research are suggested, followed by some concluding observations. 
 
This thesis has explored the boundaries of permissible conduct when economic coercion is 
applied, by persons in groups and by groups acting in concert. The legal problem in focus is 
that of redress for collective economic pressure which causes loss or damage. When groups 
take collective action they can wield considerable power against those they target. This gives 
rise to the question of to what extent, and under what conditions, it should be legitimate for 
parties acting in concert to cause economic harm to a ‘target’. There needs to be a set of rules 
that articulate principles which set boundaries for permissible conduct, recognising also that – 
in certain circumstances – it may be considered legitimate for parties acting collectively to 
inflict economic harm upon targeted entities or individuals. 
 
This thesis has shown that tort law has traditionally protected economic, trading and property 
interests against intentional intrusion. The law upholds rights to pursue a trade, business or 
livelihood free of illegitimate forms of interference.
1
 These rights are not protected from all 
interferences, “but rather only those which are unreasonable.” 2  It is the role of law to 
determine demarcations when interests conflict. 
 
A balance needs to be struck between conflicting considerations. In contemporary society 
there can be tension between personal, organisational and institutional rights and interests on 
the one hand, and the legitimacy of motivations to promote social and attitudinal change on 
the other. Contests of interests also arise in the context of competitive rivalry. When conflicts 
arise between economic interests and competing liberties, such as freedom of expression or 
freedom of association, legal mechanisms must order and balance competing priorities. 
 
The principles developed by the common law through the medium of the economic torts, and 
under competition laws prohibiting secondary boycotts, address this need to balance 
competing interests. They set boundaries for permissible conduct, defend legitimate 
economic interests and should afford protection against unrestrained, or capricious, economic 
coercion by groups. The common law has shown itself to be remarkably agile in adapting 
principles to new contexts. 
 
This thesis has argued that the established principles which underpin the general economic 
torts have enduring relevance and can offer workable and coherent solutions to the legal 
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problems discussed in this study, albeit that there will be a need for ongoing adaptation to 
take account of societal trends and new contexts. 
 
It was shown in Chapters Four, Five and Six that the general economic torts can be 
approached from a range of different perspectives. One approach is to see the torts as 
potentially oppressive remedies, in need of control mechanisms, as Carty viewed them.
3
 
Another way is to start from the viewpoint that the torts serve as protectors of important 
rights, which has been the predominant perspective adopted in this thesis. 
 
In Chapter Four, it was contended that is important that the capacity of groups to apply 
economic coercion to others should not be unfettered; in particular, that the utilisation of 
unlawful means to injure others is restricted. As Chapter Two and Three demonstrated, one of 
the roles of the economic torts has been to provide private law remedies which sanction 
illegality. Thus, the notion of unlawful means is an integral element of inducing breach of 
contract, conspiracy by unlawful means, intimidation and the tort of causing loss by unlawful 
means (although, as has been seen, the concept operates differently across the various torts). 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that, whilst there is an acknowledged need for 
control mechanisms to restrict the boundaries of the general economic torts, the design of 
legal tests and exemptions should continue to address the need to proscribe illegality. 
 
Chapter Six of this thesis explained the considerations which have provided a rationale for 
the protection of economic interests under Australian law. These include the essential role 
that contract-making plays in our society,
4
 the commitment of courts to enforce promises 
which are a product of the private autonomy of individuals,
5
 inhibiting limitations on freedom 
to trade
6
 and addressing concern about the potentially high level of coercive pressure which 
can be applied by groups and collectives.
7
 It was concluded that common law protection of 
individual economic interests is vital to the free functioning of markets and the upholding of 
the freedoms which underpin individual autonomy. 
 
A likely implication of the adoption of measures advocated in this thesis (for example, a 
widening of definitions of unlawful means, or the reshaping of tests around intentionality and 
‘targeting’) is that groups acting collectively, such as networks of environmental activists, 
could face broadened liability exposure. This could potentially be offset by expanded 
justification defences and the adoption of statutory exemptions. 
 
As this thesis showed, the elements that make up the general economic torts and the factors 
that need to be weighed up to analyse their application, are complex and highly technical. 
There is value in reflecting on Heydon’s invocation, four decades ago, that there is potential 
for this area of law to be “much more based on factors of substance rather than technicality.”8 
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II.               SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The central Research Question posed at the outset of this thesis was: when groups, or 
individual members of groups, acting in concert, band together to inflict injury upon third 
parties by economic coercion, what are – and what should be – the boundaries of permissible 
conduct? 
 
A number of associated questions were also posed. When groups take collective action 
targeting another party, what forms of coercion are proscribed under Australian law? How 
has the law fashioned control mechanisms to confine the ambit of prohibitions? How does – 
and should – the law deal with the use of unlawful means and illegality in the context of 
collective economic coercion? Should justification defences be widened, and how might this 
be achieved? 
 
The major conclusions of this thesis, following an extensive review of the academic debates 
and judicial analysis, are as follows. 
 
First, the recent major common law developments concerning the general economic torts (in 
international jurisdictions) have not yet been authoritatively addressed by the High Court of 
Australia and as a result there is uncertainty as to how many aspects of the torts operate in 
Australia. In particular, there is a need to resolve for Australia the ‘competing agendas’ 
revealed by the analysis of the House of Lords in OBG and Total Network, and to clarify and 
achieve a more consistent application of the notion of ‘unlawful means’ as it applies to the 
torts. (Chapters Two and Three.) 
 
Second, it is difficult to anticipate the choices that may be made by the High Court on matters 
of detail when it eventually has the opportunity to deliberate upon and clarify, for Australia, 
the open questions which continue to bedevil the torts. (Chapters Two and Three). 
 
Third, there is a specific need for Australia’s High Court to affirm the existence in Australia 
of the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means, which would help to firmly 
establish the boundaries of permissible economic coercion. (Chapters Two, Three and Four).  
 
Fourth, the level of inconsistency in the formulation of the component elements of the torts 
is undesirable. In particular, highly differentiated approaches taken to interpretation of the 
concept of unlawful means under the various torts have the potential to impede their practical 
application, and raise questions about their coherence. (Chapters Two, Three and Four).  
 
Fifth, exclusion of criminal offences and breaches of statute from the ambit of the unlawful 
means tort undermines the aspiration, which is inherent in the economic torts generally, to 
inhibit clearly excessive and unacceptable intentional conduct?
9
 (Chapters Three and Seven.) 
 
Sixth, for the innominate tort of causing loss by unlawful means, a wide conception of 
unlawful means, encompassing unlawful acts under civil law, criminal law and statute, is 
preferable to a narrow interpretation. This reflects a view that intentionality and consideration 
of whether ‘targeting’ has occurred provide better control mechanisms for the economic torts 
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than a narrow conception of unlawful means. This outcome would accord more closely with 
the sentiments of Lord Nicholls in OBG and Lord Walker in Total Network than the majority 
view in OBG (most notably articulated by Lord Hoffmann) and the judgment of Cromwell J 
in A.I. Enterprises. The adoption of a wider view of unlawful means would also comfortably 
align with an expansion of justification defences. (These arguments were developed through 
Chapters Two, Three, Four, Seven and Eight).  
 
Seventh, an improved conceptual map for the economic torts is needed. The proposals of 
Deakin and Randall offer an effective starting point for their future development, based 
around consideration of interests, interferences and justifications. Their ideas have potential 
to be synchronised with those of theorists from the ‘rights model’ school, such as Weinrib 
and Stevens. (Chapters Four and Six).  
 
Eighth, it is undesirable to approach the general economic torts from a starting-point that 
they need to be inhibited as a matter of policy. There is a strong case for accepting corrective 
justice theory as the explanation for liability under these torts. This may give rise to a 
preference for determining cases based on considerations of justice between the parties to a 
particular dispute, rather than a policy-based approach which would emphasise broad 
community welfare concerns. There is scope for courts to determine matters after evaluation 
of the respective rights of the claimant and defendant. Analysis of rights should be a core 
component of judicial evaluation of the application of these torts. (Chapters Five and Six).  
 
Ninth, there is potential for the development of new approaches, grounded in refinements of 
intermediate theories, under which the torts could be developed with primary reference to 
correlative considerations of justice between the claimant and defendant, but also take into 
account public interest considerations. This will require courts to be involved in the balancing 
of competing rights and interests. (Chapters Five and Six). 
 
Tenth, rather than ad hoc statutory interventions to create special categories of exemptions 
for specific contexts and particular interest groups, it would be preferable for a wider suite of 
common law justifications to be developed. Evolution of the common law, with its potential 
to establish generalised principles, can produce better outcomes than piecemeal statutory 
interventions addressing specific contexts There are sufficient wellsprings of authority in the 
common law (both in England and Australia) to enable an enlivening of the justification 
defences, and the obstacles to the development of the defences erected by existing precedents 
can be overcome. Expanded and more clearly delineated justification defences can play an 
important role in cataloguing the forms of pressure or interference with the rights of others 
that are legitimate. (These arguments were built through Chapters Six, Seven and Eight).  
 
Eleventh, the future evolution of the general economic torts is likely to be affected by the 
context of environmental activism, a relatively new frontier for the torts, and it is likely there 
will be ongoing pressure to create statutory exemptions in favour of activist groups in this 
arena. (Chapter Eight).  
 
Twelfth, purpose-based statutory exemptions from general liability principles in favour of 
special interest groups (for example, those which exempt groups from liability for otherwise 
unlawful actions on the basis that actors had an ‘environmental purpose’) should be resisted. 
This has been argued in relation to both the economic torts and the secondary boycott 
provisions of Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act. Where proposals for statutory 
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reform seek to disrupt or take away traditional common law protections of rights, they should 
be grounded in, and incorporate tests of, public interest. (Chapters Eight and Nine).  
Thirteenth, where statutory exemptions are adopted which exempt conduct from the 
operation of the economic torts or prohibitions on secondary boycotts, there is a strong case 
for the deployment of case-by-case assessments of public benefit, which require balancing of 
a range of considerations to discern whether ‘public good’ is being enhanced, in preference to 
broad, purpose-based exemptions. (Chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine).  
 
Fourteenth, a refocusing on notions of public interest in the future evolution of the economic 
torts and anti-boycott provisions can be anticipated. There is a specific need for a more 
refined approach to determination of public benefit which gives greater emphasis to 
environmental and social considerations, in addition to addressing economic factors. 
(Chapters Eight and Nine).  
 
Overall, this thesis supports adjustments to current legal tests embedded within the common 
law and legislation, to evolve the boundaries of permissible conduct. It outlines modifications 
and adaptations of existing rules that may be considered by lawmakers to improve the 
coherence of long-established legal doctrines, while enhancing societal welfare. 
 
 
III.               SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS 
 
This thesis makes a contribution to legal theory by envisaging a mixed or intermediate theory 
applicable to the general economic torts. The potential approach (which was outlined in 
Chapters Five and Six) has three core components. First, economic tort litigation must 
involve the evaluation of the rights and interests at stake in a given dispute, consistent with 
the view that disputes should be determined with primary reference to considerations of 
justice between the claimant and the defendant. Second, stronger account should be taken of 
public interest considerations. Third, courts will be required to become involved, to a greater 
extent, in the weighing and balancing of competing rights and interests. 
 
Another significant contribution to legal theory is the detailed examination in the thesis of the 
possibility of expansion of the justification defences for the economic torts (in Chapters 
Seven and Eight). 
 
It is intended that this research will be useful for legal practitioners seeking to understand the 
economic torts and statutory prohibitions on secondary boycotts, as they apply in Australia. 
Courts may find that the insights set out in this thesis provide useful guidance in their conduct 
of litigation in these areas. This thesis has highlighted that there is a continuing need for the 
High Court of Australia to deliberate on a number of anomalies and open issues central to the 
application of these torts. The precise status of some key causes of action is still to be settled 
by the High Court. The research may also prove to be of value to those involved in public 
policy debates and, ultimately, to policy-makers, albeit that many of the issues canvassed are 
politically contentious. However, is likely that there will be significant ongoing differences of 
viewpoint on a range of key issues before an enduring consensus is ultimately attained. 
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IV.               AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
A number of topics canvassed in this thesis as corollaries of the main conclusions warrant 
additional research. 
 
The thesis has advocated that, where proposals for statutory reform seek to disrupt or take 
away traditional common law protections of rights, they should be grounded in, and 
incorporate tests of, public interest or public benefit. However, the notion of public benefit 
has been shown to be imprecisely defined and highly contestable. 
 
The alternative mechanisms for applying tests of public interest have not been 
comprehensively explored in this thesis. In Chapter Eight, with reference to the creation of 
statutory exemptions to excuse environmental groups from the operation of the economic 
torts it was suggested that tests such as those that apply under New Zealand’s privacy laws, 
or in connection with the qualified privilege defence under Australia’s uniform defamation 
laws, could be employed. In Chapter Nine, in connection with secondary boycott 
prohibitions, it was proposed that advantage could be taken of existing public benefit 
exemptions under the Competition and Consumer Act, although it was acknowledged that 
refinement of the existing approaches used by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission in determining public benefit would be desirable – to give greater emphasis to 
environmental and social considerations and broaden the past predominant focus on 
economic factors. In each case there is scope for, indeed a need for, further research to be 
undertaken to evaluate and elucidate the ways in which tests of public benefit could be best 
applied and elaborated. 
It was also noted – in Chapters Eight and Nine – that transparency mechanisms for 
environmental activist groups are, at this stage, relatively undeveloped. It was suggested there 
that the new dynamics of activism are little understood, that past assumptions about the 
relative strengths of opposed groups may need to be revisited, that accountability lines are 
blurred and that the spectrum of opinions resembles the debates that raged over trade union 
activities in the twentieth century, until a settled consensus began to emerge about the 
appropriate outer limit of unions’ permissible actions when operating collectively.10 It can 
reasonably be anticipated that transparency mechanisms comparable to those that now exist 
under Australia’s industrial relations regime should, and in due course will, be developed for 
the environmental movement and that such disciplines are a desirable corollary of significant 
collective activity. If such mechanisms were to exist, concern about the need to access the 
disciplining effect of private law solutions might subside. Further research in this area might 
occur within the framework of broader debates about governance mechanisms for not-for-
profit organisations generally,
11
 and environmental NGOs in particular.
12
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V.               CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
This thesis has shown the considerable potential that exists in Australia for further refinement 
of the general economic torts. As debates progress about the degree of licence that should be 
granted to groups acting collectively, it is clear that laws such as the general economic torts 
and the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act which inhibit secondary boycotts 
have important ongoing roles to play. These legal remedies serve to discipline, and place 
necessary boundaries around, the application of economic coercion by groups acting in 
concert. They have enduring importance. 
The general economic torts are durable remedies in search of a settled framework. They 
would be strengthened if greater doctrinal coherence were achieved, if the continuing 
uncertainties which bedevil the operation of the economic torts in Australia were settled by 
the High Court, if evaluation of the rights at stake in a given contest could be more firmly 
embedded in judicial analysis and if expanded and more clearly delineated justification 
defences taking account of public benefit considerations were developed. This thesis has 
argued for a conception of the torts which takes a wide view of unlawful means placing 
emphasis on ‘targeting’, accompanied by a clearer articulation of the principles underpinning 
justification defences. 
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